L.W. Hardy Co. v. United States

1 Cl. Ct. 465, 50 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5994, 1982 U.S. Claims LEXIS 2323
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedOctober 7, 1982
DocketNo. 412-77
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 1 Cl. Ct. 465 (L.W. Hardy Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
L.W. Hardy Co. v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 465, 50 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5994, 1982 U.S. Claims LEXIS 2323 (cc 1982).

Opinion

OPINION

SCHWARTZ, Judge:

Plaintiff, L.W. Hardy Co., Inc., an Arizona corporation, sues for a refund of income taxes paid for 1971 through 1974. A stipulation of the parties has dealt with various issues of basis of equipment sold, depreciation of equipment and other miscellaneous deductions, alleged improper diversion and understatement of corporate income, and fraud penalties. The only issue not so resolved is plaintiff’s entitlement to a depletion deduction, which would warrant refunds for 1972,1973 and 1974, in the respective amounts of $17,436, $57,616, and $312,-540, for the turquoise extracted by plaintiff from two copper mines in Arizona in those years.

The Government contends that plaintiff’s contractual arrangements with the owners of the two copper mines do not constitute an economic interest in the minerals in place, without which no depletion deduction is available (see I.R.C. § 614(a); Treas.Reg. § 1.611-1(b); United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. 571, 101 S.Ct. 1931, 68 L.Ed.2d 454 (1981)). The question need not be decided in view of the threshold decision that plaintiff’s books and records are insufficient to permit calculation of a depletion deduction by the method prescribed by the [466]*466Code and regulations. Accompanying findings detail the inadequacies of plaintiff’s records. Findings sufficient for the conclusion here reached will be stated.

Since 1961, Mr. L.W. Hardy and, since its incorporation in 1968, the corporate taxpayer have mined turquoise at an open pit copper mine located outside Kingman, in Mohave County, Arizona. The mine is owned by the Duval Corporation and is known as the Kingman mine. In 1973 and 1974, the taxpayer also mined turquoise at a copper mine at Miami, in Gila County, Arizona, owned by Cities Service Corporation; the mine is known as the Miami mine. Plaintiff operates at both mines under licenses from the respective owners.

Turquoise is found in natural or chalk state. The natural is hard and sold in its state as mined. The chalk is softer; hence its name, chalk turquoise. It must be cured, i.e., dried and then steeped in chemicals to be made hard. It commands a lower price than the natural turquoise. Taxpayer mined both kinds, cured the soft, and sold both types. Taxpayer also bought turquoise from “outside” sellers and resold it. Taxpayer also bought and sold small amounts of turquoise jewelry.

Turquoise is found in association with copper. The general method for taxpayer’s turquoise mining, vis-á-vis the owner of the mine, was for taxpayer to mine and remove turquoise at its cost, so long as its operations did not interfere with the exploration and mining operations of the owner, and pay the owner a royalty rate per pound of turquoise removed.

The Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Section 611(a), allows the deduction of “a reasonable allowance for depletion” of natural deposits, in order to permit the owner of an economic interest in the deposits to effect a .tax-free recovery of the depleting asset. See A. Duda & Sons v. United States, 560 F.2d 669, 673 (5th Cir.1977). Section 613 authorizes as a depletion deduction a percentage, which varies by the kind of deposit involved, of the “gross income from the property,” excluding rents or royalties paid by the taxpayer. The allowance may not exceed 50 percent of the taxpayer’s taxable income from the property.

When more than one property is involved, the depletion deduction must be calculated separately for each property. I.R.C. § 614(a); Treas.Reg. § 1.614-1(a)(l); cf. Bryan v. United States, 162 Ct.Cl. 440, 319 F.2d 880 (1963) (applying 1939 Code). Income and expense records for each property must be maintained so that separate calculations can be made. I.R.C. § 6001; Treas. Reg. § 1.e001-1(a).1

“Gross income from the property” is defined as gross income from mining, section 613(c)(1), since the purpose of the deduction is to compensate for the minerals being depleted. Accordingly, where the extracted minerals are sold without the application of significant manufacturing processes, the gross income received is entirely attributable to the minerals themselves. See Treas.Reg. § 1.613 — 4(a). In such cases, the gross income actually received is multiplied by the depletion percentage for the mineral in question to arrive at the amount of the deduction. The Code and regulations prescribe what processes applied to the minerals are considered to be part of the mining process, so that receipts from the sale, after application of these processes, may still be considered entirely gross income from mining. I.R.C. § 613(c)(4); Treas.Reg. § 1.613-4(f).

Where, however, the taxpayer applies significant other processes (described and defined by the regulations as “non-mining processes,” sections 1.613-4(a), (g)), to the minerals before sale, the gross income received is at least in part attributable to value added by the processes and not solely to the minerals. In such cases, a “constructive” gross income must be calculated, to represent the value of the minerals prior to [467]*467application of the non-mining processes. One method prescribed by the regulations to calculate such constructive gross income requires the determination of a “representative market or field price” of the raw mineral by a comparison of actual sales of the mineral, by the taxpayer and others, prior to application of the non-mining processes. Treas.Reg. § 1.613 — 4(c). Using the actual quality and amounts sold by the taxpayer after processing and the representative prices of these minerals prior to processing, constructive gross income from mining is computed.

The regulations provide that where — as is here found to be the case — it is impossible to determine a representative market or field price, gross income from mining should be computed by use of the “proportionate profits method.” Treas.Reg. § 1.613 — 4(d)(l)(i). This method begins with the taxpayer’s actual gross income from sale of the processed mineral, and then seeks to identify the amount of such income attributable to a taxpayer’s mining operation, i.e., the value of the mineral before processing, so that the deduction is allowed only with respect to the income from mining. Treas.Reg. § 1.613-4(d)(4)(i).

The premise of the proportionate profits method is that each dollar of costs expended to produce and sell the end product earns the same percentage of profit. Therefore, the method multiplies the gross sales by a percentage, produced by the division of mining costs by total mining and nonmining costs, to reduce the gross sales to a lower figure attributable entirely to taxpayer’s mining activities. This lower figure is “gross income from mining,” to which the depletion percentage is applied. The proportionate profits formula, then, is, all mining costs divided by total costs times gross sales equals gross income from mining:

mining costs total costs X gross sales = gross income from mining

Thus if mining costs were $2,000 and total costs of mining and processing $3,000, the percentage produced by the division of the former by the latter is 66 percent, and if gross sales were $9,000, the gross income from mining would be $6,000.

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1 Cl. Ct. 465, 50 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5994, 1982 U.S. Claims LEXIS 2323, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lw-hardy-co-v-united-states-cc-1982.