Lynch v. Cambra

Ninth Circuit

Lynch v. Cambra

126 F. App'x 783

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedFebruary 10, 2005

DocketNo. 04-55662

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 126 F. App'x 783 (Lynch v. Cambra) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Lynch v. Cambra, 126 F. App'x 783 (9th Cir. 2005).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM

**

Former California state prisoner Thomas J. Lynch, Jr. appeals pro se the district court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review de novo, see Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 984 (9th Cir.2000), and we affirm in part and dismiss in part.

Lynch contends that his due process rights were violated and his guilty plea was involuntary because the state trial court failed to advise him that to perfect an appeal from a guilty plea he would first have to apply for a Certificate of Probable Cause. Even if this amounted to a violation of federal due process, Lynch fails to demonstrate prejudice. See Brecht v. [784]*784Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993); see also Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23, 27, 119 S.Ct. 961, 143 L.Ed.2d 18 (1999) (“a court’s failure to give a defendant advice required by the Federal Rules is a sufficient basis for collateral relief only when the defendant is prejudiced by the court’s error”).

Next, Lynch contends that his equal protection rights were violated by California’s computation of pre-sentencing credits. However, we conclude that because Lynch has completed his term of imprisonment and parole, there is no longer a “live controversy,” and the issue is moot. See Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481-82, 102 S.Ct. 1181, 71 L.Ed.2d 353 (1982) (per curiam).¹

AFFIRMED in part, DISMISSED in part.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM

**

Former California state prisoner Thomas J. Lynch, Jr. appeals pro se the district court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review de novo, see Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 984 (9th Cir.2000), and we affirm in part and dismiss in part.

Lynch contends that his due process rights were violated and his guilty plea was involuntary because the state trial court failed to advise him that to perfect an appeal from a guilty plea he would first have to apply for a Certificate of Probable Cause. Even if this amounted to a violation of federal due process, Lynch fails to demonstrate prejudice. See Brecht v. [784]*784Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993); see also Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23, 27, 119 S.Ct. 961, 143 L.Ed.2d 18 (1999) (“a court’s failure to give a defendant advice required by the Federal Rules is a sufficient basis for collateral relief only when the defendant is prejudiced by the court’s error”).

Next, Lynch contends that his equal protection rights were violated by California’s computation of pre-sentencing credits. However, we conclude that because Lynch has completed his term of imprisonment and parole, there is no longer a “live controversy,” and the issue is moot. See Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481-82, 102 S.Ct. 1181, 71 L.Ed.2d 353 (1982) (per curiam).¹

AFFIRMED in part, DISMISSED in part.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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126 F. App'x 783, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lynch-v-cambra-ca9-2005.

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