Lynk Media LLC v. Deon Taylor

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 LYNK MEDIA LLC, No. 2:24-cv-02706 DJC AC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 15 Defendant. 16 17 This case is before the court on plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. ECF No. 29. The 18 motion was referred to the undersigned pursuant to E.D. Cal. R. 302(c)(19). The accompanying 19 memorandum is located at ECF No 30. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned 20 recommends plaintiff’s motion be GRANTED, and that judgment be entered in favor of plaintiff. 21 I. Relevant Background 22 On October 1, 2024, plaintiff Lynk Media LLC filed this action against defendant Deon 23 Taylor alleging Copyright Infringement under 17 U.S.C §501. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff is a 24 professional videography company that has obtained active and valid copyright registrations from 25 the United States Copyright Office (the “USCO”) which cover many of its videos, including the 26 video at issue in this case (“the video”). ECF No. 1 at 2. Defendant is a medical staffing 27 company that owns and operates the Instagram account @deontaylor, which has approximately 28 218,000 followers. Id. This action arises out of defendant’s unauthorized use of one of plaintiff’s 1 copyrighted videos on its social media account. Id. at 5-6. 2 A summons was issued on October 1, 2024. ECF No. 2. On March 14, 2025, plaintiff 3 moved for alternative service and an extension of time to complete service. ECF No. 10. The 4 motion was granted. ECF No. 11. On June 6, 2025, plaintiff moved for the court to issue an 5 amended summons. ECF No. 15. An amended summons was issued on July 10, 2025. ECF No. 6 19. The summons was returned executed on July 14, 2025. ECF No. 20. Defendant did not 7 appear. Plaintiff moved for entry of default on August 14, 2025, and the Clerk of Court entered 8 default against defendant on August 15, 2025. ECF Nos. 21, 22. 9 Plaintiff now requests that this court grant default judgment in its favor, in the total 10 amount of $20,609.90, a sum is comprised of the following amounts: (1) statutory damages for 11 direct infringement in the amount of $12,500.00; (2) attorneys’ fees in the amount of $7,267.50; 12 and (3) costs in the amount of $840.40. ECF No. 30 at 10. Defendant did not respond to the 13 motion for entry of default judgment and has not otherwise appeared in this case. 14 II. Analysis 15 A. Legal Standard 16 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, default may be entered against a party 17 against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought who fails to plead or otherwise defend 18 against the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). However, “[a] defendant’s default does not 19 automatically entitle the plaintiff to a court-ordered judgment.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 20 238 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924-25 (9th 21 Cir. 1986)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b) (governing the entry of default judgments). Instead, the 22 decision to grant or deny an application for default judgment lies within the district court’s sound 23 discretion. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). In making this 24 determination, the court may consider the following factors:

25 (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of plaintiff's 26 substantive claim; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether 27 the default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. 28 1 Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). Default judgments are ordinarily 2 disfavored. Id. at 1472. 3 Generally, once default is entered, well-pleaded factual allegations in the operative 4 complaint are taken as true, except for those allegations relating to damages. TeleVideo Sys., Inc. 5 v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (citing Geddes v. United Fin. 6 Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)); see also Fair Housing of Marin v. 7 Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002). Although well-pleaded allegations in the complaint 8 are admitted by a defendant’s failure to respond, “necessary facts not contained in the pleadings, 9 and claims which are legally insufficient, are not established by default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. 10 of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 11 (9th Cir. 1978)); accord DIRECTV, Inc. v. Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A] 12 defendant is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law”) 13 (citation and quotation marks omitted); Abney v. Alameida, 334 F.Supp.2d 1221, 1235 (S.D. Cal. 14 2004) (“[A] default judgment may not be entered on a legally insufficient claim.”). A party’s 15 default conclusively establishes that party’s liability, although it does not establish the amount of 16 damages. Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560; cf. Adriana Int’l Corp. v. Thoeren, 913 F.2d 1406, 1414 (9th 17 Cir. 1990) (stating in the context of a default entered pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18 37 that the default conclusively established the liability of the defaulting party). 19 B. The Eitel Factors 20 1. Factor One: Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiff 21 The first Eitel factor considers whether the plaintiff would suffer prejudice if default 22 judgment is not entered, and such potential prejudice to the plaintiff weighs in favor of granting a 23 default judgment. See PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177. Here, plaintiff would suffer 24 prejudice if the court did not enter a default judgment because it would be without recourse for 25 recovery. Accordingly, the first Eitel factor favors the entry of default judgment. 26 2. Factors Two and Three: Merits of Claims and Sufficiency of Complaint 27 The merits of plaintiff's substantive claims and the sufficiency of the complaint are 28 considered here together because of the relatedness of the two inquiries. The court must consider 1 whether the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state a claim that supports the relief 2 sought. See Danning, 572 F.2d at 1388; PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1175. Here, the merits 3 of the claims and sufficiency of the complaint favor entry of default judgment. 4 Plaintiff brings a single cause of action for copyright infringement. ECF No. 1. To state a 5 copyright infringement claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege two things: (1) that it owns a valid 6 copyright in the work at issue, and (2) that the defendant copied protected aspects of the 7 plaintiff’s expression. Tangle, Inc. v. Aritzia, Inc., 125 F.4th 991, 995 (9th Cir. 2025). “A 8 copyright registration is prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and the facts stated 9 in the certificate.” United Fabrics Int’l, Inc. v. C&J Wear, Inc., 630 F.3d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 10 2011) (internal citations omitted). “Under the Copyright Act, the owner of a copyright has the 11 exclusive right to display its work.” Bell v. Wilmott Storage Servs., LLC, 12 F.4th 1065, 1072 12 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 847 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2017)). 13 Following entry of default, the court takes the complaint’s well-pleaded allegations 14 regarding liability as true. Fair Housing of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002). 15 Here, plaintiff has presented the court with an affidavit from the video’s author, Oliya Fedun, 16 attesting to the originality of the work and provided an image of the copyright registration number 17 and certificate. ECF No. 32. The court therefore finds the first element satisfied. 18 As to the second element, plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) circumstantial evidence of the 19 defendant’s access to the copyrighted work; and (2) substantial similarity between the 20 copyrighted work and the defendant’s work.” Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Film Ventures Int’l, 21 Inc., 543 F. Supp. 1134, 1140 (C.D. Cal. 1982). Plaintiff has shown that defendant clearly had 22 access to the video at issue, insofar as it had been published by plaintiff. As to the second 23 element, plaintiff submitted screengrabs from the original video and the infringing video, which 24 appear to be identical. ECF No. 1-1 and 1-2. Plaintiff alleges the video displayed by defendant is 25 an exact duplicate of the video it owns. ECF No. 1 at 4. Accordingly, the court finds that the 26 second and third Eitel factors are satisfied. 27 3. Factor Four: The Sum of Money at Stake in the Action 28 Under the fourth Eitel factor, the court considers the amount of money at stake in relation 1 to the seriousness of defendant’s conduct. The Copyright Act provides that a copyright infringer 2 is liable for either the copyright holder’s actual damages and any additional profits from the 3 infringer, or for statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any 4 one work, in a sum of not less than $750 or more than $30,000. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a), (c)(1). 5 Where willfulness is found, statutory damages award may be increased to as much as $150,000. 6 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1)(2). “Willful copyright infringement, for purposes of the award of statutory 7 damages, requires the defendant’s knowledge that his conduct constitutes copyright 8 infringement.” Jackson v. Sturkie, 255 F. Supp.2d 1096, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2003). In this case, 9 plaintiff is seeking statutory damages in the amount of $12,500.00 ($2,500.00 for what would 10 have been the licensing fee, multiplied by a factor of five (5) by reason of defendant’s willful 11 infringement). The court finds the requested remedy falls within the bounds of the Copyright 12 Act, is proportionate to the conduct at issue, and favors entry of default judgment. 13 4. Factor Five: Possibility of Dispute Concerning Material Facts 14 The facts of this case are relatively straightforward, and plaintiff has provided the court 15 with well-pleaded allegations supporting its claims and affidavits in support of its allegations. 16 Here, the court may assume the truth of well-pleaded facts in the complaint (except as to 17 damages) following the clerk’s entry of default and, thus, there is no likelihood that any genuine 18 issue of material fact exists. See, e.g., Elektra Entm't Group Inc. v. Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 388, 19 393 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“Because all allegations in a well-pleaded complaint are taken as true after 20 the court clerk enters default judgment, there is no likelihood that any genuine issue of material 21 fact exists.”); accord Philip Morris USA, Inc., 219 F.R.D. at 500; PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 22 1177. 23 5. Factor Six: Whether Default Was Due to Excusable Neglect 24 Upon review of the record before the court, the court finds no indication that the default 25 was the result of excusable neglect. See PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177. Plaintiff served 26 the defendant with the summons and complaint. ECF No. 20. Moreover, plaintiff served 27 defendant by mail with notice of its application for default judgment. ECF No. 29 at 3. Despite 28 ample notice of this lawsuit and plaintiff’s intention to seek a default judgment, defendant failed 1 to defend itself in this action. Thus, the record supports a conclusion that the defendant has 2 chosen not to defend this action, and not that the default resulted from any excusable neglect. 3 Accordingly, this Eitel factor favors the entry of a default judgment. 4 6. Factor Seven: Policy Favoring Decisions on the Merits 5 “Cases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel, 782 6 F.2d at 1472. However, district courts have concluded with regularity that this policy, standing 7 alone, is not dispositive, especially where a defendant fails to appear or defend itself in an action. 8 PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177; see also Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 9 F.Supp.2d 1039, 1061 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2010). Accordingly, although the court is cognizant of 10 the policy favoring decisions on the merits – and consistent with existing policy would prefer that 11 this case be resolved on the merits – that policy does not, by itself, preclude the entry of default 12 judgment. 13 7. Conclusion: Propriety of Default Judgment 14 Upon consideration of all the Eitel factors, the court concludes that plaintiff is entitled to 15 the entry of default judgment against defendants. 16 C. Terms of Judgment 17 Having concluded that entry of default judgment is appropriate, the court must now 18 determine the remedy to which plaintiff is entitled. 19 1. Statutory Damages 20 As noted above, plaintiff seeks statutory damages in the total amount of $12,500.00: 21 $2,500.00 for what would have been the licensing fee, multiplied by a factor of five by reason of 22 defendant’s willful infringement. ECF No. 30 at 18. Statutory damages exist to “provide 23 adequate compensation to the copyright holder and to deter infringement.” Desire, LLC v. 24 Manna Textiles, Inc., 986 F.3d 1253, 1271 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Frank Music Corp. v. Metro- 25 Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., 886 F.2d 1545, 1554 (9th Cir. 1989)). They are intended as a “substitute 26 for profits or actual damages” and “should not provide copyright owners a windfall.” Id. “The 27 Ninth Circuit has not adopted uniform criteria for determining the appropriate amount of statutory 28 damages for willful copyright infringement.” Curtis v. Illumination Arts, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 3d 1 1200, 1217 (W.D. Wash. 2014). To guide the statutory damages analysis, district courts turn to 2 four factors used by other circuits and by district courts within this circuit. Id. (collecting cases). 3 “The four factors are: (1) the infringers’ profits and the expenses they saved because of the 4 infringement; (2) the plaintiff's lost revenues; (3) the strong public interest in ensuring the 5 integrity of copyright laws; and (4) whether the infringer acted willfully.” Id. 6 The first two factors go to the value of the video: what defendant would have had to pay 7 to license it plus any profits gained by use, and what plaintiff lost by not receiving that licensing 8 fee. Plaintiff may “seek an award of minimum statutory damages without disclosing any 9 damages calculations but, to avoid a potential windfall, it must provide some evidence of its lost 10 profits or [defendant’s] profits if it seeks an award greater than the statutory minimum.” Atari 11 Interactive, Inc. v. Redbubble, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 3d 883, 888–89 (N.D. Cal. 2021), aff’d in part, 12 appeal dismissed in part, No. 21-17062, 2023 WL 4704891 (9th Cir. July 24, 2023). Here, 13 plaintiff submitted a declaration by the video’s author stating that “[b] ased upon the length of 14 time Defendant has displayed my Video, along with the large following on his social media 15 account, I would have licensed it for $2,500.” ECF No. 32 at 4. The court accordingly assigns 16 $2,500 as the licensing value. 17 The third and fourth factors governing assessment of statutory damages go to the public 18 interest in deterring copyright infringement and the egregiousness of the defendant’s conduct, and 19 a finding of willfulness may support a damages multiplier. Plaintiff argues that willfulness can be 20 demonstrated by the act of default, despite having received notice of existence of this action by 21 being served. ECF No. 30 at 19-21. Further, plaintiff asserts that defendant continues to infringe, 22 despite having been notified of the infringement. Id. at 21. Accordingly, the undersigned finds 23 the multiplier appropriate and recommends an award of statutory damages in the amount 24 requested. 25 2. Attorneys’ Fees 26 Plaintiff requests attorneys’ fees and costs as prevailing party. The Copyright Act allows 27 for the award of costs to a prevailing party. 17 U.S.C. § 505. Plaintiff’s demand for costs totals 28 $840.40, a sum consisting of the filing fee in this action ($402.00) and the fee for the service of 1 the summons and complaint ($440.40). The undersigned finds these costs reasonable and 2 substantiated by the record, and recommends they be awarded in full. 3 The Copyright Act also permits the award of reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing 4 party. 17 U.S.C. § 505. To assess fees, courts utilize a lodestar analysis comprised of the number 5 of hours reasonably spent multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Grove v. Wells Fargo Fin. Cal., 6 Inc., 606 F.3d 577, 582 (9th Cir. 2010). If the documentation outlining the work is inadequate, 7 the court may reduce the award accordingly. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 8 Here, plaintiff requests 1.8 hours at the rate of $750 for a senior attorney (30+ years of 9 experience), 11 hours at the rate of $500 for a junior attorney (8 years of experience), and 5.9 10 hours at the rate of $124 for paralegal work, for a total request of $ 7,267.50 in fees. ECF No. 30 11 at 30. Plaintiff submitted adequate billing records to justify the hours expended. ECF No. 31. 12 As to the rate, the court must be guided by the prevailing market rate in the relevant 13 community; courts refer to the prevailing rate in the community for similar work performed by 14 attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation. Ingram v. Oroudjian, 647 F.3d 925, 15 928 (9th Cir. 2011). While affidavits may provide evidence of the prevailing market rate, they 16 are not conclusive. Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 980 (9th Cir. 2008). Courts 17 must also rely on their own familiarity with the market. Ingram, 647 F.3d at 928. Courts base 18 their awarded rates on the standards of the legal community in which the court sits, Barjon v. 19 Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1997), which in this case means the Sacramento division of 20 the Eastern District of California. 21 Plaintiff’s counsel, who is based in New York, supports the requested rates by citing to 22 cases decided in the Central District of California. ECF No. 30 at 29. The court finds the 23 requested rates excessive for the Sacramento, California market. Recent cases in this district for 24 suits involving specialized areas of law have awarded less. See, e.g., Love v. Tri-Counties Bank, 25 No. 2:22-cv-01761 TLN CKD PS, 2025 WL 444320, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2025) (awarding 26 $690 per hour for an attorney with over 40 years of experience, $480 for an attorney with over 30 27 years of experience, $380 for an attorney with over 10 years of experience in a case involving the 28 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, and collecting cases); Unit 53, Inc. v. Run Roadlines, Inc., 1 | No. 2:24-cv-01718 DJC CSK, 2025 WL 373637, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2025) (awarding $635 a 2 | partner with more than sixteen years of experience; $620 for an attorney of almost fifteen (15) 3 || years of experience; $370 for an associate with over three (3) years of experience; and $310 for 4 || an associate with over two (2) years of experience). 5 Based on a review of recent local rates, the court concludes that plaintiff is entitled to a 6 | local rate of $690 for the senior attorney (30+ years of experience) (1.8 hours = $1,242.00), $370 7 || for a junior attorney (8+ years of experience) (11 hours = $4,070), and $125 for paralegal work 8 | (5.9 hours = $737.50), for a total award of $6,049.50 in fees. 9 HI. Conclusion 10 It is hereby RECOMMENDED THAT: 11 1. Plaintiff's motion for default judgment, (ECF No. 29) be GRANTED; 12 2. Plaintiff be awarded $12,500.00 in statutory damages, $840.40 in costs, and $6,049.50 13 in attorneys’ fees, for a total award of $19,389.90. 14 3. This case be closed. 15 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 16 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within twenty one days 17 || after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 18 || objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Id.; see also Local Rule 304(b). Such a 19 || document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 20 || Recommendations.” Any response to the objections shall be filed with the court and served on all 21 | parties within fourteen days after service of the objections. Local Rule 304(d). Failure to file 22 || objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 23 || Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 24 | (9th Cir. 1991). 25 || DATED: February 10, 2026 ~ 26 thin — Clone ALLISON CLAIRE 27 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 28