24CA1989 Lynne v Smith 08-14-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1989 Larimer County District Court No. 23CV30199 Honorable Stephen J. Jouard, Judge
Stacy Lynne,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Justin Smith,
Defendant-Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE GRAHAM* Tow and Yun, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced August 14, 2025
Stacy Lynne, Pro Se
Reynolds Gillette LLC, Brian R. Reynolds, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant- Appellee
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. ¶1 Plaintiff, Stacy Lynne, appeals the district court’s entry of
summary judgment on July 25, 2024, in favor of defendant, Justin
Smith. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 This case arises out of Lynne’s claims against Smith for
defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)
based on two separate statements he posted on Facebook.
¶3 In March 2022, John Feyen ran for the position of Larimer
County Sheriff. That month, Lynne filed suit against Feyen alleging
various instances of wrongdoing related to an incident that
occurred over a decade earlier when Feyen apprehended her.
¶4 On March 18, 2022, Smith, who was a supporter of Feyen and
the Larimer County Sheriff at the time, wrote on Facebook:
I am disappointed that desperate political games have begun. I am referring to the 11th hour lawsuit filed by self-proclaimed journalist Ms. Lynn[e] against one of the sheriff candidates in the race, attempting to smear numerous upstanding members of [the Larimer County Sheriff’s Office] relating to a case that was long ago dismissed.
1 ¶5 Smith also compared Lynne’s suit to another instance when a
different journalist made “completely false allegations” to influence
the outcome of an election.
¶6 On June 11, 2022, Smith posted more specifically about
Lynne’s previous arrest and how the charges against her were
“appropriately dropped.”
¶7 In March 2023, Lynne filed this action against Smith, seeking
damages for defamation and IIED, which she alleged resulted from
Smith’s Facebook posts. After proceeding through significant
discovery, in March 2024, Smith filed a motion for summary
judgment. Smith argued that (1) his March 18, 2022, statement
was not defamatory or, alternatively, was constitutionally privileged
opinion; (2) his June 11, 2022 statement was not materially untrue;
(3) Lynne was unable to prove Smith acted with actual malice; and
(4) in the absence of defamation, Lynne’s IIED claim could not
proceed.
¶8 In July 2024, the court granted Smith’s motion, determining
that (1) the statements in the first post were constitutionally
protected opinion or rhetorical hyperbole and not defamatory;
(2) there was insufficient evidence to show that Smith knew with a
2 high degree of awareness that the statements in the second post
were false and that the “substance, the gist, the sting, of the
matter” was true; and (3) the posts were not outrageous conduct or
otherwise done recklessly with the intent of causing Lynne severe
emotional distress.
¶9 The court also denied Lynne’s motion for post-trial relief,
stating that Lynne had failed to establish that the summary
judgment was based on any irregularity, error of law, or failure to
consider proffered evidence, nor had she provided any new evidence
that would have changed the outcome.
¶ 10 In August 2024, Lynne filed a motion for sanctions against
Smith’s counsel, Brian Reynolds, alleging he had engaged in
misconduct throughout Smith’s representation. Although the court
stated that it had serious concerns that Reynolds had engaged in
misconduct, it declined to impose sanctions in the case, choosing
instead to refer the matter to the Office of Attorney Regulation
Counsel (OARC).1
1 Lynne included a copy of a letter from the OARC regarding this
matter in her briefing, which we struck because it contained material that is not part of the record on appeal in this matter.
3 II. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 11 C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(B) requires that an appellant’s brief contain a
“clear and concise discussion of the grounds upon which the party
relies in seeking a reversal or modification of the judgment.”
Appellate courts cannot “rewrite a pro se litigant’s pleadings” or act
as their advocate. Johnson v. McGrath, 2024 COA 5, ¶ 10. “We will
not consider a bald legal proposition presented without argument or
development. [The appellate brief] must inform the court both as to
the specific errors asserted and the grounds, supporting facts, and
authorities to support [the party’s] contentions.” Barnett v. Elite
Props. of Am., Inc., 252 P.3d 14, 19 (Colo. App. 2010) (citation
omitted). When a party fails to identify how the trial court erred, by
citing authority and supporting facts, we will not review the ruling.
Westrac, Inc. v. Walker Field, 812 P.2d 714, 718 (Colo. App. 1991).
¶ 12 “The Colorado Supreme Court . . . has exclusive jurisdiction
over attorneys and the authority to regulate, govern, and supervise
the practice of law in Colorado to protect the public.” Colo. Sup. Ct.
Grievance Comm. v. Dist. Ct., 850 P.2d 150, 152 (Colo. 1993).
Whether to impose sanctions and the nature of the sanctions to be
imposed are matters within the sound exercise of the district court’s
4 discretion. Newell v. Engel, 899 P.2d 273, 275 (Colo. App. 1994).
“[A] trial court necessarily abuses its discretion if it bases its ruling
on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous
assessment of the evidence.” People v. Segovia, 196 P.3d 1126,
1129 (Colo. 2008). Appellate courts can review ethical violations,
by an attorney, if they become intertwined with the litigation.
Murray v. Just In Case Bus. Lighthouse, LLC, 2016 CO 47M, ¶ 16.
¶ 13 We review a district court’s order granting summary judgment
de novo. Westin Operator, LLC v. Groh, 2015 CO 25, ¶19.
“Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of
material fact are disputed, and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Macomber v. Nations Roof, LLC, 2025
COA 59, ¶ 12; see C.R.C.P. 56(c). The movant bears the burden of
establishing that there are no disputed genuine issues of material
fact, and the party opposing summary judgment is entitled to the
benefit of all reasonable favorable inferences that may be drawn
from the facts. Univ. of Denver v. Doe, 2024 CO 27, ¶ 8.
¶ 14 We review a district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial
for an abuse of discretion. Rains v. Barber, 2018 CO 61, ¶ 8.
Under C.R.C.P. 59(d), a court may grant a new trial when the
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24CA1989 Lynne v Smith 08-14-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1989 Larimer County District Court No. 23CV30199 Honorable Stephen J. Jouard, Judge
Stacy Lynne,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Justin Smith,
Defendant-Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE GRAHAM* Tow and Yun, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced August 14, 2025
Stacy Lynne, Pro Se
Reynolds Gillette LLC, Brian R. Reynolds, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant- Appellee
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. ¶1 Plaintiff, Stacy Lynne, appeals the district court’s entry of
summary judgment on July 25, 2024, in favor of defendant, Justin
Smith. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 This case arises out of Lynne’s claims against Smith for
defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)
based on two separate statements he posted on Facebook.
¶3 In March 2022, John Feyen ran for the position of Larimer
County Sheriff. That month, Lynne filed suit against Feyen alleging
various instances of wrongdoing related to an incident that
occurred over a decade earlier when Feyen apprehended her.
¶4 On March 18, 2022, Smith, who was a supporter of Feyen and
the Larimer County Sheriff at the time, wrote on Facebook:
I am disappointed that desperate political games have begun. I am referring to the 11th hour lawsuit filed by self-proclaimed journalist Ms. Lynn[e] against one of the sheriff candidates in the race, attempting to smear numerous upstanding members of [the Larimer County Sheriff’s Office] relating to a case that was long ago dismissed.
1 ¶5 Smith also compared Lynne’s suit to another instance when a
different journalist made “completely false allegations” to influence
the outcome of an election.
¶6 On June 11, 2022, Smith posted more specifically about
Lynne’s previous arrest and how the charges against her were
“appropriately dropped.”
¶7 In March 2023, Lynne filed this action against Smith, seeking
damages for defamation and IIED, which she alleged resulted from
Smith’s Facebook posts. After proceeding through significant
discovery, in March 2024, Smith filed a motion for summary
judgment. Smith argued that (1) his March 18, 2022, statement
was not defamatory or, alternatively, was constitutionally privileged
opinion; (2) his June 11, 2022 statement was not materially untrue;
(3) Lynne was unable to prove Smith acted with actual malice; and
(4) in the absence of defamation, Lynne’s IIED claim could not
proceed.
¶8 In July 2024, the court granted Smith’s motion, determining
that (1) the statements in the first post were constitutionally
protected opinion or rhetorical hyperbole and not defamatory;
(2) there was insufficient evidence to show that Smith knew with a
2 high degree of awareness that the statements in the second post
were false and that the “substance, the gist, the sting, of the
matter” was true; and (3) the posts were not outrageous conduct or
otherwise done recklessly with the intent of causing Lynne severe
emotional distress.
¶9 The court also denied Lynne’s motion for post-trial relief,
stating that Lynne had failed to establish that the summary
judgment was based on any irregularity, error of law, or failure to
consider proffered evidence, nor had she provided any new evidence
that would have changed the outcome.
¶ 10 In August 2024, Lynne filed a motion for sanctions against
Smith’s counsel, Brian Reynolds, alleging he had engaged in
misconduct throughout Smith’s representation. Although the court
stated that it had serious concerns that Reynolds had engaged in
misconduct, it declined to impose sanctions in the case, choosing
instead to refer the matter to the Office of Attorney Regulation
Counsel (OARC).1
1 Lynne included a copy of a letter from the OARC regarding this
matter in her briefing, which we struck because it contained material that is not part of the record on appeal in this matter.
3 II. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 11 C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(B) requires that an appellant’s brief contain a
“clear and concise discussion of the grounds upon which the party
relies in seeking a reversal or modification of the judgment.”
Appellate courts cannot “rewrite a pro se litigant’s pleadings” or act
as their advocate. Johnson v. McGrath, 2024 COA 5, ¶ 10. “We will
not consider a bald legal proposition presented without argument or
development. [The appellate brief] must inform the court both as to
the specific errors asserted and the grounds, supporting facts, and
authorities to support [the party’s] contentions.” Barnett v. Elite
Props. of Am., Inc., 252 P.3d 14, 19 (Colo. App. 2010) (citation
omitted). When a party fails to identify how the trial court erred, by
citing authority and supporting facts, we will not review the ruling.
Westrac, Inc. v. Walker Field, 812 P.2d 714, 718 (Colo. App. 1991).
¶ 12 “The Colorado Supreme Court . . . has exclusive jurisdiction
over attorneys and the authority to regulate, govern, and supervise
the practice of law in Colorado to protect the public.” Colo. Sup. Ct.
Grievance Comm. v. Dist. Ct., 850 P.2d 150, 152 (Colo. 1993).
Whether to impose sanctions and the nature of the sanctions to be
imposed are matters within the sound exercise of the district court’s
4 discretion. Newell v. Engel, 899 P.2d 273, 275 (Colo. App. 1994).
“[A] trial court necessarily abuses its discretion if it bases its ruling
on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous
assessment of the evidence.” People v. Segovia, 196 P.3d 1126,
1129 (Colo. 2008). Appellate courts can review ethical violations,
by an attorney, if they become intertwined with the litigation.
Murray v. Just In Case Bus. Lighthouse, LLC, 2016 CO 47M, ¶ 16.
¶ 13 We review a district court’s order granting summary judgment
de novo. Westin Operator, LLC v. Groh, 2015 CO 25, ¶19.
“Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of
material fact are disputed, and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Macomber v. Nations Roof, LLC, 2025
COA 59, ¶ 12; see C.R.C.P. 56(c). The movant bears the burden of
establishing that there are no disputed genuine issues of material
fact, and the party opposing summary judgment is entitled to the
benefit of all reasonable favorable inferences that may be drawn
from the facts. Univ. of Denver v. Doe, 2024 CO 27, ¶ 8.
¶ 14 We review a district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial
for an abuse of discretion. Rains v. Barber, 2018 CO 61, ¶ 8.
Under C.R.C.P. 59(d), a court may grant a new trial when the
5 movant shows an irregularity in the proceedings, newly discovered
evidence, or any error in the application of the law among other
things.
III. Analysis
¶ 15 Lynne’s brief lacks a “clear and concise discussion of the
grounds upon which [she] relies in seeking a reversal or
modification of the judgment” and therefore does not comply with
C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(B). Lynne provides no authority nor alleges that
there was any dispute of material fact to support her contention
that Smith was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Nonetheless, we address the arguments we can discern.
¶ 16 As we understand it, Lynne primarily argues that the district
court erred by declining to sanction Reynolds for the prejudicial
damage his conduct had caused, which allegedly limited her ability
to gather evidence in the case, and for general mistreatment. But
Lynne does not provide what evidence she might have uncovered
but for his conduct, nor does she establish any other legally
cognizable nexus between his conduct and the litigation or the
judgment. See Maul v. Shaw, 843 P.2d 139, 142 (Colo. App. 1992),
abrogated on other grounds by Elrick v. Merrill, 10 P.3d 689, 689-90
6 (Colo. App. 2000). Because this nexus must exist before the district
court may exercise its discretion to order sanctions against a client
for attorney conduct, we determine that the court did not err by
declining to order such sanctions. See Domenico v. Sw. Props.
Venture, 914 P.2d 390, 393 (Colo. App. 1995). Referral to the OARC
was also the proper avenue since the district court lacked
jurisdiction to impose sanctions in such circumstances. See Colo.
Sup. Ct. Grievance Comm., 850 P.2d at 152.
¶ 17 Lynne’s secondary argument is that the district court erred by
granting judgment in favor of Smith in light of Reynolds’ actions.
She makes the bald proposition, without legal argument or
authority, that, due to Reynolds’ actions, the district court was not
properly informed when it issued judgment.
¶ 18 Upon reviewing the record and legal authority, we perceive no
error in the district court’s ruling in favor of Smith. Lynne did not
allege any genuine issues of material fact in her response to Smith’s
motion for summary judgment that would preclude judgment. And
in her post-trial motion, Lynne did not argue the presence of any
irregularity, new evidence, error of law, or failure to consider
proffered evidence. See C.R.C.P. 56, C.R.C.P. 59(d). Therefore, the
7 court did not err by ruling in favor of Smith, who met his burden,
while Lynne did not.
IV. Disposition
¶ 19 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
JUDGE TOW and JUDGE YUN concur.