Lynn Sterling Hardy v. State of Texas

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMarch 18, 2002
Docket07-00-00492-CR
StatusPublished

This text of Lynn Sterling Hardy v. State of Texas (Lynn Sterling Hardy v. State of Texas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lynn Sterling Hardy v. State of Texas, (Tex. Ct. App. 2002).

Opinion



NO. 07-00-0492-CR


IN THE COURT OF APPEALS


FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS


AT AMARILLO


PANEL D


MARCH 18, 2002

______________________________


LYNN STERLING HARDY
,



Appellant

v.


THE STATE OF TEXAS,


Appellee
_________________________________


FROM THE 183rd DISTRICT COURT OF HARRIS COUNTY;


NO. 823,267; HON. WOODROW DENSEN, PRESIDING
_______________________________


Before BOYD, C.J., QUINN and REAVIS, JJ.

Lynn Sterling Hardy (Hardy) appeals his conviction for theft. Through five points of error, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting various exhibits over his hearsay objection. Furthermore, because the exhibits were inadmissible hearsay, the trial court also denied him his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine his accusers, he continues. We reverse the judgment.

Background

The State indicted appellant for theft of property having a value exceeding $20,000. The property consisted of "dump pumps." (1) Allegedly, he converted the pumps from his employer Hyseco, Inc. and sold them to others. Hyseco discovered that pumps were missing and began to contact potential customers for same. At least four entities which were contacted admitted to buying pumps from appellant. So too did they acknowledge that the pumps appeared to them to be the property of Hyseco, after a Hyseco representative described them.

The evidence from which the controversy before us arose concerned State's Exhibits 10 and 12. The former contained information given to Hyseco employees by the company's security service. It purported to show the times at which company employees, including appellant, entered the facility. The latter exhibit (i.e. 12) contained a letter, addressed to the local district attorney, from an "Anthony John Payne" (Payne) of Cape Manufacturing Engineers, Cape Town, South Africa. According to the letter, Cape Manufacturing made the pumps in question. Therein, Payne stated:

This fax serves to confirm that the pumps returned by the Police to Hyseco and inspected by me on Thursday 14 October 1999 [sic] were of South African origin. This can be confirmed by the foundry identification and cast lot No. on the side of the Port End Cover.

We have supplied these Pumps to three companies in the United States but the Hyseco pumps can be identified by the pitch of drilled holes used to hold on the name tag. Hyseco tag holes are 2 7/8" apart whilst the other customer tag holes are 1 3/4" apart."



Appellant objected to the foregoing exhibits as hearsay. So too did he argue that they were not admissible business records within the scope of Texas Rule of Evidence 803(6). Finally, he posited that their admission would effectively deny him his constitutional right to confront his accusers. However, the court overruled the objections and admitted them.

Points One Through Four

Via his first four points of error, appellant questions the admission of Exhibit 12, in particular the Payne letter. The evidence was allegedly inadmissible because it constituted unreliable hearsay outside the scope of any hearsay exception. Furthermore, its admission purportedly resulted in the denial of his right to confront and cross-examine his accusers. We agree.

Authority

The applicable standard of review is one of abused discretion. As long as the trial judge operates within the ambit of his discretion in deciding to admit or exclude evidence, we should not disturb his decision, irrespective of what it may be. Feldman v. State, No. 73,654, 22 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 20, 2002); Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). In other words, decisions which come within the zone of reasonable disagreement, when measured against pertinent law and the circumstances before the trial court, do not evince abused discretion. Feldman v. State, No. 73,654, 22; Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d at 391.

Next, hearsay consists of an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Tex. R. Evid. 801(d); Guidry v. State, 9 S.W.3d 133, 152 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Moreover, its tender by the State and receipt into evidence in a criminal proceeding implicates the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Guidry v. State, 9 S.W.3d at 149. This is so because the defendant is not afforded the opportunity to confront the out-of-court declarant. Id. Yet, that such evidence was admitted does not automatically result in the deprivation of the constitutional right. Rather, error occurs when the evidence neither falls within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule or has particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Id. at 150; Muttoni v. State, 25 S.W.3d 300, 305 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet.).

Application of Authority

As previously mentioned, the evidence in question encompasses a written statement from an "Anthony John Payne" of Cape Manufacturing Engineers, Cape Town, South Africa. Therein, he endeavors to identify pumps allegedly stolen by appellant as those of Hyseco. He does so by describing the supposed uniqueness of the holes drilled in them and used to affix Hyseco's label to the item. Moreover, the missive was faxed to the local district attorney after the latter or various police officers induced Payne to create it for use in investigating and, no doubt, prosecuting the purported theft. Finally, proving that the items belonged to the complainant was critical to the successful prosecution of appellant.

From the foregoing, it can be said that the contents of the letter represented out-of-court statements of Payne. Not only did Payne identify the pumps as belonging to Hyseco but also his testimony was offered to prove that supposed fact. In other words, they were offered as proof of the matter asserted. Thus, it is beyond question that they constituted hearsay within the definition espoused by Guidry and the rules of evidence.

Next, the State attempted to justify admission of the evidence by contending that it fell within the business record exception to the hearsay rule, i.e. Texas Rule of Evidence 803(6). However, equally clear from the record before us is that the document was created solely for the purpose of prosecuting criminal charges against appellant. This means that it was made in anticipation of litigation, and, being made for that purpose, it cannot fall within the category of a business record. Dixon v. State

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Related

Palmer v. Hoffman
318 U.S. 109 (Supreme Court, 1943)
Tufele v. State
130 S.W.3d 267 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2004)
McCarthy v. State
65 S.W.3d 47 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2001)
Wesbrook v. State
29 S.W.3d 103 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2000)
Rodriguez v. State
42 S.W.3d 181 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2001)
Dixon v. State
940 S.W.2d 192 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1996)
Muttoni v. State
25 S.W.3d 300 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2000)
Guidry v. State
9 S.W.3d 133 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1999)
Cole v. State
839 S.W.2d 798 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1992)
Montgomery v. State
810 S.W.2d 372 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1991)

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