Luis Rene Sanchez Centella v. Warden, Florida Soft Side South Detention Center, U.S. Attorney General

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION

LUIS RENE SANCHEZ

CENTELLA, Case No. 2:26-cv-01777-KCD-NPM

Plaintiff,

v.

WARDEN, FLORIDA SOFT SIDE SOUTH DETENTION CENTER, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Defendants, /

ORDER Petitioner Luis Rene Sanchez Centella is a Cuban citizen with a final order of removal. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) apparently could not deport him at the time, so he was released. After spending years living in the community under supervision, Centella was returned to immigration custody on February 10, 2026. He now seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, asking this Court to order his immediate release. (Doc. 1.) For the reasons below, the petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. I. Legal Framework The federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, provides authority to issue writs of habeas corpus when an individual is “[i]n custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). “At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing

the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). “Section 2241 authorizes federal courts to hear challenges to immigration detention.” Grigorian v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 2604573, at *2 (S.D. Fla.

Sept. 9, 2025). II. Discussion Centella’s pro se habeas petition is not easy to decipher. He presses several claims that seem to overlap, and he invokes the Fifth Amendment

across multiple counts. (See Doc. 1-1.) As best the Court can tell, Centalla’s primary argument is that he has been detained beyond the bounds of what substantive due process allows. The statutory framework for removal works like this: when a

noncitizen’s removal order becomes final, like here, the government has 90 days to effectuate removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). During that period, detention is mandatory. Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). If the 90 days pass and the noncitizen is still here, the statute gives the government a choice: release the

individual on supervision or keep them detained. Id. § 1231(a)(6). But as the Supreme Court explained in Zadvydas v. Davis, the authority to detain does not stretch into infinity. To avoid serious constitutional problems, the Court read an implicit limitation into the statute: the government may detain a noncitizen only for a period “reasonably necessary”

to secure his removal. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). And to make that rule workable, the Court established a presumption. For the first six months, detention is presumptively reasonable. Id. at 701. After that period has passed and the alien “provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of

removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” the burden then shifts to the government to provide evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002). Thus, “in order to state a [substantive due process] claim under Zadvydas, the alien not only must show

post-removal order detention in excess of six months but also must provide evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. ICE took Centella into custody on February 10, 2026. Because he has

been detained for less than six months, he remains within the window in which his detention is presumptively reasonable. Seemingly recognizing this, the habeas petition jumps to the burden-shifting framework, arguing that his removal is not likely. (Doc. 1-1.) But that argument puts the cart before the

horse. Until the six-month Zadvydas period concludes, detention is presumptively reasonable, and any due process claim is not ripe. See, e.g., Grigorian v. Bondi, Case No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 1895479, at *8 (S.D. Fla. July 8, 2025); Lopez v. Dir. of Enf’t and Removal Operations, Case No. 3:25-cv-1313-JEP-SJH, 2026 WL 261938, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2026);

Guerra-Castro v. Parra, Case No. 25-cv-22487-GAYLES, 2025 WL 1984300 at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2025) (finding habeas petition “premature” because “Petitioner has not been detained for more than six months”). Centella also raises several procedural arguments. He seemingly claims

ICE failed to provide him notice or a hearing before ending his supervised release. But the law “does not mandate a pre-deprivation process” here. Delgado De Armas v. Warden of Fla. Soft Side S. Facility, No. 2:26-CV-792- KCD-DNF, 2026 WL 1506096, at *5 (M.D. Fla. May 29, 2026). “It allows the

agency to revoke a release order and detain an individual based on changed circumstances without first convening a panel or holding a hearing.” Id. Similarly, he claims ICE has not provided a meaningful custody review. When the Supreme Court confronted the constitutional perils of indefinite

immigration detention in Zadvydas, it did not instruct lower courts to start weighing the process afforded to the detainee. It set a timer. For the first six months, detention is presumptively reasonable. 533 U.S. at 701. So until that timer goes off, Zadvydas itself seemingly supplies the constitutional metric.

Martinez v. Larose, 968 F.3d 555, 566 (6th Cir. 2020). “In other words, the Zadvydas standard is due process: a § 1231 detainee who fails the Zadvydas test fails to prove a due process violation.” Castaneda v. Perry, 95 F.4th 750, 760 (4th Cir. 2024). Because Centella’s detention is barely out of the starting gate, he is not yet entitled to anything more. III. Conclusion Centella has not been detained long enough to transform his authorized custody into a substantive due process violation under Zadvydas. And his remaining arguments—whether grounded in procedural due process or the like—do not warrant habeas relief. Because Centella has not shown his detention is unlawful, his petition (Doc. 1) must be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly, terminate any pending motions, and close the case. ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on July 2, 2026.

KyleC.Dudek =—> United States District Judge