Lumbermen's Indemnity Exchange v. Vivier

239 S.W. 286, 1922 Tex. App. LEXIS 536
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedFebruary 3, 1922
DocketNo. 732. [fn*]
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 239 S.W. 286 (Lumbermen's Indemnity Exchange v. Vivier) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lumbermen's Indemnity Exchange v. Vivier, 239 S.W. 286, 1922 Tex. App. LEXIS 536 (Tex. Ct. App. 1922).

Opinions

HIGHTOWER, C. J.

The nature arid result of this suit is clearly stated in appellants’, brief, as follows:

“The suit was brought by the appellants in the district court of Jefferson county, Tex., to set aside the award. made by the Industrial Accident Board, and it was alleged that, on the 27th day of September, 1919, one Jules Vivier, deceased, the then husband of the appellee, Mrs. Jules Vivier, was an employee of the George W. Smyth Lumber Company in Jefferson county, Tex., and that said company was the holder of a policy of insurance issued by the appellants for the payment of compensation under the terms and provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Laws of the state of Texas, as passed by the Legislature of 1913, and amended by the Act of 1917, and was a subscriber under the terms of the act and amendment; that on said date the deceased husband of the appellee was in the employ of the said company as a night watchman at its lumber yards or planing mills in Jefferson county, Tex., and that, while he was engaged in such employment, he was assaulted by unknown parties for the purpose of robbery, and his assailants had no other intention or purpose than to rob the deceased of money or other valuables upon his person, and that after he was assaulted he was robbed; then it was alleged that such assault and assassination did not arise out of any relationship of the deceased with his duties under his employment, and that he did not receive his injury and meet his death in defense of the property intrusted to him as such watchman, but that he was simply assaulted and robbed just as he might have been if he had not been such watchman, and that his assassination had no connection whatever with his work or his duties, so that his injury did not arise out of or in the course of his employment. It was alleged that nevertheless the appellee claimed that her husband was injured in the course of his employment, and that as such surviving widow she was entitled to receive compensation according to said compensation laws, and had made claim for such compensation, and the Industrial Accident Board had heard and considered the claim, and made an award allowing compensation, over the protest of appellants, who had always denied liability for the payment of compensation, and that the Industrial Accident Board had entered its award for compensation on the 17th day of January, 1920, whereby it was determined that the deceased was earning an average weekly wage of $19.25, and the Board awarded compensation in 60 per cent, of said amount, ox $11.55 per week for a period of 360 weeks, beginning September 27, 1919, and to continue thereafter until the full amount should be satisfied. It was alleged that in due time appellants duly notified the appel-lee and the Industrial Accident Board that they were not willing and did not consent; to abide by the final ruling and decision of the Board, and that they would institute suit to set aside the final ruling and decision of the court, and this suit was brought to set aside the award in due time and in due course.
“Appellee answered appellants’ petition and filed a cross-action against appellants as the original plaintiffs, and asserted as the basis therefor the right to compensation accruing under the facts involved by the foregoing allegations.
“It was the contention of appellants upon the trial that there could be no recovery for compensation because, under all the facts and circumstances, it should be held that the injuries to deceased were not sustained in the cours0 of Ms employment within the terms and pro *287 visions of the Compensation Law as amended in 1917, but the trial court held that said injuries were received in the course of employment, and that the appellee would be entitled to recover compensation, and made its award accordingly, decreeing that the appellee was entitled to recover from the appellants on her cross-action, the sum of $11.55 per week for a period of 360 weeks, beginning September 27, 1919, and that appellee was entitled to recover at the date of the judgment for a period of 71 weeks, aggregating the sum of $820.05, with interest from the date of the judgment at 6 per cent, per annum, and that an additional amount should be paid by appellants from week to week.”

From the judgment against them, appellants have duly prosecuted an appeal to this court.

We find in the brief of appellants two assignments of error, which are submitted together, as follows:

“The court erred in holding and finding that Mrs. Jules Vivier was entitled to recover on her cross-action compensation against said original plaintiffs as arising under the terms and provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Law of the State of Texas as amended by the act of the Legislature of 1917.”
(2) “All of the facts and evidence show that the injury which Jules Vivier received was not sustained in the course of his employment as an employee of the Geo. W. Smyth Lumber, Company, and that the injury so sustained by him and from which he died was caused by an act of a third person intended to injure the said Jules Vivier because of reasons personal to him, and not directed against him as an employee of the Geo. W. Smyth Lumber Company, or because of his employment by the Geo. W. Smyth Lumber Company, the subscriber in question, and the court erred in holding and finding that the injury from which Jules Vivier died was sustained in the course of his employment as an employee of the Geo. W. Smyth Lumber Company, and in rendering judgment for the compensation claimed on account of his death.”

These assignments are submitted as a proposition within themselves.

A majority of this court, after full consideration, have reached the ' conclusion that the assignments must be sustained; Associate Justice WALKER dissenting. In view of the dissent, and to the end that there may be no misunderstanding or mistake about the evidence upon which the trial judge rendered his judgment, we have deemed it well to let this opinion show every word of the material testimony that was introduced below, and in doing So we could not shorten the opinion materially by making our own statement of the evidence, and will therefore let the opinion show it in full, as given by the witnesses themselves.

It was agreed by the parties below that the- George W. Smyth Lumber Company was a subscriber under the Workmen’s Compensation Laws of this state (Vernon’s Ann. Civ. St. Supp. 1918, arts. 5246 — 1 to 5246— 91), and carried a policy with appellants, which was in force at the time of the injury to Jules Vivier, who was an employee of said lumber company. At the commencement of the trial below appellee assumed the burden resting upon her to show that she was entitled to compensation as prayed. The first witness introduced was F. E. Sager, manager for the George W. Smyth Lumber Company, whose testimony was as follows:

“Direct Examination.
“My name is F. E. Sager, and I am manager for the George W. Smyth Lumber Company in Beaumont, Tex. As manager of that company I have charge, or disposition, of hiring and firing the employees.
“On or about the 27th day of September, A. D. 1919, Mr. Jules Vivier was in the employ of the George W. Smyth Lumber Company; his position with that company on that date was that of night watchman in the sash and door department.

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Related

Texas Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Cheely
232 S.W.2d 124 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1950)
Vivier v. Lumbermen's Indemnity Exch.
250 S.W. 417 (Texas Commission of Appeals, 1923)

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Bluebook (online)
239 S.W. 286, 1922 Tex. App. LEXIS 536, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lumbermens-indemnity-exchange-v-vivier-texapp-1922.