Luis Guillermo Castillo-Rubio v. Russell Aboud

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Texas
DecidedMay 15, 2026
Docket3:25-cv-00097
StatusUnknown

This text of Luis Guillermo Castillo-Rubio v. Russell Aboud (Luis Guillermo Castillo-Rubio v. Russell Aboud) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Luis Guillermo Castillo-Rubio v. Russell Aboud, (W.D. Tex. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO DIVISION

LUIS GUILLERMO CASTILLO-RUBIO, § § Plaintiff, § v. § § EP-25-cv-00097-LS RUSSELL ABOUD, § § Defendant. § § §

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S SECOND MOTION TO COMPEL AND ORDERING PARTIES TO CONFER AND FILE A JOINT STATEMENT

Plaintiff Luis Guillermo Castillo-Rubio brings this action for breach of contract, legal malpractice, fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment against Defendant Russel Aboud in connection with Defendant’s legal representation of Plaintiff in a federal criminal case. First Amend. Verified Compl. & Jury Demand 1, ECF No. 20. Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant’s Responses to Requests for Production and to Require Supplemental Discovery Responses, ECF No. 33 [hereinafter “Second Mot. Compel”]. The Honorable District Judge Leon Schydlower referred Plaintiff’s Second Motion to Compel to the undersigned Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Court Rule CV-72. Order Ref’ing Mot., ECF No. 34. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff, an incarcerated pro se litigant,1 filed his First Motion to Compel on January 5, 2026. Pl.’s Mot. Compel Disc., Sancs., & Order Deeming Matters Admit., ECF No. 24. In it, he

1 Although the Court is mindful of Plaintiff’s pro se status, and thus construes his filings liberally, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), “[t]he right of self-representation does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law,” see Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975)). informed the Court that Defendant had failed to respond or object to his interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for admission, and moved for Defendant to be compelled to respond to the requests in full. Id. at 3, 8. The district court granted the request, “order[ing] both parties to respond to all discovery requests in compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Order Grant. Pt. & Deny. Pt. Pl.’s Mot. Compel, Deny. Pl.’s Mot. Order Show Cause, & Amend.

Schedul. Order 1, ECF No. 30 [hereinafter “Order Mot. Compel & Amend. Schedul. Order”] (emphasis omitted). In his Second Motion to Compel, filed May 4, 2026, Plaintiff reported that Defendant had yet to serve responses to the requests for production or produce any responsive materials. Second Mot. Compel 3–4. Plaintiff further stated that, while he did receive Defendant’s responses to the interrogatories and requests for admission after the district court entered its order compelling production, such responses were incomplete. Id. at 3–6. Plaintiff thus moved the Court to compel Defendant to (1) respond to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production; (2) produce all responsive, non- privileged documents and provide a privilege log for any document withheld on privilege grounds;

(3) supplement his interrogatory answers; and (4) amend his responses to the requests for admission. Id. at 7–8. Within the motion, Plaintiff included a Certificate of Conference stating that he, in good faith, sent a letter to Defendant in February 2026, setting forth the deficiencies and requesting that they be cured within ten days. Id. at 9. However, Plaintiff did not certify that he had attempted to discuss these deficiencies with Defendant or attach the responses he received to the motion. See id. In response to Plaintiff’s motion, Defendant stated he had “properly answered and objected [to the requests for production] accordingly” and that certain responsive documents were already in Plaintiff’s possession, otherwise accessible, or did not exist. Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s Mot. Compel Resps. Reqs. Prod. & Def.’s Mot. Compel Answers Interrogs. 1, ECF No. 35 [hereinafter “Resp.”]. He did not, however, provide copies of his responses or articulate any discernible objections to Plaintiff’s requests. Id. Defendant further “move[d] that Plaintiff answer discovery,” advising the Court that “Plaintiff has not answered his discovery” and “[n]one of Defendant’s requests for production

were answered.” Resp. at 2 (emphasis in original). Yet, within the same paragraph and in direct tension with his assertions, Defendant appears to acknowledge that Plaintiff did serve responses to the interrogatories, albeit incomplete ones, and responded to the production requests by lodging objections. Id. Defendant further failed to support his motion with a certification of conferral, a description of the purported deficiencies, or by attaching any party’s discovery requests or responses. Id. A. Plaintiff’s Second Motion to Compel is denied. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(1) requires that a motion to compel discovery “must include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person . . . failing to make disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it without court action.”

To comply with the Rule, a movant must not only exhibit good faith but must also confer, or attempt to confer, with the opposing party. Satisfaction of the conferral requirement involves the moving party engaging in, or at least attempting to engage in, a two-way dialogue to discuss discovery disputes. See Castillo v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas, LLC, No. 3:23-CV-00467-ATB, 2024 WL 4531080, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2024) (citing Perkins v. United States Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., No. EP-23-CV-258-KC, 2024 WL 1493808, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 2024); Compass Bank v. Shamgochian, 287 F.R.D. 397, 399 (S.D. Tex. 2012)) (“To ‘confer’ means that the parties must have enough two-way communications to discuss, deliberate, or compare views on any issues necessary to resolve the dispute.”). As a general rule, a single letter sent to the opposing party does not satisfy the good faith conferral requirement, particularly where the letter simply lists alleged deficiencies and does not attempt to open the door to discussion concerning disputed discovery. Compass Bank, 287 F.R.D. at 399–400 (collecting cases) (holding a “single letter unilaterally identifying flaws in [d]efendant's discovery responses and setting an arbitrary response deadline for [d]efendant would seem to be

inadequate, as it does not equate to a good faith conferral or attempt to confer”); Cotracom Commodity Trading Co. v. Seaboard Corp., 189 F.R.D. 456, 459 (D. Kan. 1999) (holding conferral requirement requires parties to “make genuine efforts to resolve the dispute by determining precisely what the requesting party is actually seeking; what responsive documents or information the discovering party is reasonably capable of producing; and what specific, genuine objections or other issues, if any, cannot be resolved without judicial intervention”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s letter – which invites neither conversation nor conference – falls short of satisfying the conferral requirement. The Motion to Compel Defendant’s Responses to Requests for Production and to Require Supplemental Discovery Responses, ECF No. 33 is thus

DENIED. B. Defendant’s request “that Plaintiff answer discovery” is denied. To the extent Defendant’s request “that Plaintiff answer discovery” could be construed as a motion, see Resp.

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Luis Guillermo Castillo-Rubio v. Russell Aboud, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/luis-guillermo-castillo-rubio-v-russell-aboud-txwd-2026.