Lynn B. v. Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: March 4, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01521
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 8 LYNN B., 9 Plaintiff, Case No. C25-1521-MLP 10 v. ORDER 11 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 12 Defendant. 13 I. INTRODUCTION 14 Plaintiff seeks review of the denial of her application for Disability Insurance Benefits. 15 Plaintiff contends that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred at step two, and by failing to 16 incorporate limitations from accepted medical opinions into the residual functional capacity 17 (“RFC”) finding. (Dkt. # 12.) The Commissioner filed a response arguing that the ALJ’s decision 18 is free of legal error, supported by substantial evidence, and should be affirmed. (Dkt. # 16.) 19 Plaintiff did not file a reply. Having considered the ALJ’s decision, the administrative record 20 (“AR”), and the parties’ briefing, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s final decision and 21 DISMISSES the case with prejudice.1 22 23

1 The parties consented to proceed before the undersigned Magistrate Judge. (Dkt. # 2.) 1 II. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff was born in October 1978, has a greater than high school education, and has 3 worked as a financial planner. AR at 188, 232, 764. Plaintiff was last gainfully employed in 4 2018. Id. at 209. In July 2022, Plaintiff applied for benefits, alleging disability as of February 5,

5 2021. Id. at 188. Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially and on reconsideration, and 6 Plaintiff requested a hearing. Id. at 17. After the ALJ conducted a hearing in August 2024, the 7 ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled. Id. at 17, 32. 8 Using the five-step disability evaluation process,2 the ALJ found, in pertinent part, that 9 Plaintiff has the severe impairments of post-concussive syndrome, traumatic brain injury, 10 headaches, neurocognitive disorder, lumbar and cervical degenerative disc disease, depressive 11 disorder, and anxiety disorder. AR at 19. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff can perform light 12 work with additional postural and exertional limitations; can understand and remember simple, 13 routine tasks and sustain them for two-hour intervals over an eight-hour workday; and can 14 tolerate occasional interaction with the public and occasional changes in the routine work setting.

15 Id. at 22. 16 As the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, the ALJ’s decision is the 17 Commissioner’s final decision. AR at 1-6. Plaintiff appealed the final decision of the 18 Commissioner to this Court. (Dkt. # 4.) 19 III. LEGAL STANDARDS 20 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court may overturn the Commissioner’s denial of social 21 security benefits if the ALJ’s decision rests on legal error or is not supported by substantial 22 evidence. Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 494 (9th Cir. 2022). Substantial evidence is defined 23

2 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. 1 as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 2 conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102-03 (2019) (cleaned up). In applying this 3 standard, the Court must consider the record as a whole to determine whether it contains 4 sufficient evidence to support the ALJ’s findings. Id.

5 Although the Court evaluates the record as a whole, it is not permitted to reweigh the 6 evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Ahearn v. Saul, 988 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th 7 Cir. 2021). The ALJ is tasked with evaluating testimony, resolving conflicts in the medical 8 evidence, and addressing ambiguities in the record. Smartt, 53 F.4th at 494-95. Where the 9 evidence can be interpreted in more than one rational way, the ALJ’s decision must be upheld. 10 Id. Even if the ALJ erred, reversal is not warranted unless the error affected the outcome of the 11 disability determination. Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2020). The party 12 challenging the ALJ’s decision bears the burden of demonstrating harmful error. Shinseki v. 13 Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009). 14 IV. DISCUSSION

15 A. The ALJ Did Not Err at Step Two 16 Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred at step two by failing to include her benign paroxysmal 17 positional vertigo (“BPPV”) as a severe impairment. (Dkt. # 12 at 2-13.) The Commissioner 18 responds that the ALJ properly considered BPPV as a symptom of Plaintiff’s severe impairments, 19 and, in any event, any step-two error was harmless because step two was decided in Plaintiff’s 20 favor. (Dkt. # 16 at 2-10.) 21 Step two is a threshold determination meant to screen out weak claims. Buck v. Berryhill, 22 869 F.3d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146-47 (1987)). 23 The ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a “severe” impairment. 20 C.F.R. 1 § 404.1520(c). If the claimant has at least one severe impairment, the evaluation proceeds to step 2 three. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). 3 A claimant generally cannot be prejudiced by the ALJ’s failure to find a particular 4 impairment severe at step two so long as the ALJ finds at least one severe impairment and

5 considers the functional effects of all impairments when assessing the RFC. Buck, 869 F.3d at 6 1049; Social Security Ruling 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *5. “The RFC therefore should be 7 exactly the same regardless of whether certain impairments are considered ‘severe’ or not.” 8 Buck, 869 F.3d at 1049. 9 Even if the ALJ erred in not listing BPPV as a severe impairment at step two, any error 10 was harmless. At step four, the ALJ expressly discussed evidence related to Plaintiff’s dizziness, 11 noting that she “complained of dizziness when requested to perform heel, toe, and tandem 12 walking, squatting, and spinal range of motion and did not perform said maneuvers,” and 13 accordingly limited her “to light work including the postural and environmental limitations as 14 described in the residual functional capacity,” incorporating those limitations into the RFC

15 formulation. AR at 26-27; see Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007). 16 1. The ALJ Did Not Err in Evaluating Plaintiff’s Testimony 17 Within her step-two argument, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to provide sufficient 18 explanation for discounting her testimony regarding BPPV. (Dkt. # 12 at 11-13.) The ALJ, 19 however, reasonably discounted her subjective testimony as inconsistent with the objective 20 medical evidence, including her positive response to treatment, and with her activities of daily 21 living. AR at 24. 22 Absent evidence of malingering, an ALJ must provide clear and convincing reasons for 23 discounting a claimant’s testimony. See Laborin v. Berryhill, 867 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 1 2017). That said, the ALJ is not required to believe every allegation, nor to analyze testimony 2 line by line. See Ahearn, 988 F.3d at 1116; Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1277 (9th Cir. 3 2020). The question is not whether this Court is convinced, “but instead whether the ALJ’s 4 rationale is clear enough that it has the power to convince.” Smartt, 53 F.4th at 499.

5 Plaintiff testified that she can only read or watch movement for about thirty seconds 6 before she starts to experience symptoms, including eye pain, head pain, and dizziness. AR at 50. 7 As the ALJ noted, after a physical exam revealed BPPV, doctors referred her to vestibular rehab. 8 Id. at 27 (citing id. at 824-25). Initial testing “indicated moderate perception of handicap related 9 to dizziness/imbalance.” Id. (citing id. at 816). Vestibular physical-therapy notes indicate that, as 10 of July 27, 2023, “BPPV testing was negative; patient does not appear to have BPPV at this 11 time.” Id. at 955. Plaintiff declined repeat BPPV testing. Id. at 982. 12 As for other symptoms, Plaintiff told providers that her “lengthy course of physical 13 therapy” in 2021 was very helpful, but she discontinued due to “difficulty tolerating sessions and 14 limiting her ability to participate in life.” AR at 764. The ALJ further noted that, after Plaintiff

15 was discharged from physical therapy in January 2022, she returned to much of her regular 16 routine, including coaching and hiking. Id. at 25 (citing id. at 411). In March 2023 she reported 17 that she takes care of pets, cooks three times a week, shops online, drives short distances, and 18 completes chores such as vacuuming, laundry, and washing dishes. Id. at 26 (citing id. at 802). 19 On this record, it was not unreasonable for the ALJ to conclude that this evidence of 20 improvement with treatment and ongoing activities contradicted Plaintiff’s allegations of greater 21 limitations. 22 23 1 B. The ALJ Did Not Err in RFC Assessment 2 Plaintiff next argues the ALJ erred in formulating the RFC by not including all 3 limitations from accepted medical opinions. (Dkt. # 12 at 13-18.) RFC is the most a claimant can 4 still do despite her limitations and is assessed based on all relevant evidence in the record. See 20

5 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). An RFC must include all functional limitations supported by the record. 6 See Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009). 7 The ALJ considered the opinions of State agency psychological consultants Andrew 8 Forsyth, Ph.D., and Matthew C., Psy.D., and found them persuasive. AR at 29. In relevant part, 9 Dr. Forsyth opined Plaintiff “is capable of carrying out short and simple (2-3 step) tasks on a 10 consistent basis[,]” id. at 74, and Dr. Matthew C. opined the same, id. at 87. Plaintiff argues there 11 is a conflict between these opinions and the RFC, which limits her to simple, routine tasks but 12 does not specify “2-3 steps.” (Dkt. # 12 at 14.) 13 The Commissioner relies on Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 14 2008), to support the ALJ’s interpretation of short and simple (2-3 step) tasks as equivalent to

15 simple, routine tasks. (Dkt. # 16 at 10-11.) In Stubbs-Danielson, the Ninth Circuit held that an 16 RFC limiting a claimant to “simple, routine” work properly incorporated a medical opinion 17 limiting the claimant to “simple tasks” and “short simple instructions.” 539 F.3d at 1174-75; see 18 also Aimee F. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2023 WL 142764, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 10, 2023) (RFC 19 limiting plaintiff to simple, routine tasks accounted for opinion limiting her to understanding, 20 remembering, and carrying out short, simple instructions). 21 Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in translating these medical opinions into an RFC 22 limiting Plaintiff to simple, routine tasks that she can sustain for two hours at a time. AR at 22; 23 1 see also Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 807 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he ALJ is 2 responsible for translating and incorporating clinical findings into a succinct RFC.”). 3 Plaintiff further argues she is not capable of performing the jobs the ALJ identified 4 because they require Reasoning Level Two, which she contends is inconsistent with her RFC

5 limiting her to simple tasks. (Dkt. # 12 at 14-16.) An ALJ may rely on a Vocational Expert 6 (“VE”) to testify as to what jobs a claimant with a given RFC can perform and the availability of 7 those jobs. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999). To do so, the ALJ poses a 8 hypothetical to the VE that reflects all of the claimant’s limitations. Id. 9 Here, the ALJ presented the VE with a hypothetical reflecting the ultimate RFC 10 determination limiting Plaintiff to simple, routine tasks for two hours at a time. AR at 22, 61. 11 Plaintiff contends this was error because the VE identified jobs requiring Reasoning Level Two, 12 which the Dictionary of Occupational Titles describes as involving “detailed but uninvolved” 13 instructions. (Dkt. # 12 at 16.) 14 The Ninth Circuit has recognized, however, that Reasoning Level Two can be consistent

15 with limitations to simple tasks and short, simple instructions. See Leach v. Kijakazi, 70 F.4th 16 1251, 1256-57 (9th Cir. 2023); Rounds, 807 F.3d at 1004, n. 6 (“Unpublished decisions of panels 17 of this Court and opinions from some of our sister circuits have concluded that an RFC limitation 18 to ‘simple’ or ‘repetitive’ tasks is consistent with Level Two reasoning.”); Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 19 F.3d 842, 847 (9th Cir. 2015) (RFC for simple, routine, repetitive tasks consistent with Level 20 Two reasoning); Ranstrom v. Colvin, 622 F. App’x 687, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2015) (no “appreciable 21 difference” between ability to make simple decisions based on “short, simple instructions” and 22 Level Two reasoning requiring “detailed but uninvolved” instructions). 23 1 The ALJ appropriately relied on the VE’s expertise to determine that Plaintiff could 2 perform the jobs identified based on a hypothetical matching her RFC. Accordingly, the ALJ did 3 not err in formulating the RFC. 4 V. CONCLUSION

5 For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner’s final decision is AFFIRMED and this 6 case is DISMISSED with prejudice. 7 Dated this 4th day of March, 2026. 8 A 9 MICHELLE L. PETERSON United States Magistrate Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23