Lvnv Funding LLC, Etc. v. Vanessa Martinez

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: May 13, 2026
• Docket: A-2094-24
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2094-24

LVNV FUNDING LLC A/P/O HOUSEHOLD BANK (SB) N.A.,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

VANESSA MARTINEZ,

Defendant-Appellant. ___________________________

Argued April 27, 2026 – Decided May 13, 2026

Before Judges Sabatino and Bergman.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County, Docket No. DC-016742-07.

Yongmoon Kim argued the cause for appellant (Kim Law Firm LLC, attorneys; Yongmoon Kim, Mark Jensen, and Nick Gagua, on the briefs).

Jacquelyn A. DiCicco (J. Robbin Law PLLC) argued the cause for respondent (Austin Patrick O'Brien, on the brief).

PER CURIAM Defendant Vanessa Martinez appeals from a Special Civil Part order

denying her motion to vacate a default judgment entered in favor of plaintiff

LVNV Funding, LLC in December 2007. Defendant contends the trial court

erred in denying her motion claiming she was not properly served the summons

and complaint and did not receive notice of the lawsuit or judgment until June

2024. We affirm.

I.

On September 24, 2007, plaintiff filed a debt collection complaint seeking

$1,736.26 from defendant for unpaid revolving credit card charges. At the time

of the complaint filing, defendant's address contained in plaintiff's account file

was at an apartment on Kearney Street in Paterson. On October 4, 2007, the

Special Civil Part Clerk sent a copy of the summons and complaint to defendant

at the Kearney Street address by way of regular and certified mail with return

receipt requested. On October 23, 2007, the Clerk received the Return of

Service of the certified mail marked as "unclaimed," and the regular mailing was

not returned. No answer was filed. Subsequently, plaintiff requested and was

granted a default judgment against defendant in the amount of $1,852.69,

consisting of the charged-off debt owed plus accrued interest and costs as of

December 2007.

A-2094-24 2 In November 2024, defendant moved to vacate the judgment, representing

in a certification that at the time of service and entry of the judgment, she no

longer had resided at the service address, and she moved from that address in

2003. Defendant certified she resided at multiple addresses before eventually

relocating to Puerto Rico with her children in 2006 due to personal hardship.

While living in Puerto Rico, defendant arranged for her tax preparer, Jorge

Cano, whose accounting office was located on Crooks Avenue in Clifton, to

allow her to use that location as her mailing address due to the instability of her

living situation. She returned to New Jersey in the summer of 2007 but lived at

different addresses until finally settling at a Broadway Street address in Paterson

in November 2009.

Defendant asserts that she never received notice of the lawsuit or default

judgment until approximately June 24, 2024, when Cano—who was still serving

as her tax preparer—received mail addressed to defendant concerning a Notice

of Application for Wage Execution at the Crooks Avenue address.

Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing the complaint had been mailed to

the address on her credit account, the Special Civil Part Clerk's certified mail

went unclaimed, and the regular mail had not been returned as undeliverable.

Plaintiff also contended defendant's motion was untimely.

A-2094-24 3 On January 31, 2025, without holding oral argument, the trial court

entered an order denying defendant's motion, finding that although an

application to vacate a default should be "construed liberally," the defendant

moved to vacate default judgment over sixteen years after its entry, and she

failed to show good cause. Further, the court noted that while defendant

contended she moved frequently, she was properly served with the complaint in

September 2007 when she returned to the United States.

On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by (1)

"citing to unpublished decisions in violation of [Rule] 1:36-3[;]" (2) "by failing

to hold oral argument in violation of [Rule] 1:6-2[;]" and (3) in denying

defendant's "motion by misconceiving applicable law and misapplying it to the

factual record." We reject defendant's contentions for reversal.

II.

We review a trial judge's determination on a motion to vacate a default

judgment under Rule 4:50-1 for "a clear abuse of discretion." US Bank Nat'l

Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012). "The trial court's determination

under the rule warrants substantial deference and should not be reversed unless

it results in a clear abuse of discretion." Ibid. To warrant reversal, the movant

must demonstrate that the motion judge's "decision [was] 'made without a

A-2094-24 4 rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested

on an impermissible basis.'" Id. at 467-68 (quoting Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores,

Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 123 (2007)); see also BV001 REO Blocker, LLC v. 53 W.

Somerset St. Props., LLC, 467 N.J. Super. 117, 124 (App. Div. 2021) (finding

that "a trial court mistakenly exercises its discretion when it 'fails to give

appropriate deference to the principles' governing the motion [or] relies 'upon a

consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors'") (internal citations

omitted).

We initially address defendant's procedural contentions that the court

erred by relying on unpublished cases and by not holding oral argument. Under

Rule 1:36-3, "except to the extent required by res judicata, collateral estoppel,

the single controversy doctrine or any other similar principle of law, no

unpublished opinion shall be cited by any court." Unpublished cases are non-

precedential and non-binding. Ibid.

We conclude defendant's argument related to citation to unpublished cases

lacks sufficient merit to warrant an extended discussion in a written opinion. R.

2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add only notwithstanding the court's citation to

unpublished decisions, a review of the record supports the denial of defendant's

A-2094-24 5 motion based on the reasons we set forth later in this opinion related to the

substantive issues surrounding service of process.

Concerning defendant's claim of error based on the court's failure to hold

oral argument, the trial court mistakenly found, "[o]ral argument was not

requested for this matter," when in fact, defendant's motion stated, "oral

argument is waived on this motion unless opposition is filed and as may be

directed by the Court." (emphasis added). Plaintiff opposed the motion, which

defendant contends triggered their request for oral argument.

Rule 1:6-2(d) states:

[N]o motion shall be listed for oral argument unless a party requests oral argument in the moving papers or in timely-filed answering or reply papers, or unless the court directs. A party requesting oral argument may, however, condition the request on the motion being contested. If the motion involves pretrial discovery or is directly addressed to the calendar, the request shall be considered only if accompanied by a statement of reasons and shall be deemed denied unless the court otherwise advises counsel prior to the return day. As to all other motions, the request shall be granted as of right.

A trial court can dispense with a request for oral argument if "special or

unusual circumstances" exist. Filippone v. Lee, 304 N.J. Super. 301, 306 (App.

Div. 1997). Further, where a request for oral argument is "repetitive, frivolous

[or] unsubstantiated," the trial court may, in its discretion, deny the party's

A-2094-24 6 request. See Kozak v. Kozak, 280 N.J. Super. 272, 274-76 (Ch. Div. 1994); see

also Spina Asphalt Paving Excavating Contractors, Inc. v. Borough of Fairview,

304 N.J. Super. 425, 427 n.1 (App. Div. 1997) (noting that while the trial court

provided no justification for the failure to hold oral argument, in violation of

Rule 1:6-2(d), there was no prejudice suffered, rendering remand inappropriate).

Although we do not approve of a court not holding oral argument when

properly requested under Rule 1:6-2(d), here the trial court's failure to hold

argument was apparently unintentional, as it appears the court mistakenly

believed oral argument was not requested. Based on our review of the record,

and our determinations made hereafter related to the alleged deficient service of

process raised by defendant, we conclude defendant was not sufficiently

prejudiced by the court not holding oral argument. Because we conclude

defendant's substantive arguments lack sufficient support based on the reasons

set forth below, we determine a remand to hold oral argument would be futile

under the factual circumstances herein.

In her final argument, defendant contends the trial court improperly

assessed her motion under the "good cause" standard, rather than the appropriate

standard set forth at Rule 4:50-1, which governs defective service of process.

Defendant emphasizes that under Rule 4:50-1(d), if defective service renders a

A-2094-24 7 judgment void, there is no requirement to assert a meritorious defense, and

similarly, Rule 4:50-1(f) does not require such a showing because it is meant for

exceptional circumstances where equity and justice demand relief. Defendant

asserts that by the court applying the incorrect standard, it abused its discretion

requiring reversal. We are not persuaded that reversal is warranted.

Rule 6:2-3(d)(1), governs service of process in the Special Civil Part and

provides, "[t]he clerk of the court shall simultaneously mail . . . such process by

both certified and ordinary mail." "[S]ervice by mail shall have the same effect

as personal service, and the simultaneous mailing shall constitute effective

service unless the mail is returned to the court by the postal service with a

marking indicating it has not been delivered." R. 6:2-3(d)(4). "[I]f the certified

mail is returned to the court marked 'unclaimed' or 'refused,' service is effective

provided that the ordinary mail has not been returned." Ibid.

Rule 4:50-1, in pertinent part, states:

On motion, with briefs, and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment or order . . . (d) [where] the judgment or order is void . . . or (f) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or order.

"A default judgment will be considered void when a substantial deviation

from service of process rules has occurred, casting reasonable doubt on proper

A-2094-24 8 notice." Jameson v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 363 N.J. Super. 419, 425 (App.

Div. 2003) (clarifying when a judgment will be set aside under subsection (d)).

Subsection (f) requires the movant to show "exceptional circumstances" and the

court "may consider the movant's delay, the justification for its request, and

potential prejudice to the responding party." BV001 REO Blocker, 467 N.J.

Super. at 126.

Furthermore, and importantly, the motion must be made within a

reasonable time. R. 4:50-2. "[A] reasonable time is determined based upon the

totality of the circumstances." Romero v. Gold Star Distrib., LLC, 468 N.J.

Super. 274, 296 (App. Div. 2021). Additionally, "[t]he trial court has the

discretion to consider the circumstances of each case." Ibid.

Although the trial court did not thoroughly analyze the motion based on

the Rule 4:50-1 standard and utilized the lack of good cause as its basis for

denial, we conclude that facet of its analysis was harmless. "It is well settled

that a trial court's order or judgment may be affirmed for reasons other than

those expressed by the judge." Price v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 368 N.J. Super. 356,

359 n.1 (App. Div. 2004) (citing Ellison v. Evergreen Cemetery, 266 N.J. Super.

74, 78 (App. Div. 1993)). "[I]f the order of the lower tribunal is valid, the fact

A-2094-24 9 that it was predicated upon an incorrect basis will not stand in the way of

affirmance." Isko v. Planning Bd. of Livingston, 51 N.J. 162, 175 (1968).

Based on our review of the record, defendant has not shown sufficient

grounds to vacate the judgment. The clerk of the Special Civil Part served the

summons and complaint upon defendant by certified and regular mail to her last

known address in accordance with court rules applicable to the Special Civil

Part. Service was duly effectuated on defendant in accordance with Rule 6:2-

3(d)(4) when it was returned as "unclaimed" and the ordinary mail was not

returned. Plaintiff served her at her last known address provided by defendant

as contained in its file. Defendant notably failed to submit a change of address

to the post office when she moved to Puerto Rico prior to the date of service. In

addition, multiple documents, including her tax returns, filed in or about 2007

provided the address utilized by defendant for service. Based on the foregoing,

we conclude plaintiff took appropriate steps to serve defendant in 2007.

Defendant's motion to vacate the default judgment, premised upon Rule 4:50-

1(d) and filed sixteen years after entry of the default judgment, was not

submitted within a reasonable time as required by Rule 4:50-2, nor were

exceptional circumstances demonstrated under Rule 4:50-1(f). We recognize

A-2094-24 10 defendant claims she never received timely service, but she nonetheless fails to

overcome the presumption that the method of service was legally proper.

To the extent we have not addressed any of defendant's remaining

arguments, we conclude those arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

A-2094-24 11