Luis Vento Perez v. U S Dept of Homeland Security, Immigration & Customs Enforcement

• Court: District Court, M.D. Florida
• Decided: June 24, 2026
• Docket: 2:26-cv-01817
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION

LUIS VENTO PEREZ,

Petitioner, Case No. 2:26-cv-1817-KCD-KRH

v.

U S DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,

Respondents. /

ORDER Petitioner Luis Vento Perez has filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his detention by U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). (Doc. 1.)1 He claims that his continued imprisonment violates the Fifth Amendment. Respondents oppose the petition. (Doc. 14.) For the reasons below, the petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. I. Background Perez is a native of Cuba who entered the United States in 1999. (Doc. 1 at 7.) An immigration judge ordered his removal in 2001. Perez was placed in immigration custody on December 23, 2025, to execute the removal order. According to the unrebutted record, on February 9, 2026, ICE transported

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, case history, and alterations have been omitted in this and later citations. Perez to the southern border to remove him to Mexico, but he did not cooperate. (Doc. 14-2.) He apparently refused to depart his housing unit in El

Paso, Texas. (Id. at 2.) This habeas petition followed. II. Legal Framework The federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, provides authority to issue writs of habeas corpus when an individual is “[i]n custody in violation of

the Constitution or law or treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). “At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001).

“Section 2241 authorizes federal courts to hear challenges to immigration detention.” Grigorian v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 2604573, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2025). III. Discussion

A. Substantive Due Process The statutory framework for removal works like this: when a noncitizen’s removal order becomes final, like here, the government has 90 days to effectuate removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). During that period,

detention is mandatory. Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). If the 90 days pass and the noncitizen is still here, the statute gives the government a choice: release the individual on supervision or keep them detained. Id. § 1231(a)(6). But as the Supreme Court explained in Zadvydas v. Davis, the authority to detain does not stretch into infinity. To avoid serious

constitutional problems, the Court read an implicit limitation into the statute: the government may detain a noncitizen only for a period “reasonably necessary” to secure his removal. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). And to make that rule workable, the Court established a presumption. For the first

six months, detention is presumptively reasonable. Id. at 701. After that period has passed and the alien “provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” the burden then shifts to the government to provide evidence sufficient to rebut

that showing. Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002). Thus, “in order to state a claim under Zadvydas, the alien not only must show post-removal order detention in excess of six months but also must provide evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no significant

likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. ICE took Perez into custody on December 23, 2025, which is just at the six-month mark today. But according to the unrebutted record, he has refused removal to Mexico. (Doc. 14-2.) Such conduct tolls the detention

period. See Akinwale, 287 F.3d at 1052 n.4 (stating that “removal period shall be extended ... if the alien ... acts to prevent the alien’s removal subject to an order of removal”). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C), the removal clock stops ticking if an alien refuses to cooperate in obtaining travel documents. It also tolls if the

alien “conspires or acts to prevent [his] removal.” Id. Common sense (and the Eleventh Circuit) tells us that a person cannot actively thwart his own deportation and then use the resulting delay to demand his freedom. Whether by stubbornly withholding a signature on a required form or by

affirmatively taking steps to sabotage the government’s efforts, an alien who engineers his own prolonged detention cannot turn around and complain about it. The law does not reward that kind of gamesmanship. See Quo Zing Song v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 516 F. App’x 894, 899 (11th Cir. 2013) (“The six-

month period is tolled, however, if the alien acts to prevent his removal.”). That is precisely the game Perez is playing here. He claims his detention violates the Fifth Amendment, yet his refusal to cooperate with ICE is the very roadblock keeping him in custody.2 If he signs the paperwork

and gets off the bus, his removal is reasonably foreseeable; if he does not, the delay is entirely of his own making. Because Perez is apparently responsible

2 The Immigration and Nationality Act does not leave an individual without recourse if he objects to his designated destination. The statute provides a framework for contesting removal to a specific third country. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b). But nowhere in his petition does Perez allege—let alone offer evidence to show—that he has formally challenged his proposed removal to Mexico. Instead, he has apparently dug in his heels and refused to physically depart the United States. Because it seems he bypassed the proper legal channels for contesting his destination, the Court accepts he is legally subject to removal to Mexico. for stalling his own departure, the presumptively reasonable period for his detention is tolled.

B. Procedural Due Process As best the Court can tell, Perez also presses a procedural due process claim, alleging that he was not “given notice or an interview” in violation of the Fifth Amendment. (Doc. 1 at 7.) The Court cannot agree. To understand

why, start with the baseline reality of Perez’s legal status. He is a noncitizen subject to a final, unexecuted order of removal. His release on supervision was a matter of administrative grace born of logistical necessity, not a permanent constitutional entitlement. When the Government determines

that circumstances have changed and it is finally time to carry out its removal order, the Constitution does not demand a full-dress, pre-deprivation trial. Due process, as the Supreme Court has often reminded us, is flexible. It “calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). In the context of revoking a noncitizen’s supervised release and detaining him, like here, ICE’s regulations strike that constitutional balance by guaranteeing written notice and an informal interview that allows the

individual to respond. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(l)(1), 241.13(i). According to the unrebutted record, Perez received both. (See Doc. 14-1 at 10-12.) He got exactly what the Fifth Amendment requires in this context—notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). The Constitution guarantees a fair process, not a favorable result. Because ICE afforded Perez the requisite notice and an opportunity to be heard, his procedural due process claim fails. IV. Conclusion Perez’s due process claim under Zadvydas is stalled for noncooperation, so the habeas petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to him refiling a new petition should his current detention go unimpeded and he can demonstrate there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly, terminate any pending motions and deadlines, and close the case. ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on June 24, 2026.

KyleC.Dudek United States District Judge