Lynch v. CT Medical Licensing Board

CourtDistrict Court, D. South Carolina
DecidedJuly 28, 2025
Docket3:25-cv-06144
StatusUnknown

This text of Lynch v. CT Medical Licensing Board (Lynch v. CT Medical Licensing Board) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lynch v. CT Medical Licensing Board, (D.S.C. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

John D. Lynch II, ) C/A No.: 3:25-6144-CMC-SVH ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) ) REPORT AND Connecticut Department of Health ) RECOMMENDATION and Connecticut Medical Licensing ) Board, ) ) Defendants. ) )

John D. Lynch II (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this amended complaint against Connecticut Department of Health and Connecticut Medical Licensing Board (collectively “Defendants”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends this matter be summarily dismissed. I. Factual and Procedural Background Plaintiff alleges he was not “notified of the combined meeting of the state of CT medical Licensure Board and CT Department of Health June 19, 2012.” [ECF No. 10 at 3]. He also claims the “CT Department of Health has misnamed the plaintiff John D. Lynch II, MD, Emergency with John D. Lynch Jr., MD, Urology in data bank.” . at 3–4. He also alleges his Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request for the minutes of the June 19, 2012 meeting was denied. . at 5. For relief, he seeks the restoration of his medical license.

On July 1, 2025, the undersigned issued orders (1) directing Plaintiff to submit documents necessary to bring this case into proper form and (2) advising Plaintiff of the deficiencies of his complaint and permitting him until July 22, 2025, to file an amended complaint. [ECF Nos. 14, 15]. Plaintiff has

filed no responses. II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review Plaintiff filed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may

be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. , 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B). , 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. , 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). In evaluating

a pro se complaint, the plaintiff’s allegations are assumed to be true. ., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should

do so. A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. , 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can

ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. ., 901 F.2d 387, 390–91 (4th Cir. 1990). Although the court must liberally construe a pro se complaint, the United States Supreme Court has made it

clear a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim. , 556 U.S. 662, 677‒78 (2009); , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on

its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint’s factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. , 556 U.S. at 678‒79. B. Analysis

1. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, “constrained to exercise only the authority conferred by Article III of the Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute.” , 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, a federal court is required, , to determine if a valid basis for its jurisdiction exists “and to dismiss the action if no such ground appears.” at 352; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). Although the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction

may be raised at any time during the case, determining jurisdiction at the outset of the litigation is the most efficient procedure. , 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 1999). There is no presumption that a federal court has jurisdiction over a case,

, 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1999), and a plaintiff must allege facts essential to show jurisdiction in his pleadings. , 298 U.S. 178, 189–90 (1936); , 762 F.2d 348, 350 (4th Cir. 1985)

(“[P]laintiffs must affirmatively plead the jurisdiction of the federal court.”). When a complaint fails to include “an affirmative pleading of a jurisdictional basis[,] a federal court may find that it has jurisdiction if the facts supporting jurisdiction have been clearly pleaded.” , 191 F.3d at 399 (citations omitted). However, if the court, viewing the allegations in the

light most favorable to a plaintiff, finds insufficient allegations in the pleadings, the court will lack subject-matter jurisdiction. The two most commonly recognized and utilized bases for federal court jurisdiction are (1) diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and

(2) federal question pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The allegations contained in this complaint do not fall within the scope of either form of the court’s limited jurisdiction. Plaintiff indicated he is bringing this under “federal question”

jurisdiction. [ECF No. 1 at 3]. However, he fails to allege any federal cause of action. To the extent he has a FOIA claim, his claim would sound in state law, as he has requested information from a state agency. .

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