UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION
LUIS RAMIREZ RODRIGUEZ,
Petitioner, Case No. 2:26-cv-1440-KCD-DNF v.
FIELD OFFICER DIRECTOR, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
Respondents. /
ORDER Petitioner Luis Ramirez Rodriguez has filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his detention by U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). (Doc. 1.)1 He claims that his continued imprisonment violates the Fifth Amendment. Respondents oppose the petition. (Doc. 6.) For the reasons below, the petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. I. Background Rodriguez is a native of Cuba who entered the United States in 2007. (Doc. 6-1 at 2.) A year later, an immigration judge ordered him removed. (Id.) When that removal did not come to fruition, he was placed on an order of
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, case history, and alterations have been omitted in this and later citations. supervision and released from custody. According to the records provided, Rodriguez’s removal order is final.
On November 6, 2025, ICE took Rodriguez into immigration custody to execute the removal order. According to the unrebutted record, on February 3, 2026, ICE transported Rodriguez to the southern border to remove him to Mexico, but he refused to cooperate. (Doc. 6-2.) He refused to get dressed and
get on the bus. (Id. at 2.) This habeas petition followed. II. Legal Framework The federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, provides authority to issue writs of habeas corpus when an individual is “[i]n custody in violation of
the Constitution or law or treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). “At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001).
“Section 2241 authorizes federal courts to hear challenges to immigration detention.” Grigorian v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 2604573, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2025). III. Discussion
A. Substantive Due Process Invoking the Fifth Amendment, Rodriguez claims that he has been detained beyond the bounds of what substantive due process allows. The Fifth Amendment protects noncitizens during deportation proceedings. At the same time, however, “detention during deportation proceedings [is] a
constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). “[T]he through line of history is recognition of the Government’s sovereign authority to set the terms governing the admission and exclusion of noncitizens.” Dep’t of State v. Munoz, 602 U.S. 899, 911-12
(2024). “In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976). Because immigration detention is a civil tool rather than a criminal
penalty, the constitutional line is generally drawn at punishment. See Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1387 (10th Cir. 1981). By contrast, the Government can lawfully hold a noncitizen to ensure they are present for removal or to keep the public safe. That is simply the machinery
of the immigration system doing its job. A substantive due process violation happens only when that machinery breaks down—when the detention loses its reasonable connection to effectuating a removal order and morphs into a penalty. Cf. Lee v. Stone, No. 2:11-CV-00014-RWS, 2011 WL 4553147, at *7
(N.D. Ga. Aug. 25, 2011). So long as the custody serves a legitimate immigration purpose rather than acting as a punitive measure, it stays on the right side of the Constitution. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987); Rodriguez v. Perry, 747 F. Supp. 3d 911, 917 (E.D. Va. 2024) (“[A]liens . . . have a substantive due process right to be free of arbitrary
confinement pending deportation proceedings.”). Rodriguez cannot show that his current stint in custody is a punishment masquerading as immigration processing or is otherwise arbitrary. He is subject to a final removal order that stands uncontested. The
INA explicitly authorizes a return to detention to effectuate such orders. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). And the government no doubt has a legitimate interest in doing exactly that—enforcing its laws, ensuring individuals do not flee, and protecting the public. See Malam v. Adducci, 469 F. Supp. 3d 767, 790
(E.D. Mich. 2020). Here, the Government revoked Rodriguez’s release specifically to enforce his outstanding removal order. Returning him to custody thus serves a recognized, legitimate government objective Nor is Rodriguez being held beyond what the Constitution allows.
When a noncitizen’s removal order becomes final, like here, the government has 90 days to effectuate removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). During that period, detention is mandatory. Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). If the 90 days pass and the noncitizen is still here, the statute gives the government a choice: release
the individual on supervision or keep them detained. Id. § 1231(a)(6). But as the Supreme Court explained in Zadvydas v. Davis, the authority to detain does not stretch into infinity. To avoid serious constitutional problems, the Court read an implicit limitation into the statute: the government may detain a noncitizen only for a period
“reasonably necessary” to secure his removal. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). And to make that rule workable, the Court established a presumption. For the first six months, detention is presumptively reasonable. Id. at 701. After that period has passed and the alien “provides good reason to believe that there is
no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” the burden then shifts to the government to provide evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002). Thus, “in order to state a claim under Zadvydas, the alien not only must
show post-removal order detention in excess of six months but also must provide evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. ICE took Rodriguez into custody on November 6, 2025, which is beyond
six months. But according to the unrebutted record, he has since refused removal to Mexico. (Doc. 6-2.) Such conduct tolls the detention period. See Akinwale, 287 F.3d at 1052 n.4 (stating that “removal period shall be extended ... if the alien ... acts to prevent the alien’s removal subject to an
order of removal”). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C), the removal clock stops ticking if an alien refuses to cooperate in obtaining travel documents. It also tolls if the alien “conspires or acts to prevent [his] removal.” Id.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION
LUIS RAMIREZ RODRIGUEZ,
Petitioner, Case No. 2:26-cv-1440-KCD-DNF v.
FIELD OFFICER DIRECTOR, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
Respondents. /
ORDER Petitioner Luis Ramirez Rodriguez has filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his detention by U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). (Doc. 1.)1 He claims that his continued imprisonment violates the Fifth Amendment. Respondents oppose the petition. (Doc. 6.) For the reasons below, the petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. I. Background Rodriguez is a native of Cuba who entered the United States in 2007. (Doc. 6-1 at 2.) A year later, an immigration judge ordered him removed. (Id.) When that removal did not come to fruition, he was placed on an order of
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, case history, and alterations have been omitted in this and later citations. supervision and released from custody. According to the records provided, Rodriguez’s removal order is final.
On November 6, 2025, ICE took Rodriguez into immigration custody to execute the removal order. According to the unrebutted record, on February 3, 2026, ICE transported Rodriguez to the southern border to remove him to Mexico, but he refused to cooperate. (Doc. 6-2.) He refused to get dressed and
get on the bus. (Id. at 2.) This habeas petition followed. II. Legal Framework The federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, provides authority to issue writs of habeas corpus when an individual is “[i]n custody in violation of
the Constitution or law or treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). “At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001).
“Section 2241 authorizes federal courts to hear challenges to immigration detention.” Grigorian v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 2604573, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2025). III. Discussion
A. Substantive Due Process Invoking the Fifth Amendment, Rodriguez claims that he has been detained beyond the bounds of what substantive due process allows. The Fifth Amendment protects noncitizens during deportation proceedings. At the same time, however, “detention during deportation proceedings [is] a
constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). “[T]he through line of history is recognition of the Government’s sovereign authority to set the terms governing the admission and exclusion of noncitizens.” Dep’t of State v. Munoz, 602 U.S. 899, 911-12
(2024). “In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976). Because immigration detention is a civil tool rather than a criminal
penalty, the constitutional line is generally drawn at punishment. See Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1387 (10th Cir. 1981). By contrast, the Government can lawfully hold a noncitizen to ensure they are present for removal or to keep the public safe. That is simply the machinery
of the immigration system doing its job. A substantive due process violation happens only when that machinery breaks down—when the detention loses its reasonable connection to effectuating a removal order and morphs into a penalty. Cf. Lee v. Stone, No. 2:11-CV-00014-RWS, 2011 WL 4553147, at *7
(N.D. Ga. Aug. 25, 2011). So long as the custody serves a legitimate immigration purpose rather than acting as a punitive measure, it stays on the right side of the Constitution. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987); Rodriguez v. Perry, 747 F. Supp. 3d 911, 917 (E.D. Va. 2024) (“[A]liens . . . have a substantive due process right to be free of arbitrary
confinement pending deportation proceedings.”). Rodriguez cannot show that his current stint in custody is a punishment masquerading as immigration processing or is otherwise arbitrary. He is subject to a final removal order that stands uncontested. The
INA explicitly authorizes a return to detention to effectuate such orders. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). And the government no doubt has a legitimate interest in doing exactly that—enforcing its laws, ensuring individuals do not flee, and protecting the public. See Malam v. Adducci, 469 F. Supp. 3d 767, 790
(E.D. Mich. 2020). Here, the Government revoked Rodriguez’s release specifically to enforce his outstanding removal order. Returning him to custody thus serves a recognized, legitimate government objective Nor is Rodriguez being held beyond what the Constitution allows.
When a noncitizen’s removal order becomes final, like here, the government has 90 days to effectuate removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). During that period, detention is mandatory. Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). If the 90 days pass and the noncitizen is still here, the statute gives the government a choice: release
the individual on supervision or keep them detained. Id. § 1231(a)(6). But as the Supreme Court explained in Zadvydas v. Davis, the authority to detain does not stretch into infinity. To avoid serious constitutional problems, the Court read an implicit limitation into the statute: the government may detain a noncitizen only for a period
“reasonably necessary” to secure his removal. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). And to make that rule workable, the Court established a presumption. For the first six months, detention is presumptively reasonable. Id. at 701. After that period has passed and the alien “provides good reason to believe that there is
no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” the burden then shifts to the government to provide evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002). Thus, “in order to state a claim under Zadvydas, the alien not only must
show post-removal order detention in excess of six months but also must provide evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. ICE took Rodriguez into custody on November 6, 2025, which is beyond
six months. But according to the unrebutted record, he has since refused removal to Mexico. (Doc. 6-2.) Such conduct tolls the detention period. See Akinwale, 287 F.3d at 1052 n.4 (stating that “removal period shall be extended ... if the alien ... acts to prevent the alien’s removal subject to an
order of removal”). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C), the removal clock stops ticking if an alien refuses to cooperate in obtaining travel documents. It also tolls if the alien “conspires or acts to prevent [his] removal.” Id. Common sense (and the Eleventh Circuit) tells us that a person cannot actively thwart his own
deportation and then use the resulting delay to demand his freedom. Whether by stubbornly withholding a signature on a required form or by affirmatively taking steps to sabotage the government’s efforts, an alien who engineers his own prolonged detention cannot turn around and complain
about it. The law does not reward that kind of gamesmanship. See Quo Zing Song v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 516 F. App’x 894, 899 (11th Cir. 2013) (“The six- month period is tolled, however, if the alien acts to prevent his removal.”). That is precisely the game Rodriguez is playing here. He claims his
detention violates the Fifth Amendment, yet his refusal to cooperate with ICE is the very roadblock keeping him in custody.2 If he signs the paperwork and gets off the bus, his removal is reasonably foreseeable; if he does not, the delay is entirely of his own making. Because Rodriguez is apparently
responsible for stalling his own departure, the presumptively reasonable period for his detention is tolled.
2 The Immigration and Nationality Act does not leave an individual without recourse if he objects to his designated destination. The statute provides a framework for contesting removal to a specific third country. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b). But nowhere in his petition does Rodriguez allege—let alone offer evidence to show—that he has formally challenged his proposed removal to Mexico. Instead, he has apparently dug in his heels and refused to physically depart the United States. Because it seems he bypassed the proper legal channels for contesting his destination, this Court accepts he is legally subject to removal to Mexico. B. Procedural Due Process Rodriguez also challenges the procedural mechanics of his re-detention.
(Doc. 1 at 3-4.)3 He claims that ICE’s decision to revoke his supervision violated the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of procedural due process. (Id.) The Court cannot agree. To understand why, start with the baseline reality of Rodriguez’s legal status. He is a noncitizen subject to a final, unexecuted
order of removal who has been convicted of several felonies. His release on supervision was a matter of administrative grace born of logistical necessity, not a permanent constitutional entitlement. When the Government determines that circumstances have changed and it is finally time to carry
out its removal order, the Constitution does not demand a full-dress, pre- deprivation trial. Due process, as the Supreme Court has often reminded us, is flexible. It “calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
In the context of revoking a noncitizen’s supervised release and detaining him, like here, ICE’s regulations strike that constitutional balance by guaranteeing written notice and an informal interview that allows the individual to respond. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(l)(1), 241.13(i). According to the
Government’s evidence, which stands unrebutted, Rodriguez received both.
3 The habeas petition is not paginated, so the Court uses the page numbering generated by its electronic filing system. (Doc. 6-8.) He got exactly what the Fifth Amendment requires in this context—notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). And any arguments about the sufficiency of the notice are rejected. See Tran v. Warden, Fla. Soft Side S. Det. Ctr., No. 2:25-cv-1224-KCD-NPM, 2026 WL 672969 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2026). The Constitution guarantees a fair process, not a favorable result. Because ICE afforded Rodriguez the requisite notice and an opportunity to be heard, his procedural due process claim fails. Ill. Conclusion Rodriguez’s due process claim under Zadvydas is stalled for noncooperation, so the habeas petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to him refiling a new petition should his current detention go unimpeded and he can demonstrate there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.4 The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly, terminate any pending motions and deadlines, and close the case. ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on May 28, 2026.
KyleC.Dudek ~*~” United States District Judge 4 The habeas petition also requests a bond hearing (Doc. 1 at 5), but because Rodriguez is subject to a final removal order, his detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231. He is thus not entitled to a bond hearing under a different statutory scheme.