UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______
LUIS CELESTINO PECHE GARCIA,
Petitioner, Case No. 1:26-cv-349
v. Honorable Paul L. Maloney
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents. ____________________________/
OPINION Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated this action by filing a counseled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Discussion I. Procedural History In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention and asks the Court to, inter alia, assume jurisdiction over this matter and issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to release Petitioner. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.29.) In an order entered on February 2, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on February 5, 2026, (ECF No. 4), and Petitioner filed his reply on February 8, 2026, (ECF No. 6). II. Factual Background Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2; Notice to Appear (NTA), ECF No. 4-1, PageID.70.) On July 11, 2024, Petitioner applied for admission into
the United States at the Brownsville, Texas Port of Entry. (NTA, ECF No, 4-1, PageID.70.) The Department of Homeland Security issued Petitioner a Form I-862, NTA, charging him with inadmissibility pursuant to § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) for being “an immigrant who, at the time of application for admission, is not in possession of [valid immigration and travel documents].” (Id., PageID.73.) At that time, Petitioner was paroled into the United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2; Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.36.) Petitioner subsequently filed an application for asylum, which remains pending. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.10.) On January 7, 2025, ICE agents arrested Petitioner. (Id., PageID.3.) Petitioner was not given notice of the revocation of his parole prior to his re-detention. (Id., PageID.3, 10.) Petitioner
is scheduled for a master hearing before the Detroit Immigration Court on February 20, 2026. (Notice of Hearing, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.75.) III. Habeas Corpus Legal Standard The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration- related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025). IV. Exhaustion Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies.
Here, no applicable statute or rule mandates administrative exhaustion by Petitioner. Thus, whether to require exhaustion is within this Court’s “sound judicial discretion.” See Shearson v. Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 593–94 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992)). “Courts have described an implied requirement to raise issues with an agency as a ‘judge- made,’ ‘prudential,’ or ‘common law’ duty to exhaust,” Island Creek Coal Co. v. Bryan, 937 F.3d 738, 746 (6th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted), and such a court-made exhaustion rule must comply with statutory schemes and Congressional intent, Shearson, 725 F.3d at 593–94. Notably, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has not yet decided “whether courts should impose administrative exhaustion in the context of a noncitizen’s habeas petition for unlawful mandatory detention,” Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *3 (E.D.
Mich. Sep. 9, 2025) (citing Hernandez Torrealba v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv- 1621, 2025 WL 2444114, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025)), and “[t]he Sixth Circuit has not formally adopted a standard for determining when prudential exhaustion applies.” Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025). However, courts within the Sixth Circuit “have applied the three-factor test, set forth in United States v. California Care Corp., 709 F.2d 1241, 1248 (9th Cir. 1983) (derived from McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479, 484[ (1971)]; McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193–95[ (1969)),]” to determine whether prudential exhaustion should be required. Id. Under this three-factor test, Courts may require prudential exhaustion when: (1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review. Id. (citing Shweika v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:06-cv-11781, 2015 WL 6541689, at *12 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2015)). Upon consideration of these factors, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion should not be required in Petitioner’s case. Here, Petitioner’s § 2241 petition presents principally legal questions of statutory interpretation, which do not require the record that would be developed if the Court required Petitioner to exhaust her administrative remedies. Moreover, this Court is not bound by, and is not required to give deference to, any agency interpretation of a statute. See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2273 (2024) (discussing that “courts need not and under the [Administrative Procedure Act (APA)] may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous”). Second, Petitioner’s constitutional challenge to his detention does not require exhaustion. The Sixth Circuit has noted that due process challenges generally do not require exhaustion because the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) cannot review constitutional challenges. See Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th Cir. 2006) (discussing that “an alien’s due process challenge generally does not require exhaustion,” but noting that an “alien must raise correctable procedural errors,” such as a claim “that the BIA denied him due process by relying upon an ‘incomplete and inaccurate’ transcript to review his case,” “to the BIA”). Finally, it is doubtful
that BIA review of Petitioner’s custody would preclude the need for judicial review. The Court reaches that conclusion based upon the fact that the Government has clearly set forth its belief that all noncitizens are subject to mandatory detention during removal proceedings. And, recently the BIA proclaimed that all noncitizens are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216, 229 (BIA 2025). It is simply unlikely that any administrative review by the BIA would lead the Government to change its position and thereby obviate the need for judicial review of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition. Accordingly, for the foregoing
reasons, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion is not required. Alternatively, even in situations where a court may ordinarily apply prudential exhaustion, the court may still choose to waive exhaustion. See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4 (citations omitted). A court may choose to rule upon the merits of the issues presented when the “legal question is ‘fit’ for resolution and delay means hardship.” Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000) (citation omitted). A court may also waive exhaustion if the “pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture.” Shearson, 725 F.3d at 594 (citation omitted). Here, given the Government’s position and the BIA’s recent decision in Yajure Hurtado,
requiring Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies would likely be futile. Moreover, it is clear that delay would result in hardship to Petitioner. It is “unmistakable that . . . depriving [Petitioner] of his liberty while awaiting a BIA appeal decision certainly equates to hardship. And any delay results in the very harm [Petitioner] is trying to avoid . . . – detention.” See Lopez- Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *5. In sum, the Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against Petitioner. Moreover, even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court concludes in the alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate. Accordingly, the Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition. V. Merits Discussion A. Statutory and Regulatory Basis for Petitioner’s Parole and Recent Detention Here, Petitioner entered the United States at a port of entry and was subsequently paroled into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Petitioner also filed a Form I-589 Application for Asylum and Withholding Removal, which remains pending.
The INA “establishes the framework governing noncitizens’ entry into and removal from the United States, with regulations promulgated by the enforcing agencies providing further governance.” Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1132 (D. Or. 2025). “Noncitizens who arrive at a port of entry without a visa or other entry document, like Petitioner, are deemed ‘inadmissible’ under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)” due to their lack of entry documents. Id. at 1132 & n.7 (noting that “[d]epending on the circumstances, other categories of inadmissibility may also apply, but § 1182(a)(7) applies for noncitizens without proper documentation”). Once a noncitizen is deemed inadmissible, “the immigration officer must order the noncitizen’s removal unless the noncitizen indicates an intention to apply for asylum or fear of prosecution.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)). The government may place the noncitizen into expedited removal
proceedings, see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), or the government may place the noncitizen into regular removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). See Y-Z-L-H, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1132–33 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)). Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). However, “applicants for admission may be temporarily released on parole [into the United States] ‘for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit,’” as set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288 (2018) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). The decision to grant parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) is determined “on a case-by-case basis.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Then, “when the purpose of the parole has been served,” § 1182(d)(5)(A) provides that “the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to
the United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). To terminate the previously granted parole, the agency must comply with the applicable regulatory and statutory requirements. As set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i), which governs the “[t]ermination of parole,” In cases not covered by paragraph (e)(1) of this section,[1] upon accomplishment of the purpose for which parole was authorized or when in the opinion of one of the officials listed in paragraph (a) of this section, neither humanitarian reasons nor public benefit warrants the continued presence of the alien in the United States, parole shall be terminated upon written notice to the alien and he or she shall be restored to the status that he or she had at the time of parole.
8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i). That is, “[u]nder the governing regulation, [§ 1182(d)(5)(A)] parole may be terminated only if the purpose of parole is accomplished, or humanitarian reasons and the public benefit no longer warrant parole.” Loaiza Arias v. LaRose, No. 3:25-cv-02595- BTM-MMP, 2025 WL 3295385, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)). As explained below, the Court concludes that Respondents have failed to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions to terminate Petitioner’s parole. Cf. Coal. for Humane Immigrant Rts. v. Noem, No. 25-cv-872 (JMC), 2025 WL 2192986, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2025)
1 Paragraph (e)(1) provides for the automatic termination of parole without written notice where the noncitizen has either departed from the United States or at the expiration of time for which the parole was authorized. The parties have not suggested that either circumstance applies here. (holding that the government failed to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions and that paroled noncitizens cannot be subject to expedited removal proceedings); Salgado Bustos v. Raycraft, No. 25-13202, 2025 WL 3022294, at *5–7 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025) (same); E.V. v. Raycraft, No. 4:25-cv-2069, 2025 WL 2938594, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 16, 2025) (same). First, based on the information before the Court, it does not appear that the purpose of
Petitioner’s parole has been accomplished. Petitioner left Columbia, seeking asylum in the United States, and Petitioner entered the United States at a port of entry. At that time, Petitioner was granted parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), which provides for parole into the United States “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit,” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Petitioner filed a Form I-589 Application for Asylum and Withholding Removal, which remains pending. Thus, when Petitioner was recently arrested and detained, Petitioner was still seeking asylum. Moreover, there is nothing before the Court to suggest that the humanitarian reason or public benefit that justified Petitioner’s parole no longer applies. Indeed, Respondents make no argument about whether the requirements for termination of parole in § 1182(d)(5)(A) and its
regulations have been satisfied. Further, district courts that have addressed the termination of § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole “have found that just as a grant of parole requires an individualized review, revocation of parole requires a case-by-case assessment to comply with the statute,” and the Court finds the reasoning in these non-binding cases to be persuasive. Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, 794 F. Supp. 3d 128, 146 (W.D.N.Y. 2025) (citations omitted) (addressing this issue, and granting the petitioner’s motion for preliminary injunction and ordering that the petitioner be released); see, e.g., Y-Z-L-H, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1137–47 (addressing this issue, and granting the petitioner’s habeas petition and ordering that the petitioner be released from custody); Loaiza Arias, 2025 WL 3295385, at *2–4 (same); Noori v. LaRose, No. 25-cv-1824-GPC-MSB, 2025 WL 2800149, at *10–13 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2025) (same); Munoz Materano v. Arteta, No. 25 CIV. 6137 (ER), --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2630826, at *14–17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2025) (same); Gabriel B.M. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-4298 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 3443584, at *6–7 (D. Minn. Dec. 1, 2025) (addressing this issue, and granting the petitioner’s request for a preliminary injunction and ordering the petitioner’s release
from custody); Orellana v. Francis, No. 25-cv-04212 (OEM), 2025 WL 2822640, at *2–3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2025) (addressing the issue in the context of a motion for reconsideration filed by the respondents, and affirming the court’s grant of habeas relief to the petitioner and the court’s order to release the petitioner). But see Doe v. Noem, 152 F.4th 272, 278–79, 285 (1st Cir. 2025) (reversing district court’s grant of preliminary relief and vacating district court’s stay of the termination notice for previously granted parole because “Plaintiffs ha[d] not demonstrated a strong likelihood of success in showing that under the statute, the Secretary must terminate these grants of parole under the [parole] program[s] on an individual basis”). 2
2 Doe v. Noem, 152 F.4th 272 (1st Cir. 2025), is distinguishable from the present case. As the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota recently explained in Gabriel B.M. v. Bondi, a case that is similar to the present action: First, unlike here, the government in Doe did make a determination that the purpose of the plaintiffs’ parole had been accomplished. The plaintiffs, non-citizens who entered into the United States through the Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela (“CHNV”) parole program, lost parole status when the government, via a lengthy and thorough notice published in the Federal Register, decided to terminate the CHNV program altogether, determining that the program no longer served its implementing purpose. In contrast, for Petitioner’s revocation, there is no evidence to suggest that such a determination or other finding was made at all, and the evidence in the record strongly suggests it wasn’t. Second, the Doe court did not address the regulatory requirements established by 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i), which implement the parole statute and illuminate the procedural requirements for termination of parole. . . . Part 212.5(e)(2)(i) not only restates the revocation authority enumerated in § 1182(d)(5)(A), but also clarifies the (admittedly minimal) procedures the Respondents must follow when invoking Here, there is no indication in the record before the Court that any such case-by-case determination regarding the revocation of Petitioner’s parole was made. In summary, as explained above, based on the information that is presently before the Court, there is no indication that Respondents followed the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements to revoke or terminate Petitioner’s parole. If Respondents did not follow those
requirements, then they did not have the authority to arrest and detain Petitioner, “unless there [wa]s some other valid reason to arrest him.” Mata Velasquez, 794 F. Supp. 3d at 145; cf. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., No. 21-3369, 2022 WL 17369438, at *6 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 2022) (discussing that “an agency’s action that fails to observe the procedures required by its own regulations should be set aside” (citation omitted)); Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 545 (6th Cir. 2004) (“It is an elemental principle of administrative law that agencies are bound to follow their own regulations[,] . . . [and] ‘[a]n agency’s failure to follow its own regulations tends
the parole statute’s revocation authority. The Respondents’ failure to follow the governing regulation is equally unlawful. . . . Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Doe court’s interpretation of § 1182(d)(5)(A) reads the bulk of the revocation clause out of the statute. That interpretation rests entirely on the fact that the revocation clause does not include the same “case-by-case” language. But such a myopic focus on that omission elides a significant portion of the text of the revocation clause. The revocation clause in the parole statute gives the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority to revoke parole “when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Secretary . . ., have been served.” If Respondents were not required to make such a determination to effect termination of parole, then there would be no reason for this language to have been included in the statute. This contradicts “one of the most basic interpretive canons, that a statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.” Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (cleaned up). Instead, because the parole statute (and its implementing regulation) require such a preconditional determination to be made, the Court enforces it here. Gabriel B.M. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-4298 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 3443584, at *7 (D. Minn. Dec. 1, 2025). Doe v. Noem is distinguishable from the present action for these same reasons. to cause unjust discrimination and deny adequate notice and consequently may result in a violation of an individual’s constitutional right to due process.’” (additional internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sameena, Inc. v. U.S. Air Force, 147 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1998))). Respondents do not claim that they had any reason to arrest and detain Petitioner other than her status as a noncitizen. Indeed, Respondents argue that any noncitizen, regardless of whether they
are already present and residing in the United States, is “an alien seeking admission” subject to mandatory detention under § 1225. This Court and other courts throughout the country have rejected this argument. Cf., e.g., Salgado Mendoza v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1252, 2025 WL 3077589, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 4, 2025); Ruiz Mejia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1227, 2025 WL 3041827, at *5–6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); De Jesus Ramirez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1261, 2025 WL 3039266, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Escobar-Ruiz v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1232, 2025 WL 3039255, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Marin Garcia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1271, 2025 WL 3017200, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Cervantes Rodriguez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1196, 2025 WL 3022212, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Puerto-Hernandez v. Lynch, No. 1:25-cv-
1097, 2025 WL 3012033, at *9 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 2025); Rodriguez Carmona v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1131, 2025 WL 2992222, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 2025). Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that Respondents failed to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements to revoke or terminate Petitioner’s § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole.3 4 VI. Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner has received notice of the charges against his, has access to counsel, is scheduled to attend hearings with an immigration judge, has the right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and has been detained by ICE for a relatively short period of time. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the very liberty that [the Due Process Clause] protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citation omitted). The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause extends to all persons, regardless of status. See A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 145 S. Ct.
3 The Court has recently reached the same conclusion in other habeas corpus actions filed by immigration detainees who had received § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole. See Kenzhebaev v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1786, 2025 WL 3737975 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 29, 2025); Hernandez v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1719, 2025 WL 3730936 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 26, 2025); Tezara Munoz v. Lynch, No. 1:25-cv-1632, 2025 WL 3687338 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 19, 2025); Gil Pirona v. Noem, No. 1:25- cv-1571, 2025 WL 3687339 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 19, 2025); Infante Rodriguez v. Raycraft, No. 1:25- cv-1560, 2025 WL 3673583 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 18, 2025); Quintero-Martinez v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1507, 2025 WL 3649515 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 17, 2025); Puerta Marin v. Lynch, No. 1:25-cv-1444, 2025 WL 3533028 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 10, 2025); Parra Ocanto v. Lynch, No. 1:25-cv-1447, 2025 WL 3522113 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 9, 2025); Arevalo v. Lynch, No. 1:25-cv- 1365, 2025 WL 3522106 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 9, 2025); Rodriguez Martinez v. Raycraft, No. 1:25- cv-1504, 2025 WL 3511093 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 8, 2025); Godoy Zelaya v. Lynch, No. 1:25-cv- 1355, 2025 WL 3496472 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 5, 2025). 4 Respondents also contend that Petitioner an “arriving alien” subject to mandatory detention. For the reasons previously set forth in detail in Hernandez Montiel v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1610, 2026 WL 32076 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2026), Petitioner is not an “arriving alien” for purposes of § 1225(b.) 1364, 1367 (2025). Thus, noncitizens, such as Petitioner, are entitled to its protections. See id.; see also Chavez-Acosta v. Garland, No. 22-3045, 2023 WL 246837, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 18. 2023). The Sixth Circuit held that the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), regarding the adequacy of process, applies in the context of immigration detention. See, e.g., United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio, 983 F.3d 848, 852–56 (6th Cir. 2020) (“If this court
has previously addressed the due-process claim, then we are bound by precedent; if the claim is an issue of first impression, then we generally apply the three-factor test the Supreme Court set out in Mathews v. Eldridge.”). Under Mathews, the Court must consider the following three factors: “(1) the private interest that will be affected by official action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest; and (3) the government’s interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures entail.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). The first Mathews factor clearly weighs in favor of Petitioner. Here, Petitioner entered the United States at a port of entry, and Respondents granted Petitioner parole into the United States,
determining that Petitioner was not a flight risk or danger. Respondents have now detained Petitioner, and there is no dispute that Petitioner has a significant private interest in avoiding detention, as one of the “most elemental of liberty interests” is to be free from detention. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (citation omitted). The Court may also consider Petitioner’s conditions of confinement, i.e., “whether a detainee is held in conditions indistinguishable from criminal incarceration.” See Günaydin v. Trump, 784 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1187 (D. Minn. 2025) (citing Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 28 (1st Cir. 2021); Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020)). There can be no doubt that he is “experiencing [many of] the deprivations of incarceration, including loss of contact with friends and family, loss of income earning, . . . lack of privacy, and, most fundamentally, the lack of freedom of movement.” See Günaydin, 784 F. Supp. 3d at 1187. The second Mathews factor also weighs in Petitioner’s favor. Clearly, there is a high risk of erroneously depriving Petitioner of his freedom if Petitioner does not receive an individualized determination regarding the revocation of his parole. “To mitigate the risk of erroneous
deprivation, due process would require, ‘at [a] minimum, the opportunity for [Petitioner] to submit evidence relevant to whether [the government] should revoke [his parole] before [it] make[s] a revocation decision.’” Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, 794 F. Supp. 3d 128, 153 (W.D.N.Y. 2025) (citation omitted). Finally, under the third Mathews factor, the Court recognizes that the Government “does, indeed, have a legitimate interest in ensuring noncitizens’ appearance at removal proceedings and preventing harms to the community.” See Sampiao v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11981-JEK, 2025 WL 2607924, at *12 (D. Mass. Sep. 9, 2025) (citation omitted). However, Respondents have not shown that they have a significant interest in Petitioner’s continued detention. Notably, continuing to
enforce Petitioner’s detention would likely impose more costs upon the Government, as it would be required to continue funding and overseeing Petitioner’s detention. See id. In sum, the Court’s balancing of the Mathews factors weighs in Petitioner’s favor. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights. VII. Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief Because the Court will grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein, the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition. VIII. Proper Respondents Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent in this action, and they seek the dismissal of all of the other named Respondents. The Court concludes that the ICE Detroit Field Office Director is not the only proper Respondent for the reasons set forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the following cases:
Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025). To ensure that this Court’s orders regarding a hearing or release will bind at least one Respondent with authority to act in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western District of Michigan, the Court will retain the ICE Detroit Field Office Director and the Secretary for the Department of Homeland Security as Respondents. The Court will dismiss the United States Department of Homeland Security, the United States Attorney General, and the Executive Office
for Immigration Review as Respondents. Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment granting Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The Court will order Respondents to release Petitioner from custody, subject to any conditions that existed under Petitioner’s § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole. Additionally, the Court will enjoin Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner absent a material change in circumstances unless the requirements of due process have been satisfied. The Court will also order Respondents to file a status report within three days of the issuance of the Court’s opinion and judgment to certify compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment. the Court will dismiss the United States Department of Homeland Security, the United States Attorney General, and the Executive Office for Immigration Review as Respondents.
Dated: February 20, 2026 /s/ Paul L. Maloney Paul L. Maloney United States District Judge