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10 11 LUIS CARLOS ZUNIGA ZUNIGA, ) Case No.: 2:26-cv-00556-JLT-SKO (HC) ) 12 Petitioner, ) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO ) SUMMARILY DISMISS PETITION 13 v. ) 14 ) WARDEN OF THE CALIFORNIA CITY ) 15 DETENTION FACILITY, et al., ) ) 16 Respondents. ) ) 17 )
19 Petitioner is an immigration detainee proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas 20 corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 21 Petitioner filed the instant petition on February 23, 2026. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner challenges his 22 continued detention by the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). He claims his 23 prolonged detention without a bond hearing violates his procedural due process rights under the Fifth 24 Amendment. He claims he should be immediately released, or alternatively, provided a bond hearing 25 before an immigration judge (“IJ”) at which the Government must justify his continued detention by 26 clear and convincing evidence. 27 For the reasons discussed below, the Court will recommend the petition be dismissed without 28 prejudice. 2 Petitioner is an immigration detainee who was detained and placed in custody by the 3 Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) on November 17, 2025. (Doc. 1 at 6.) He states he is 4 currently in removal proceedings. (Doc. 1 at 5.) 6 A. Summary Dismissal 7 Habeas corpus petitions are subject to summary dismissal pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules 8 Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. The provisions of Rule 4, which 9 are applicable to § 2241 petitions under Rule 1(b), provide in pertinent part: “If it plainly appears from 10 the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the 11 judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.” The Advisory Committee 12 Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the Court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus, either on its 13 own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the 14 petition has been filed. 15 B. Jurisdiction 16 A district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus when the petitioner “is in custody in 17 violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 18 “[D]istrict courts retain jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider habeas challenges to 19 immigration detention that are sufficiently independent of the merits of [a] removal order.” Lopez- 20 Marroquin v. Barr, 955 F.3d 759, 759 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1211–12 21 (9th Cir. 2011)). Pertinent here, the Supreme Court specifically directed that federal courts have 22 jurisdiction to review a constitutional challenge to a non-citizen’s detention. See Demore v. Kim, 538 23 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). 24 C. Petitioner’s Detention is not Unreasonably Prolonged 25 In his sole claim for relief, Petitioner alleges his prolonged detention without a bond hearing 26 violates his due process rights. (Doc. 1 at 17-18.) He states he was detained on November 17, 2025, 27 and has remained in custody since then. He complains the 3-month period is prolonged and indefinite, 28 and he should be given a bond hearing, or in the alternative, released from custody. For reasons 1 discussed below, the Court finds that Petitioner’s 3-month period of detention does not qualify as 2 unreasonably prolonged. 3 The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides that “[n]o person shall be ... deprived of 4 life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” “It is well established that the Fifth Amendment 5 entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings,” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 6 (1993), and “[a] statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious constitutional 7 problem,” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). The Supreme Court nevertheless has 8 recognized that “[d]etention during deportation proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of 9 [the deportation] process.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003); see also Carlson v. Landon, 342 10 U.S. 524, 538 (1952) (“[d]etention is necessarily a part of this deportation procedure”). 11 In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that a detention period less than six months is 12 presumptively reasonable as to aliens detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(6). 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 13 Beyond that six-month period, the alien must “provide[] good reason to believe that there is no 14 significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. at 701. As to aliens 15 detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2), the Supreme Court has held that no such 6- 16 month time limit is proscribed, whether implicit or explicit. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 300- 17 01 (2018). In Demore v. Kim, the Supreme Court noted that shorter detention periods during removal 18 proceedings lasting roughly between a month and a half to five months are a “constitutionally 19 permissible part of [the removal] process.” 538 U.S. 510, 530 (2003). 20 Several circuit and district courts have found that unreasonably long detention periods with no 21 allowance for a bond hearing may violate the due process clause. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Marin 22 (“Rodriguez IV”), 909 F.3d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 2018) (the Ninth Circuit asserted “grave doubts that any 23 statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without any process is constitutional....”); Diop v. 24 ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 235 (3d Cir. 2011) (detention of an alien for a period of nearly 25 three years without further inquiry into whether it was necessary to ensure his appearance at the 26 removal proceedings or to prevent a risk of danger to the community, was unreasonable, and, 27 therefore, a violation of the Due Process Clause”); German Santos v. Warden Pike, 965 F.3d 203 (3d 28 Cir. 2020) (reversing and remanding to district court to order bond hearing while detained under § 1 1226(c)); Diep v. Wofford, 1:24-cv-01238-SKO, 2025 WL 604744 (E.D. Cal Feb. 25, 2025) (ordering 2 bond hearing for noncitizen detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) for 13 months); A.E. v. Andrews, 1:25- 3 cv-00107-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 1424382 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025) (ordering bond hearing for 4 noncitizen detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) for 20 months).
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10 11 LUIS CARLOS ZUNIGA ZUNIGA, ) Case No.: 2:26-cv-00556-JLT-SKO (HC) ) 12 Petitioner, ) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO ) SUMMARILY DISMISS PETITION 13 v. ) 14 ) WARDEN OF THE CALIFORNIA CITY ) 15 DETENTION FACILITY, et al., ) ) 16 Respondents. ) ) 17 )
19 Petitioner is an immigration detainee proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas 20 corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 21 Petitioner filed the instant petition on February 23, 2026. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner challenges his 22 continued detention by the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). He claims his 23 prolonged detention without a bond hearing violates his procedural due process rights under the Fifth 24 Amendment. He claims he should be immediately released, or alternatively, provided a bond hearing 25 before an immigration judge (“IJ”) at which the Government must justify his continued detention by 26 clear and convincing evidence. 27 For the reasons discussed below, the Court will recommend the petition be dismissed without 28 prejudice. 2 Petitioner is an immigration detainee who was detained and placed in custody by the 3 Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) on November 17, 2025. (Doc. 1 at 6.) He states he is 4 currently in removal proceedings. (Doc. 1 at 5.) 6 A. Summary Dismissal 7 Habeas corpus petitions are subject to summary dismissal pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules 8 Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. The provisions of Rule 4, which 9 are applicable to § 2241 petitions under Rule 1(b), provide in pertinent part: “If it plainly appears from 10 the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the 11 judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.” The Advisory Committee 12 Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the Court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus, either on its 13 own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the 14 petition has been filed. 15 B. Jurisdiction 16 A district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus when the petitioner “is in custody in 17 violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 18 “[D]istrict courts retain jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider habeas challenges to 19 immigration detention that are sufficiently independent of the merits of [a] removal order.” Lopez- 20 Marroquin v. Barr, 955 F.3d 759, 759 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1211–12 21 (9th Cir. 2011)). Pertinent here, the Supreme Court specifically directed that federal courts have 22 jurisdiction to review a constitutional challenge to a non-citizen’s detention. See Demore v. Kim, 538 23 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). 24 C. Petitioner’s Detention is not Unreasonably Prolonged 25 In his sole claim for relief, Petitioner alleges his prolonged detention without a bond hearing 26 violates his due process rights. (Doc. 1 at 17-18.) He states he was detained on November 17, 2025, 27 and has remained in custody since then. He complains the 3-month period is prolonged and indefinite, 28 and he should be given a bond hearing, or in the alternative, released from custody. For reasons 1 discussed below, the Court finds that Petitioner’s 3-month period of detention does not qualify as 2 unreasonably prolonged. 3 The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides that “[n]o person shall be ... deprived of 4 life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” “It is well established that the Fifth Amendment 5 entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings,” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 6 (1993), and “[a] statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious constitutional 7 problem,” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). The Supreme Court nevertheless has 8 recognized that “[d]etention during deportation proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of 9 [the deportation] process.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003); see also Carlson v. Landon, 342 10 U.S. 524, 538 (1952) (“[d]etention is necessarily a part of this deportation procedure”). 11 In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that a detention period less than six months is 12 presumptively reasonable as to aliens detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(6). 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 13 Beyond that six-month period, the alien must “provide[] good reason to believe that there is no 14 significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. at 701. As to aliens 15 detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2), the Supreme Court has held that no such 6- 16 month time limit is proscribed, whether implicit or explicit. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 300- 17 01 (2018). In Demore v. Kim, the Supreme Court noted that shorter detention periods during removal 18 proceedings lasting roughly between a month and a half to five months are a “constitutionally 19 permissible part of [the removal] process.” 538 U.S. 510, 530 (2003). 20 Several circuit and district courts have found that unreasonably long detention periods with no 21 allowance for a bond hearing may violate the due process clause. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Marin 22 (“Rodriguez IV”), 909 F.3d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 2018) (the Ninth Circuit asserted “grave doubts that any 23 statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without any process is constitutional....”); Diop v. 24 ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 235 (3d Cir. 2011) (detention of an alien for a period of nearly 25 three years without further inquiry into whether it was necessary to ensure his appearance at the 26 removal proceedings or to prevent a risk of danger to the community, was unreasonable, and, 27 therefore, a violation of the Due Process Clause”); German Santos v. Warden Pike, 965 F.3d 203 (3d 28 Cir. 2020) (reversing and remanding to district court to order bond hearing while detained under § 1 1226(c)); Diep v. Wofford, 1:24-cv-01238-SKO, 2025 WL 604744 (E.D. Cal Feb. 25, 2025) (ordering 2 bond hearing for noncitizen detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) for 13 months); A.E. v. Andrews, 1:25- 3 cv-00107-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 1424382 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025) (ordering bond hearing for 4 noncitizen detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) for 20 months). However, these cases involved detention 5 periods substantially longer than 6 months. Here, Petitioner’s shorter detention period of 3 months is 6 well within the 6-month presumptively reasonable period contemplated in Zadvydas and does not 7 implicate those constitutional concerns. See, e.g., De Oliveira Viegas v. Green, 370 F. Supp. 3d 443, 8 448–49 (D.N.J. 2019) (“As a general matter, courts in this District have found detention for a year, or 9 just over a year, insufficient to support an as-applied challenge to a § 1226(c) detention post- 10 Jennings.”); Muse v. Sessions, 2018 WL 4466052, at *4 (D. Minn. Sept. 18, 2018) (collecting cases 11 re: the same) (“[a]s detention continues past a year, courts become extremely wary of permitting 12 continued custody absent a bond hearing”). 13 The Court finds that Petitioner’s short detention period does not qualify as unreasonably 14 prolonged that violates his Fifth Amendment due process rights. That is not to say that Petitioner’s 15 continued detention could not violate due process at some point in the future. At this point, however, 16 the Court finds that Petitioner fails to demonstrate that in his case his 3-month detention without a 17 bond hearing constitutes a violation of due process. As previously noted, the Supreme Court has held 18 that “[d]etention during deportation proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of [the 19 deportation] process.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 531. 21 For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that the petition be DISMISSED 22 without prejudice. 23 This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Court Judge 24 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 25 Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within twenty- 26 one (21) days after being served with a copy of this Findings and Recommendation, a party may file 27 written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Id. The document should be 28 captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation” and shall not exceed 1 fifteen (15) pages, except by leave of court with good cause shown. The Court will not consider 2 exhibits attached to the Objections. To the extent a party wishes to refer to any exhibit(s), the party 3 should reference the exhibit in the record by its CM/ECF document and page number, when possible, 4 or otherwise reference the exhibit with specificity. Any pages filed in excess of the fifteen (15) page 5 limitation may be disregarded by the District Judge when reviewing these Findings and 6 Recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file 7 objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. 8 Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014). This recommendation is not an order that is 9 immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 10 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court's 11 judgment. 12
14 Dated: March 9, 2026 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto . 15 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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