F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 14 1998 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
CORY DEAN LUMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 97-2073 (D.C. No. CIV-94-1313) DONALD A. DORSEY, Warden; (D. N.M.) ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON, McKAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore,
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. appellant’s request for oral argument is denied, and the case is ordered submitted
without oral argument.
Petitioner Cory Dean Luman appeals the district court’s denial of his
petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On appeal,
petitioner asserts (1) ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing; (2) the
district court abused its discretion in improperly considering petitioner’s mental
health in sentencing in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; and (3)
the sentences imposed were disproportionate to the offenses committed thus
violating the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. We have previously granted a
certificate of appealability, we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253,
and we affirm.
I. Background
Petitioner was charged with eighteen counts of aggravated burglary,
aggravated battery, criminal sexual penetration, and kidnaping. The first seven
counts arose out of a rape committed against a female victim in her home on or
about January 2, 1989. The remaining ten counts related to a rape committed
against another female victim in her home on or about January 15, 1992.
Petitioner pled guilty to six counts of the indictment and to habitual offender
status due to a previous felony conviction for criminal sexual contact of a minor,
his niece. In return, the state dismissed the remaining twelve counts of the
-2- indictment. Petitioner was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment on each count
to run consecutively plus a one-year enhancement for the habitual offender status
for a total of fifty-five years.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
In reviewing the denial of a federal habeas corpus petition, we accept the
district court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, and we review the
court’s conclusions of law de novo. See Matthews v. Price, 83 F.3d 328, 331
(10th Cir. 1996).
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Initially, petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
at sentencing when his attorney “recommended the maximum sentence to the
court and the facts justified imposition of a lesser sentence.” Appellant’s Br. in
Chief at 11. Petitioner alleges that his counsel should have argued in his favor
for some sentencing relief, and his failure to do so constituted ineffective
assistance.
A district court decision “that [counsel] was not ineffective is a mixed
question of fact and law which we review de novo.” United States v. Carter, No.
97-2122, 1997 WL 770595, at *9 (10th Cir. Dec. 16, 1997). The district court’s
findings of fact underlying the decision, however, are reviewed only for clear
-3- error. Id. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, petitioner must show
that counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,”
and that counsel’s deficient performance so prejudiced the proceeding, that absent
the alleged errors, the outcome would have been different. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 692 (1984).
Petitioner asserts that counsel made certain statements at sentencing that
prejudiced his sentencing, and that without those statements, petitioner would
have received a lighter sentence. He also contends that counsel failed to argue in
his behalf. Specifically, petitioner alleges that counsel’s statement to the court
that petitioner was “truly sorry, but sorry doesn’t cut it with the Court, doesn’t cut
it with the community,” his statement that petitioner “molested a woman in her
home and destroyed her feeling of safety before he was apprehended,” and his
statement that petitioner “should be given the maximum sentence of 55 years,” R.
Vol. I, tab 8, ex. C-1 at 12-13, so prejudiced the sentencing as to be considered
ineffective assistance.
We agree that the statements petitioner refers to in his brief, when read
cold and out of context, produce some cause for concern. When read in the full
content of counsel’s advocacy at the sentencing hearing, however, counsel’s
statements, although possibly not “prudent or appropriate,” Duvall v. Reynolds,
No. 96-6329, 1997 WL 758810, at *3 (10th Cir. Dec. 10, 1997), were nonetheless
-4- constitutionally permissible. As expanded below, it appears that counsel believed
his client would get the presumptive sentence of nine years on each count and that
his forthright acknowledgment of the seriousness of the offense could avoid the
one-third increase for aggravating circumstances and persuade the court to
combine a substantial suspension of sentence with conditions of treatment and
counseling.
Even if counsel’s remarks at sentencing were to be considered
constitutionally deficient performance, however, we determine that petitioner
failed to establish that the district court’s sentencing decision was prejudiced by
counsel’s statements, or that, but for counsel’s remarks, the sentence would have
been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692-93. The six counts to which
petitioner pled guilty were all second degree felonies which in New Mexico carry
a basic sentence of nine years. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-15(A)(3). This basic
sentence can be altered by one-third for mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
See id. § 31-18-15.1. Accordingly, when accepting petitioner’s plea, the court
correctly explained that the sentencing range for each of the counts in the plea
was no more that twelve or less than six years. 1 The court further explained to
1 Petitioner erroneously states in his brief that the plea agreement “contemplated a range of imprisonment of six to nine years for each offense.” Appellant’s Br. in Chief at 20. It is evident that petitioner clearly understood his plea to carry a sentencing range of six to twelve years for each offense, with a (continued...)
-5- petitioner that his plea carried a presumptive sentence of nine years on each count
and that the sentences could run consecutively for a total of fifty-four years. The
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F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 14 1998 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
CORY DEAN LUMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 97-2073 (D.C. No. CIV-94-1313) DONALD A. DORSEY, Warden; (D. N.M.) ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON, McKAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore,
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. appellant’s request for oral argument is denied, and the case is ordered submitted
without oral argument.
Petitioner Cory Dean Luman appeals the district court’s denial of his
petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On appeal,
petitioner asserts (1) ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing; (2) the
district court abused its discretion in improperly considering petitioner’s mental
health in sentencing in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; and (3)
the sentences imposed were disproportionate to the offenses committed thus
violating the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. We have previously granted a
certificate of appealability, we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253,
and we affirm.
I. Background
Petitioner was charged with eighteen counts of aggravated burglary,
aggravated battery, criminal sexual penetration, and kidnaping. The first seven
counts arose out of a rape committed against a female victim in her home on or
about January 2, 1989. The remaining ten counts related to a rape committed
against another female victim in her home on or about January 15, 1992.
Petitioner pled guilty to six counts of the indictment and to habitual offender
status due to a previous felony conviction for criminal sexual contact of a minor,
his niece. In return, the state dismissed the remaining twelve counts of the
-2- indictment. Petitioner was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment on each count
to run consecutively plus a one-year enhancement for the habitual offender status
for a total of fifty-five years.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
In reviewing the denial of a federal habeas corpus petition, we accept the
district court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, and we review the
court’s conclusions of law de novo. See Matthews v. Price, 83 F.3d 328, 331
(10th Cir. 1996).
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Initially, petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
at sentencing when his attorney “recommended the maximum sentence to the
court and the facts justified imposition of a lesser sentence.” Appellant’s Br. in
Chief at 11. Petitioner alleges that his counsel should have argued in his favor
for some sentencing relief, and his failure to do so constituted ineffective
assistance.
A district court decision “that [counsel] was not ineffective is a mixed
question of fact and law which we review de novo.” United States v. Carter, No.
97-2122, 1997 WL 770595, at *9 (10th Cir. Dec. 16, 1997). The district court’s
findings of fact underlying the decision, however, are reviewed only for clear
-3- error. Id. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, petitioner must show
that counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,”
and that counsel’s deficient performance so prejudiced the proceeding, that absent
the alleged errors, the outcome would have been different. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 692 (1984).
Petitioner asserts that counsel made certain statements at sentencing that
prejudiced his sentencing, and that without those statements, petitioner would
have received a lighter sentence. He also contends that counsel failed to argue in
his behalf. Specifically, petitioner alleges that counsel’s statement to the court
that petitioner was “truly sorry, but sorry doesn’t cut it with the Court, doesn’t cut
it with the community,” his statement that petitioner “molested a woman in her
home and destroyed her feeling of safety before he was apprehended,” and his
statement that petitioner “should be given the maximum sentence of 55 years,” R.
Vol. I, tab 8, ex. C-1 at 12-13, so prejudiced the sentencing as to be considered
ineffective assistance.
We agree that the statements petitioner refers to in his brief, when read
cold and out of context, produce some cause for concern. When read in the full
content of counsel’s advocacy at the sentencing hearing, however, counsel’s
statements, although possibly not “prudent or appropriate,” Duvall v. Reynolds,
No. 96-6329, 1997 WL 758810, at *3 (10th Cir. Dec. 10, 1997), were nonetheless
-4- constitutionally permissible. As expanded below, it appears that counsel believed
his client would get the presumptive sentence of nine years on each count and that
his forthright acknowledgment of the seriousness of the offense could avoid the
one-third increase for aggravating circumstances and persuade the court to
combine a substantial suspension of sentence with conditions of treatment and
counseling.
Even if counsel’s remarks at sentencing were to be considered
constitutionally deficient performance, however, we determine that petitioner
failed to establish that the district court’s sentencing decision was prejudiced by
counsel’s statements, or that, but for counsel’s remarks, the sentence would have
been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692-93. The six counts to which
petitioner pled guilty were all second degree felonies which in New Mexico carry
a basic sentence of nine years. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-15(A)(3). This basic
sentence can be altered by one-third for mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
See id. § 31-18-15.1. Accordingly, when accepting petitioner’s plea, the court
correctly explained that the sentencing range for each of the counts in the plea
was no more that twelve or less than six years. 1 The court further explained to
1 Petitioner erroneously states in his brief that the plea agreement “contemplated a range of imprisonment of six to nine years for each offense.” Appellant’s Br. in Chief at 20. It is evident that petitioner clearly understood his plea to carry a sentencing range of six to twelve years for each offense, with a (continued...)
-5- petitioner that his plea carried a presumptive sentence of nine years on each count
and that the sentences could run consecutively for a total of fifty-four years. The
court also explained that due to a prior conviction, petitioner could receive an
additional one-year sentence as an habitual offender. See id. § 31-18-17. As
predicted, petitioner was sentenced to fifty-five years’ incarceration. It is clear
that under the prejudice prong of Strickland, petitioner failed to show that, but for
counsel’s remarks or omissions, his sentence would have been less.
Petitioner further asserts that counsel failed to argue mitigating factors
which could have influenced the sentence in his favor, including his abusive
childhood, his emotional problems, the sudden death of his brother, and his need
for treatment. On the contrary, our review of counsel’s remarks at sentencing
indicates that he mentioned all of these factors. See R. Vol. I, tab 8, ex. C-1 at
12-14. Moreover, counsel elicited testimony from Rob Colby, an evaluator with
the Forensic Evaluation Service, who specifically requested that the court provide
petitioner with mandatory treatment as part of his incarceration. See id. at 7. In
addition, counsel elicited testimony from petitioner’s father who opined that
petitioner needed “help.” Id. at 11-12. Counsel then requested that the court
1 (...continued) “presumptive sentence of nine years.” Tr. of Plea, May 21, 1992, at 2. Based on the six to twelve year range explained by the court at the time petitioner entered his plea, petitioner’s repeated assertions in his brief that the sentencing court imposed the “maximum” sentence is also in error.
-6- suspend all but twenty or twenty-five years of petitioner’s sentence conditioned
on a five-year probation period during which time he could receive needed
therapy and sex abuse counseling within the prison environment with the goal of
rejoining the community. See id. at 13-14. In conclusion, we determine that
counsel’s advocacy at petitioner’s sentencing, although perhaps clumsy, did
not constitute deficient performance which prejudiced the proceeding, and we
therefore reject petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
C. Mental Health Factors
Next, petitioner alleges that in sentencing him, the court failed to consider
mental health factors which contributed to his offenses in violation of his due
process rights. Specifically, petitioner alleges that the court should have
considered his abusive childhood, the recent untimely death of his brother, and his
need for treatment as factors mitigating his sentence.
Initially we note that a sentencing court’s failure to consider mitigating
factors does not constitute a violation of constitutional rights. See Scrivner v.
Tansy, 68 F.3d 1234, 1240 (10th Cir. 1995) (no violation of constitutional rights
occurs when court does not consider mitigating factors during sentencing in
noncapital case). The record indicates that the sentencing court was attentive to
the statements of one of the victims, the evaluating psychologist, petitioner’s
-7- father, petitioner’s counsel, and petitioner, as well as to the prosecution. The
court concluded that, although there were usually reasons for the kind of violent
behavior of which petitioner was convicted, it also had to consider the need for
punishment and the need to protect society.
Moreover, our reading of the court’s statements indicate that the court
recognized petitioner’s need for treatment and recommended that, if possible, he
be sent to a facility where treatment was available. Therefore, contrary to
petitioner’s contentions, we discern no relevant omission in the information
provided to the court, or any constitutional breach in the court’s consideration of
the information provided.
D. Disproportionate Sentences
Finally, petitioner asserts that, in light of the mitigating mental health
factors, the sentences imposed were disproportionate to the offenses committed
and excessively punitive. Petitioner argues that the sentences constitute cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Solem v. Helm,
463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983) (“cruel and unusual punishments” include “sentences
that are disproportionate to the crime committed”).
The Supreme Court’s proportionality analysis in Solem includes an
assessment of “(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii)
-8- the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the
sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.” 463
U.S. at 292. In reviewing claims that a sentence is disproportionate to the crime,
we “grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily
possess in determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes, as well as
to the discretion that trial courts possess in sentencing convicted criminals.” Id.
at 290; see also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980) (“Outside the
context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of
particular sentences have been exceedingly rare.”).
Here, petitioner does not refute the gravity or violence of his crimes.
Although petitioner attempts to compare his sentence to some meted out for
murder, he fails to address the sentences imposed for the same crimes in New
Mexico or other jurisdictions. We conclude that petitioner has failed to establish
that his sentences were disproportionate. 2 Moreover, because petitioner’s
sentence falls within the prescribed statutory limits, it generally cannot be found
to be cruel and unusual punishment. See United States v. Youngpeter, 986 F.2d
349, 355 (10th Cir. 1993).
2 We note that roughly calculating the range of petitioner’s sentence under the federal sentencing guidelines reveals that petitioner fares much better under the state sentencing scheme, especially in light of the parole possibility existent in the state scheme.
-9- The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of New
Mexico is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay Circuit Judge
-10-