OPINION ON REMAND
TERRIE LIVINGSTON, Justice.
Appellant Phillip Earl Lydia appeals from a jury verdict finding him guilty of [904]*904aggravated robbery causing bodily injury to a disabled person. The jury sentenced appellant to eighteen years’ imprisonment. We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
Appellant’s point on appeal concerns questions that the prosecutor asked during voir dire. Thus, we will only include the facts relevant to this issue.1
During voir dire, the prosecutor asked the entire panel, “Do each of you feel as though you could evaluate a witness and his testimony and decide if he’s being truthful without automatically dismissing his testimony because of some criminal history?” Lydia, 109 S.W.Sd at 496. Appellant objected to this question. Id. The trial court overruled the objection, but granted appellant a running objection to the question. Id. The prosecutor repeated the question, in various forms, to members of the panel on a group and individual basis. Id. at 496-97. The prosecutor further expanded on the hypothetical by asking one of the jurors if it would make a difference if the crime committed by the witness was against the defendant. Id. at 497. Appellant objected again, but the trial court overruled the objection and granted appellant a running objection. Id. The jury later found appellant guilty, and the court sentenced him to eighteen years’ imprisonment.
In appellant’s sole point on appeal, he complained that the prosecutor improperly attempted to bind prospective jurors to a specific factual situation during voir dire contrary to the court of criminal appeals’ pronouncement in Standefer v. State, 59 S.W.3d 177, 181-82 (Tex.Crim.App.2001). We held that the prosecutor’s questions were not commitment questions because they did not ask the prospective jurors to resolve or refrain from resolving any issue. Lydia, 81 S.W.3d at 492. Because we answered this question negatively, we did not reach the second or third prongs of the Standefer test for commitment questions. Id.
The court of criminal appeals granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review to determine “whether the State improperly attempted to bind prospective jurors to specific factual situations diming the voir dire examination, contrary to this court’s determination in Standefer.” Lydia, 109 S.W.3d at 496. The court held that the prosecutor’s questions did in fact ask jurors to resolve issues concerning witness credibility on the basis of particular facts; therefore, they were commitment questions. Id. at 499. The court of criminal appeals then vacated and remanded the case for further analysis under the remaining prongs of the Standefer test for improper commitment questions. Id. at 500.
Discussion
The trial court has broad discretion over the process of selecting a jury. Barajas v. State, 93 S.W.3d 36, 38 (Tex.Crim.App.2002); Allridge v. State, 762 S.W.2d 146, 167 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1040, 109 S.Ct. 1176, 103 L.Ed.2d 238 (1989). The main reason for this is that voir dire could go on forever without reasonable limits. Faulder v. State, 745 S.W.2d 327, 334 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). We leave to the trial court’s discretion the propriety of a particular question, and the trial court’s discretion will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Barajas, 93 S.W.Sd at 38; Allridge, 762 [905]*905S.W.2d at 16B; Faulder, 745 S.W.2d at 334.
The general rule has been that it is improper to ask a commitment question during voir dire because it would amount to an improper attempt to bind a juror. See Allridge v. State, 850 S.W.2d 471, 480 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 831, 114 S.Ct. 101, 126 L.Ed.2d 68 (1993). In Standefer, the court of criminal appeals held that during voir dire a trial court should first determine if a question is a commitment question. 59 S.W.3d at 181-82. If it is a commitment question, then the court must decide whether it is nevertheless a proper question. Id. For it to be a proper commitment question, one of the possible answers to the question must give rise to a valid challenge for cause. Id. However, even if a question meets the “challenge for cause” requirement, the inquiry does not end there. Id. at 182. A proper commitment question must also contain only those facts necessary to test whether a prospective juror is challengea-ble for cause. Id.
The code of criminal procedure allows either side to challenge a juror for cause when the challenging side can show the juror is incapable or unfit to serve on the jury. Tex.Code Crim. PROC. Ann. art. 35.16 (Vernon 1989 & Supp.2003). The rule lists many specific challenges, but also allows a juror to be challenged for cause if either side can show “[t]hat he has a bias or prejudice in favor of or against the defendant.” Id. art. 35.16(a)(9). The court of criminal appeals has held that a member of the venire may be properly challenged for cause and removed “if he cannot impartially judge the credibility of a witness.” Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 560 (Tex.Crim.App.1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1070, 120 S.Ct. 1680, 146 L.Ed.2d 487 (2000). Potential jurors “must be open-minded and persuadable, with no extreme or absolute positions regarding the credibility of any witness.” Id. While a defendant does not have a right to have a particular juror sit on his jury, he does have the right “not [to] have a particular venire member on the jury if the venire member is challengeable for cause or the defendant exercises one of his peremptory challenges.” Johnson v. State, 43 S.W.3d 1, 6-7 (Tex.Crim.App.2001).
Application
In this case, the prosecutor asked the entire venire panel whether it could fairly evaluate a witness and his testimony if the witness, here the victim, had a criminal history. The prosecutor repeatedly asked the same question of prospective jurors who indicated they might have a concern with this type of witness testimony. The prosecutor also asked whether the prospective jurors could fairly evaluate such a witness who had been convicted of crimes against the actual defendant on trial. Two jurors who gave specific statements in response to these questions were seated on the jury.
Because the questions are commitment questions, we must first determine if one of the possible answers to the questions would give rise to a valid challenge for cause. See Standefer, 59 S.W.3d at 182.
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OPINION ON REMAND
TERRIE LIVINGSTON, Justice.
Appellant Phillip Earl Lydia appeals from a jury verdict finding him guilty of [904]*904aggravated robbery causing bodily injury to a disabled person. The jury sentenced appellant to eighteen years’ imprisonment. We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
Appellant’s point on appeal concerns questions that the prosecutor asked during voir dire. Thus, we will only include the facts relevant to this issue.1
During voir dire, the prosecutor asked the entire panel, “Do each of you feel as though you could evaluate a witness and his testimony and decide if he’s being truthful without automatically dismissing his testimony because of some criminal history?” Lydia, 109 S.W.Sd at 496. Appellant objected to this question. Id. The trial court overruled the objection, but granted appellant a running objection to the question. Id. The prosecutor repeated the question, in various forms, to members of the panel on a group and individual basis. Id. at 496-97. The prosecutor further expanded on the hypothetical by asking one of the jurors if it would make a difference if the crime committed by the witness was against the defendant. Id. at 497. Appellant objected again, but the trial court overruled the objection and granted appellant a running objection. Id. The jury later found appellant guilty, and the court sentenced him to eighteen years’ imprisonment.
In appellant’s sole point on appeal, he complained that the prosecutor improperly attempted to bind prospective jurors to a specific factual situation during voir dire contrary to the court of criminal appeals’ pronouncement in Standefer v. State, 59 S.W.3d 177, 181-82 (Tex.Crim.App.2001). We held that the prosecutor’s questions were not commitment questions because they did not ask the prospective jurors to resolve or refrain from resolving any issue. Lydia, 81 S.W.3d at 492. Because we answered this question negatively, we did not reach the second or third prongs of the Standefer test for commitment questions. Id.
The court of criminal appeals granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review to determine “whether the State improperly attempted to bind prospective jurors to specific factual situations diming the voir dire examination, contrary to this court’s determination in Standefer.” Lydia, 109 S.W.3d at 496. The court held that the prosecutor’s questions did in fact ask jurors to resolve issues concerning witness credibility on the basis of particular facts; therefore, they were commitment questions. Id. at 499. The court of criminal appeals then vacated and remanded the case for further analysis under the remaining prongs of the Standefer test for improper commitment questions. Id. at 500.
Discussion
The trial court has broad discretion over the process of selecting a jury. Barajas v. State, 93 S.W.3d 36, 38 (Tex.Crim.App.2002); Allridge v. State, 762 S.W.2d 146, 167 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1040, 109 S.Ct. 1176, 103 L.Ed.2d 238 (1989). The main reason for this is that voir dire could go on forever without reasonable limits. Faulder v. State, 745 S.W.2d 327, 334 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). We leave to the trial court’s discretion the propriety of a particular question, and the trial court’s discretion will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Barajas, 93 S.W.Sd at 38; Allridge, 762 [905]*905S.W.2d at 16B; Faulder, 745 S.W.2d at 334.
The general rule has been that it is improper to ask a commitment question during voir dire because it would amount to an improper attempt to bind a juror. See Allridge v. State, 850 S.W.2d 471, 480 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 831, 114 S.Ct. 101, 126 L.Ed.2d 68 (1993). In Standefer, the court of criminal appeals held that during voir dire a trial court should first determine if a question is a commitment question. 59 S.W.3d at 181-82. If it is a commitment question, then the court must decide whether it is nevertheless a proper question. Id. For it to be a proper commitment question, one of the possible answers to the question must give rise to a valid challenge for cause. Id. However, even if a question meets the “challenge for cause” requirement, the inquiry does not end there. Id. at 182. A proper commitment question must also contain only those facts necessary to test whether a prospective juror is challengea-ble for cause. Id.
The code of criminal procedure allows either side to challenge a juror for cause when the challenging side can show the juror is incapable or unfit to serve on the jury. Tex.Code Crim. PROC. Ann. art. 35.16 (Vernon 1989 & Supp.2003). The rule lists many specific challenges, but also allows a juror to be challenged for cause if either side can show “[t]hat he has a bias or prejudice in favor of or against the defendant.” Id. art. 35.16(a)(9). The court of criminal appeals has held that a member of the venire may be properly challenged for cause and removed “if he cannot impartially judge the credibility of a witness.” Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 560 (Tex.Crim.App.1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1070, 120 S.Ct. 1680, 146 L.Ed.2d 487 (2000). Potential jurors “must be open-minded and persuadable, with no extreme or absolute positions regarding the credibility of any witness.” Id. While a defendant does not have a right to have a particular juror sit on his jury, he does have the right “not [to] have a particular venire member on the jury if the venire member is challengeable for cause or the defendant exercises one of his peremptory challenges.” Johnson v. State, 43 S.W.3d 1, 6-7 (Tex.Crim.App.2001).
Application
In this case, the prosecutor asked the entire venire panel whether it could fairly evaluate a witness and his testimony if the witness, here the victim, had a criminal history. The prosecutor repeatedly asked the same question of prospective jurors who indicated they might have a concern with this type of witness testimony. The prosecutor also asked whether the prospective jurors could fairly evaluate such a witness who had been convicted of crimes against the actual defendant on trial. Two jurors who gave specific statements in response to these questions were seated on the jury.
Because the questions are commitment questions, we must first determine if one of the possible answers to the questions would give rise to a valid challenge for cause. See Standefer, 59 S.W.3d at 182. By asking the questions, the prosecution was trying to learn if any of the prospective jurors would not impartially judge the credibility of the witness or if any of them had “extreme or absolute positions regarding the credibility of any witness” based on the witness’s potential criminal history. Ladd, 3 S.W.3d at 560. The possible answers to these questions would lead to a challenge for cause under article 35.16(a)(9) based on a juror’s bias. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 35.16(a)(9); Ladd, 3 S.W.3d at 560 (holding that a prospective juror may be properly chai-[906]*906lenged for cause and removed if he cannot impartially judge the credibility of a witness); see also Rivera v. State, 82 S.W.3d 64, 66-67 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. refd) (stating that if a prospective juror responded to a question by stating that he would automatically disbelieve a defendant’s testimony simply because he was the defendant, that person would be stricken for cause). Thus, the questions meet the second Standefer prong for proper commitment questions. We further conclude that the questions meet the third Standefer prong because they contain only those facts necessary to test whether a prospective juror is challengeable for cause. Standefer, 59 S.W.3d at 182.2 Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s sole point.
Conclusion
Having overruled appellant’s sole point, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
DAUPHINOT, J., filed a concurring opinion.