Lumumba v. Pierce County

Opinion

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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 FRANCISCA AJAI NDETA LUMUMBA, Case No. 3:25-cv-05381-TMC 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 SUPPLEMENT COMPLAINT v. 10 PIERCE COUNTY; PIERCE COUNTY 11 JAIL; PIERCE COUNTY SHERIFF'S 12 OFFICE; NAPHCARE INC; MULTICARE 13 HEALTH SYSTEM; JOSHUA PILAND; 14 ALEX UTI; JOHN DOES 1-10; JANE DOES 15 1-5, 16 Defendant. 17

18 This matter comes before the Court on pro se Plaintiff Francisca Ajai Ndeta Lumumba’s 19 motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint. Dkt. 30. For the reasons provided below, the 20 Court GRANTS the motion. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 Ms. Lumumba’s complaint was filed on May 15, 2025. Dkt. 6. The Court granted 23 Ms. Lumumba’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint on June 5, 2025. Dkt. 11. 24 1 The second amended complaint added Defendants NaphCare, Inc., MultiCare Health System, 2 Alexandra M. Brown, Joshua Piland, and Alex Uti. Dkt. 12. It alleged that Defendants used 3 excessive force during her arrest and detention in Pierce County Jail and failed to provide

4 adequate medical care despite her preexisting disabilities. Id. at 3. Ms. Lumumba brought several 5 claims against Defendants for violations of the United States Constitution, Americans with 6 Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and Washington state laws. Id. 7 On July 10, 2025, Ms. Lumumba moved for leave to file a supplemental complaint. 8 Dkt. 30. The supplemental complaint contains additional facts relating to Ms. Lumumba’s 9 medical conditions and Defendants’ conduct during her arrest and detention. See Dkt. 30-2 at 2– 10 6. It also adds new causes of action which include violations of the First Amendment of the 11 United States Constitution, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 12 (“HIPPA”), the Abuse of Vulnerable Adults Act, RCW 74.34, the Involuntary Treatment Act,

13 RCW 71.05, the Public Records Act, RCW 42.56, and RCW 43.43.830. Id. at 2. 14 II. DISCUSSION 15 A. Legal Standard Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), “a party may amend its pleading only with 16 the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when 17 justice so requires.” Courts must apply this policy “with extreme liberality.” Eminence Cap., LLC 18 v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court has discretion to grant or deny a 19 request to amend but must provide justification when it denies a request. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 20 178, 182 (1962). “A motion to amend under Rule 15(a)(2) ‘generally shall be denied only upon 21 showing of bad faith, undue delay, futility, or undue prejudice to the opposing party.’” Chudacoff 22 v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nev., 649 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Foman, 371 U.S. at 23 182. “In exercising this discretion, a court must be guided by the underlying purpose of Rule 15 to 24 1 facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” United States v. 2 Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Chudacoff, 649 F.3d at 1152. 3 B. Leave to Amend

4 The Court grants Ms. Lumumba’s request for leave to file the supplemental complaint. 5 The Court must grant leave to amend “freely” and “with extreme liberality.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 15(a)(2); Eminence, 316 F.3d at 1051. This standard is applied with greater liberality to pro se 7 plaintiffs such as Ms. Lumumba. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation 8 omitted); see Flowers v. First Hawaiian Bank, 295 F.3d 966, 976 (9th Cir. 2002) (the Court is 9 “very cautious in approving a district court’s decision to deny pro se litigants leave to amend.”) 10 (citation omitted); Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) 11 (“Unless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect, . . . a pro se litigant is 12 entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to amend[.]”).

13 Defendants have not opposed Ms. Lumumba’s motion and Ms. Lumumba’s proposed 14 amendments do not appear to be futile or made in bad faith. See Chudacoff, 649 F.3d at 1152. 15 The supplemental complaint adds factual details regarding her preexisting medical conditions 16 and Defendants’ actions during her arrest and detention. See Dkt. 30-2 at 2–6. As for prejudice 17 against Defendants, Ms. Lumumba’s core allegations remain the same and the addition of facts 18 may instead aid in a more “complete adjudication” of this proceeding. Monterey Bay Mil. Hous., 19 LLC v. Pinnacle Monterey LLC, No. 14-CV-03953-BLF, 2015 WL 1737691, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 20 Apr. 13, 2015). At this early stage of the case, the proposed amendments should not cause any 21 delay nor any other prejudice to the Defendants. See Chudacoff, 649 F.3d at 1152. 22 Accordingly, given Ms. Lumumba’s pro se status and the Court’s obligation to liberally

23 construe filings by pro se litigants, the Court will treat the new supplemental complaint, Dkt. 30- 24 2, and the second amended complaint, Dkt. 12, together as the operative complaint. See Erickson 1 v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed,. .. and a 2 || pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal 3 pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]”) (citation modified). 4 I. CONCLUSION 5 The Court thus GRANTS Ms. Lumumba’s motion to file a supplemental complaint 6 (Dkt. 30). The Clerk is directed to file the supplemental complaint at Dkt. 30-2 as part of

7 Ms. Lumumba’s amended complaint at Dkt. 12.

g The Clerk is directed to send uncertified copies of this Order to all counsel of record and

g || to any party appearing pro se at said party’s last known address.

10 Dated this 13th day of August, 2025.

fag 2 Tiffany. Cartwright United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24