Opinion by
Mr. Justice Jones,
William B. Lyman, a resident of Philadelphia, died testate on October 23, 1928, leaving to survive him his widow, Fannie O. Lyman, but no issue. By his will, dated June 15, 1926, he left certain pecuniary legacies to collateral relatives and a charity; made an outright devise and a bequest to his wife of certain real estate and personal property; and devised and bequeathed his residuary estate to his wife for life with power to consume. The remainder “left at the time of her decease,” he bequeathed to seven named col-laterals and a charity in equal shares. He appointed Mrs. Lyman executrix of his will which was duly probated.
The presently material portion of William R. Lyman’s will is as follows:
“IX. All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, real, personal and mixed, whatsoever and wheresoever situate at the time of my decease, I give, devise and bequeath unto my dear wife, Fannie C. Lyman, for and during the term of her natural life, with full power and authority to use so much of my residuary estate from time to time as may be necessary for her support [166]*166and maintenance, should the income therefrom prove insufficient; the true intent and meaning of this provision of my Will'is not to give to my dear wife either a fee simple in the real estate of this my residuary estate, or' an absolute estate in the personal property passing under 'this my residuary clause, and no such construction shall be placed thereon. That my true intent and-meaning of this clause is to give to my wife a life estate only in this my residuary real and personal property, and also to enable her to use so much .of the principal as may be necessary for her support, in the event that the income from my residuary estate proves insufficient to supply her wants, and in the determining. of what are necessary wants she is to be the sole judge.. ,
: “And from and immediately after the decease of .my dear wife, I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and remainder of my said residuary estate, rejal, and personal, that may be left at the time of her decease unto [seven named collaterals and a charity], in equal shares or parts, that is to say: to be .equally divided among the above named legatees share and share alike, absolutely and in fee simple.”1
[167]*167Upon tbe audit of tbe account of Fannie C. Lyman as executrix of ber husband’s will, tbe Orphans’ Court of Philadelphia County entered a decree on November 29, 1930, awarding to ber, as life tenant, tbe residuary estate of ber deceased husband at an appraised valuation of $187,378.01 as of that date. Mrs. Lyman died testate on April 28, 1948, having consumed in her lifetime, as found by tbe learned court below, $22,824.53 in value of ber husband’s residuary estate. There was thus left of that estate, on tbe basis of tbe 1930 appraisal, property of tbe value of $164,553.48. However, tbe unconsumed property was actually worth only $104,118.47 as of the date of the life tenant’s death. Tbe indicated loss in value, to wit, $60,435.01, was due entirely to depreciation in market value. For tbe most part, the securities and cash, comprising tbe unconsumed property, continued to stand at tbe date of Mrs. Lyman’s death in her name, as executrix, or in tbe name of ber deceased husband, William R. Lyman.
Tbe remaindermen, contending that tbe life tenant was indebted to them for tbe value of tbe unconsumed portion of tbe residuary estate at tbe appraised value thereof as of tbe date of tbe original distribution, made claim accordingly against Mrs. Lyman’s estate at tbe audit of tbe account of her executors; and, tbe court below so decreed on the assigned authority of [168]*168Powell’s Estate, 340 Pa. 404, 17 A. 2d 391, and Hays Estate, 358 Pa. 38, 55 A. 2d 763, where it was held, under the wills respectively there construed, that a debt- or and creditor relationship existed between the particular life tenants with power to consume and the remaindermen.
We think the conclusion thus reached by the learned court below runs directly counter to the plain intent of William E. Lyman’s will which, in last analysis, is the gauge whereby the respective rights of the life tenant and remaindermen are to be measured. That the intention of a testator is the pole star in the construction of his will requires no citation of authority. As was said by Mr. Justice Stearns for this court in Nicholson Estate, 355 Pa. 426, 429-430, 50 A. 2d 283,— “That the words of the present will are nearly similar to those employed in the cases cited is not absolutely controlling. Every will, in a sense, is unique. Precedents are of little value. The same words, or those nearly similar, used under different circumstances and contexts, may express different intentions [citing cases].”
The question for decision here is whether the testator’s will expresses or implies an intention that his widow, as life tenant of his residuary estate with power to consume, should be an insurer to collateral re-maindermen of its asset value as of the date of the distribution thereof to her. In the very nature of the testamentary problem, it cannot be said dogmatically that, in all instances, a bequest for life with power to consume automatically creates a debtor and creditor relation between a life tenant and the remaindermen. In DuPuy’s Estate, 346 Pa. 143, 150, 29 A. 2d 689, where Powell’s Estate, supra, was advanced in support of the remaindermen’s contention that the consuming life tenant was chargeable with the depreciation in the value of the testator’s property while it was in her hands, our late brother, Mr. Justice Linn, [169]*169pointedly declared for tbis court that, “A testator may give a legal life estate and provide that the debtor-creditor rule shall not be applied but that the remain-dermen shall take the risk of depreciation in value.” And, it was there further recognized that a testator may so provide by implication as well as by direct expression. It is true that in DuPuy’s Estate the will there involved constituted the life tenant a trustee for the remaindermen while, here, the testator did not employ technical terms from which a trust could be inferred. But, that distinction does not make the cardinal rule of construction as to the conclusiveness of the testator’s indicated intent any less applicable.
What, then, was William R. Lyman’s testamentary intent? As the law stood in 1926 when he executed his will, a life tenant with power to consume had never been held to be a debtor of the remaindermen. Such a life tenant was then spoken of as a “quasi trustee” for herself and the remaindermen: Watson’s Estate, 241 Pa. 271, 280, 88 A. 433; and, the remainderman was not a creditor of a life tenant having a right of consumption: see Metz’s Estate, 323 Pa. 241, 242, 185 A. 740. The rule of debtor-creditor relationship, which has pertained to an ordinary life tenancy,2 was not extended to a life tenancy with power of consumption until the decision in Powell’s Estate in 1941. The testator cannot, therefore, be presumed to have intended to impose a legal liability upon his wife, as life tenant, which extant rules of construction did not then impose on the character of life estate which he bequeathed. In Hood v. Pennsylvania Society to Protect Children from Cruelty, 221 Pa. 474, 479-480, 70 A. 845, this court pertinently said, — “It is quite true . .
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Opinion by
Mr. Justice Jones,
William B. Lyman, a resident of Philadelphia, died testate on October 23, 1928, leaving to survive him his widow, Fannie O. Lyman, but no issue. By his will, dated June 15, 1926, he left certain pecuniary legacies to collateral relatives and a charity; made an outright devise and a bequest to his wife of certain real estate and personal property; and devised and bequeathed his residuary estate to his wife for life with power to consume. The remainder “left at the time of her decease,” he bequeathed to seven named col-laterals and a charity in equal shares. He appointed Mrs. Lyman executrix of his will which was duly probated.
The presently material portion of William R. Lyman’s will is as follows:
“IX. All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, real, personal and mixed, whatsoever and wheresoever situate at the time of my decease, I give, devise and bequeath unto my dear wife, Fannie C. Lyman, for and during the term of her natural life, with full power and authority to use so much of my residuary estate from time to time as may be necessary for her support [166]*166and maintenance, should the income therefrom prove insufficient; the true intent and meaning of this provision of my Will'is not to give to my dear wife either a fee simple in the real estate of this my residuary estate, or' an absolute estate in the personal property passing under 'this my residuary clause, and no such construction shall be placed thereon. That my true intent and-meaning of this clause is to give to my wife a life estate only in this my residuary real and personal property, and also to enable her to use so much .of the principal as may be necessary for her support, in the event that the income from my residuary estate proves insufficient to supply her wants, and in the determining. of what are necessary wants she is to be the sole judge.. ,
: “And from and immediately after the decease of .my dear wife, I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and remainder of my said residuary estate, rejal, and personal, that may be left at the time of her decease unto [seven named collaterals and a charity], in equal shares or parts, that is to say: to be .equally divided among the above named legatees share and share alike, absolutely and in fee simple.”1
[167]*167Upon tbe audit of tbe account of Fannie C. Lyman as executrix of ber husband’s will, tbe Orphans’ Court of Philadelphia County entered a decree on November 29, 1930, awarding to ber, as life tenant, tbe residuary estate of ber deceased husband at an appraised valuation of $187,378.01 as of that date. Mrs. Lyman died testate on April 28, 1948, having consumed in her lifetime, as found by tbe learned court below, $22,824.53 in value of ber husband’s residuary estate. There was thus left of that estate, on tbe basis of tbe 1930 appraisal, property of tbe value of $164,553.48. However, tbe unconsumed property was actually worth only $104,118.47 as of the date of the life tenant’s death. Tbe indicated loss in value, to wit, $60,435.01, was due entirely to depreciation in market value. For tbe most part, the securities and cash, comprising tbe unconsumed property, continued to stand at tbe date of Mrs. Lyman’s death in her name, as executrix, or in tbe name of ber deceased husband, William R. Lyman.
Tbe remaindermen, contending that tbe life tenant was indebted to them for tbe value of tbe unconsumed portion of tbe residuary estate at tbe appraised value thereof as of tbe date of tbe original distribution, made claim accordingly against Mrs. Lyman’s estate at tbe audit of tbe account of her executors; and, tbe court below so decreed on the assigned authority of [168]*168Powell’s Estate, 340 Pa. 404, 17 A. 2d 391, and Hays Estate, 358 Pa. 38, 55 A. 2d 763, where it was held, under the wills respectively there construed, that a debt- or and creditor relationship existed between the particular life tenants with power to consume and the remaindermen.
We think the conclusion thus reached by the learned court below runs directly counter to the plain intent of William E. Lyman’s will which, in last analysis, is the gauge whereby the respective rights of the life tenant and remaindermen are to be measured. That the intention of a testator is the pole star in the construction of his will requires no citation of authority. As was said by Mr. Justice Stearns for this court in Nicholson Estate, 355 Pa. 426, 429-430, 50 A. 2d 283,— “That the words of the present will are nearly similar to those employed in the cases cited is not absolutely controlling. Every will, in a sense, is unique. Precedents are of little value. The same words, or those nearly similar, used under different circumstances and contexts, may express different intentions [citing cases].”
The question for decision here is whether the testator’s will expresses or implies an intention that his widow, as life tenant of his residuary estate with power to consume, should be an insurer to collateral re-maindermen of its asset value as of the date of the distribution thereof to her. In the very nature of the testamentary problem, it cannot be said dogmatically that, in all instances, a bequest for life with power to consume automatically creates a debtor and creditor relation between a life tenant and the remaindermen. In DuPuy’s Estate, 346 Pa. 143, 150, 29 A. 2d 689, where Powell’s Estate, supra, was advanced in support of the remaindermen’s contention that the consuming life tenant was chargeable with the depreciation in the value of the testator’s property while it was in her hands, our late brother, Mr. Justice Linn, [169]*169pointedly declared for tbis court that, “A testator may give a legal life estate and provide that the debtor-creditor rule shall not be applied but that the remain-dermen shall take the risk of depreciation in value.” And, it was there further recognized that a testator may so provide by implication as well as by direct expression. It is true that in DuPuy’s Estate the will there involved constituted the life tenant a trustee for the remaindermen while, here, the testator did not employ technical terms from which a trust could be inferred. But, that distinction does not make the cardinal rule of construction as to the conclusiveness of the testator’s indicated intent any less applicable.
What, then, was William R. Lyman’s testamentary intent? As the law stood in 1926 when he executed his will, a life tenant with power to consume had never been held to be a debtor of the remaindermen. Such a life tenant was then spoken of as a “quasi trustee” for herself and the remaindermen: Watson’s Estate, 241 Pa. 271, 280, 88 A. 433; and, the remainderman was not a creditor of a life tenant having a right of consumption: see Metz’s Estate, 323 Pa. 241, 242, 185 A. 740. The rule of debtor-creditor relationship, which has pertained to an ordinary life tenancy,2 was not extended to a life tenancy with power of consumption until the decision in Powell’s Estate in 1941. The testator cannot, therefore, be presumed to have intended to impose a legal liability upon his wife, as life tenant, which extant rules of construction did not then impose on the character of life estate which he bequeathed. In Hood v. Pennsylvania Society to Protect Children from Cruelty, 221 Pa. 474, 479-480, 70 A. 845, this court pertinently said, — “It is quite true . . . that [170]*170when a judicial decision is rendered the law is not presumed to be changed by it, but to have'been the same before as after, although previous decisions may have been to a different effect. This is the general rule, but it is not to he applied in all cases without discrimination. On the subject of interpretation of wills it meets the cardinal and controlling principle that the intention of the testator must prevail ... In the present case, therefore, as in all others, the question is, what was the intention of the testator, and that is to be ascertained by what the testator understood to be the legal meaning of his language at the time he used it.”
Fannie C. Lyman, to whom the testator repeatedly refers in his will as “my dear wife” (see paragraph IN, supra, and paragraphs II and III in footnote 1, ante), was clearly the primary object of his bounty as the learned auditing judge correctly found. The testator devised and bequeathed to his wife, absolutely and in fee simple, his residence property in Philadelphia; his recreation camp in the Adirondacks; all of the household goods, silverware and furnishings of every description contained in the two premises; and all of his jewelry, automobiles and equipment of every nature. He then gave his wife his residuary estate for life with power of consumption and constituted her the sole judge in determining what her necessary wants were. There is not the slightest indication in the will that the testator intended to make his widow a debtor of the remaindermen for the unconsumed residuary estate at its originally appraised valuation. In the light of the express terms of the will, the testator could not have thought that a debtor and creditor relationship between his wife and the remaindermen with respect to his residuary estate could arise during the lifetime of the widow. He deliberately postponed creation of the gift to the remaindermen until “from and immediately after the decease of my dear wife”; and what they [171]*171then took was an interest in what “may be left at the time of her decease.” Throughout, the will breathes a paramount solicitude for the comfort and economic welfare of the testator’s widow. If it be said that the same was true in Powell’s Estate and Bays Estate} supra, the answer is evident. It is a far .different thing to find, if the intent of the testator be given due and appropriate effect, that he intended the primary object of his bounty to have the capital gains on the corpus of a life estate, which she has the power to consume, than it is to conclude that he intended to impose upon such primary beneficiary liability for depreciation in the value of the corpus on the basis of a rule ■of construction that did not exist when he executed his will. The testamentary intent in the present instance is clear. The remaindermen were to take merely what was left of the testator’s residuary estate, in the ■form and at the value, as it existed upon Mrs. Lyman’s death. There is ho occasion for resort to rules of construction. As was said by Mr. Justice Linn in Gordon Estate, 360 Pa. 325, 330, 61 A. 2d 849, — “. . . it. is elementary that such rules are never applied to defeat the expressed intention of a testator.” Manifestly, such intention cannot justly be ascertained by an ex post facto rule of construction.
Decree reversed and record remanded- with directions that a decree be entered in accordance with this opinion; costs to be borne by the estate.