Luis Alberto Chirinos Gonzalez v. Jeremy Casey, Warden of Imperial Regional Detention Facility of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LUIS ALBERTO CHIRINOS Case No.: 3:26-cv-01265-RBM-MMP GONZALEZ, 12 ORDER GRANTING IN PART Petitioner, 13 PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS v. CORPUS 14

JEREMY CASEY, Warden of Imperial 15 [Doc. 1] Regional Detention Facility of U.S.

16 Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al., 17 Respondents. 18 19 20 Pending before the Court are Petitioner Luis Alberto Chirinos Gonzalez’s 21 (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 22 (Doc. 1) and Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO Motion”) (Doc. 2). 23 For the reasons set forth below, the Petition is GRANTED IN PART. 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 A. Factual Background 26 Petitioner, a national and citizen of Venezuela, entered the United States on or 27 around November 14, 2021. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 15–16.) Petitioner was then detained, issued a 28 Notice to Appear (“NTA”), and released on his own recognizance shortly thereafter. (Id. 1 ¶ 16; see Doc. 2-1 ¶ 5.) Petitioner filed an asylum application in February 2023 and is also 2 “a derivative beneficiary of his wife’s asylum application, which has been pending since 3 Spring 2022.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 18.) 4 On February 3, 2023, Petitioner was arrested for driving under the influence and 5 subsequently convicted on January 10, 2024. (Id. ¶ 21; see Doc. 10-2 at 3.) On September 6 23, 2023, Petitioner applied for Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) under 8 U.S.C. § 7 1254a and “pursuant to the [2023] designation of TPS for Venezuela.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 19.) “His 8 application was granted on February 15, 2024.” (Id.; see Doc. 2-2, Ex. A at 5–6.) 9 On June 27, 2025, Petitioner “was arrested by ICE when he attended a probation 10 appointment related to his driving under the influence conviction.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 22; see Doc. 11 10-2 at 2.) He was then transferred and detained at the Rio Grande Processing Center in 12 Texas. (Doc. 1 ¶ 22.) On September 1, 2025, Petitioner sought to renew his TPS pursuant 13 to the most recent January 17, 2025 extension by submitting an Application for TPS on an 14 I-821 Form. (See Doc. 1 ¶ 19; Doc. 2-2, Ex. B at 8.) Petitioner received a notice 15 confirming receipt of his application. (See Doc. 2-2, Ex. B at 8.) On October 3, 2025, 16 Petitioner was released from ICE detention under the Alternatives to Detention (“ATD”) 17 program “with an electronic ankle monitor and instructions to report to ICE.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 23; 18 see Doc. 10-2 at 3.) 19 On or around January 4, 2026, Petitioner “was arrested and charged with 20 misdemeanor violations of New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1198(9)(d) (‘No person 21 subject to a court ordered ignition interlock device shall operate a motor vehicle without 22 such device.’) and New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511 (aggravated unlicensed 23 operation of a motor vehicle).” (Doc. 1 ¶ 24.) “After being detained for [about three 24 hours]at the Nassau County Police station, [Petitioner] was transferred to federal 25 immigration custody.” (Id.; see Doc. 2-1 ¶ 18.) His new criminal charges remain pending 26 and he is currently detained at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 6, 24.) 27 B. Procedural Background 28 On February 27, 2026, Petitioner commenced this action by filing the Petition. (Doc. 1 1.) Petitioner also filed the TRO Motion that same day. (Doc. 2.) Pursuant to this Court’s 2 Order (see Doc. 3), Respondents filed a Return to the Petition on March 11, 2026. (Doc. 3 5.) Petitioner filed a Reply in Support of the Petition on March 12, 2026. (Doc. 7.) 4 The Court subsequently issued an Order for Supplemental Briefing. (Doc. 9.) 5 Respondents filed Supplemental Briefing on April 21, 2026. (Doc. 10.) Petitioner filed a 6 Response to Respondents’ Supplemental Briefing on April 24, 2026. (Doc. 11.) 7 II. LEGAL STANDARD 8 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 9 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2). 10 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 11 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 12 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may 13 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit 14 judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the 15 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 16 treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). 17 III. DISCUSSION 18 Petitioner claims his detention violates the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) 19 and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 4, 45–51.) Specifically, 20 Petitioner claims he has TPS and therefore cannot be removed or detained under 8 U.S.C. 21 § 1254a (the “TPS statute”). (Id. ¶¶ 1–2, 31–44.) Respondents acknowledge that Petitioner 22 had valid TPS from February 15, 2024, to April 2, 2025, but contend Petitioner is properly 23 detained because his TPS was terminated on November 20, 2025. (Doc. 10 at 2.) This 24 action therefore hinges on whether Petitioner currently retains TPS. 25 A. INA 26 1. TPS Statutory Framework and Venezuela’s Designation 27 The TPS program provides humanitarian relief to eligible nationals from countries 28 experiencing conditions that make it unsafe or impossible for their citizens to return home. 1 8 U.S.C. § 1254a. The Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security 2 (“DHS”) “may designate a foreign state for TPS when nationals of that state cannot return 3 there safely due to armed conflict, natural disaster, or other ‘extraordinary and temporary 4 conditions.’” Nat’l TPS All. v. Noem, 150 F.4th 1000, 1010 (9th Cir. 2025) (citing 8 U.S.C. 5 § 1254a(b)(1)(c)). To receive TPS, individuals must have continuously resided in the 6 United States since the effective date of the designation and must meet certain additional 7 requirements. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(1)–(3). TPS recipients cannot be removed from 8 the United States while the designation is in effect. § 1254a(a)(1)(A). Additionally, the 9 TPS statute provides that a noncitizen “provided temporary protected status under this 10 section shall not be detained by the Attorney General on the basis of the [noncitizen]’s 11 immigration status in the United States.” § 1254a(d)(4). 12 DHS first designated Venezuela for TPS in March 2021 and then re-designated 13 Venezuela for TPS on October 3, 2023. See 86 Fed. Reg. 13574 (Mar. 9, 2021); Extension 14 and Redesignation of Venezuela for Temporary Protected Status, 88 Fed. Reg. 68130 (Oct. 15 3, 2023) (the “2023 Designation”). TPS recipients under the 2023 Designation were given 16 legal status and work authorization through April 2, 2025. 88 Fed. Reg. 68130 (Oct. 3, 17 2023). On January 17, 2025, DHS extended the 2023 Designation through October 2, 18 2026. See Extension of the 2023 Designation of Venezuela for Temporary Protected 19 Status, 90 Fed. Reg. 5961 (Jan. 17, 2025) (“2025 Extension”). However, in February 2025, 20 former DHS Secretary Kristi Noem vacated the 2025 Extension and terminated the 2023 21 Designation. See Vacatur of 2025 Temporary Protected Status Decision for Venezuela, 90 22 Fed. Reg. 8805 (Feb. 3, 2025); Termination of the October 3, 2023, Designation of 23 Venezuela for Temporary Protected Status, 90 Fed. Reg. 9040 (Feb. 5, 2025). 24 That termination and vacatur decisions were set aside in an action before the United 25 States District Court for the Northern District of California, where the district court held 26 27 28 1 that such agency actions violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Nat’l TPS 2 All. v. Noem, 798 F. Supp. 3d 1108, 1164 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (the “September 5th Order”). 3 But on October 3, 2025, the United States Supreme Court stayed the district court’s 4 September 5th Order and allowed the termination of TPS for Venezuela to take effect 5 “pending the disposition of the Government’s appeal in the United States Court of Appeals 6 for the Ninth Circuit and the disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is 7 timely sought.” Noem v. Nat’l TPS All., 146 S. Ct. 23, 24 (2025). 8 On December 10, 2025, before the Ninth Circuit resolved the Government’s appeal 9 of the September 5th Order, the district court issued a declaratory judgment providing that: 10 “(1) the vacatur of the January 17, 2025, TPS extension for Venezuela was unlawful as was 11 (2) the termination of Venezuela’s 2023 TPS [D]esignation on February 5, 2025.” Nat’l 12 TPS All. v. Noem, Case No. 25-cv-01766-EMC, 2025 WL 3539156, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13 10, 2025) (the “December 10th Order”). Unlike the September 5th Order, which set aside 14 the challenged vacatur and termination decisions, the district court reasoned it had authority 15 “to issue [declaratory] relief . . . so long as the relief simply preserve[d] the status quo” and 16 did “not materially alter the status of the case on appeal.” Id. 17 On January 28, 2026, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s September 5th 18 Order. See Nat’l TPS All. v. Noem, 166 F.4th 739, 748–49 (9th Cir. 2026).2 19 2. Lawfulness of Petitioner’s Detention 20 Petitioner argues his TPS “must be deemed valid” based on the declaratory judgment 21 issued in the December 10th Order because it “has preclusive effect in [this] case, 22 controlling the legal question of whether members of the National TPS Alliance . . . , such 23

24 25 1 The APA allows courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency actions.” 5 U.S.C § 706(2). 26

27 2 As of the date of this Order, a petition for a writ of certiorari has not been filed as to the appeal of the September 5th Order, and the Government’s appeal of the December 10th 28 1 as [himself], retain their TPS status.” (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 2, 33–34; see Doc. 11 at 4–5.) 2 Respondents assert that although the “[d]istrict [c]ourt in National TPS Alliance v. Noem 3 vacated [DHS’s] vacatur of the TPS re-designation and termination of TPS for 4 Venezuelans[,]”3 Petitioner does not have TPS because “the Supreme Court has stayed [the 5 September 5th Order] pending disposition of the Government’s appeal in the Ninth Circuit 6 and disposition of a petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court.” (Doc. 10 at 2 7 (citing Nat’l TPS All., 146 S. Ct. 23).) 8 Indeed, despite the Ninth Circuit’s affirmance, the September 5th Order remains 9 subject to a Supreme Court stay. See Nat’l TPS All., 146 S. Ct. at 24; see also Vargas 10 Sivira v. Noem, Case No. 1:25-cv-01987-KES-EPG-HC, 2026 WL 221778, at *1 n.1 (E.D. 11 Cal. Jan. 28, 2026), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:25-CV-01987-KES-EPG 12 (HC), 2026 WL 288172 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2026) (noting the Supreme Court’s stay 13 “allow[ed] the Secretary’s vacatur and termination of Venezuela’s TPS status to enter into 14 effect”). And unlike the September 5th Order, the December 10th Order did not set aside 15 the agency’s challenged actions. See Nat’l TPS All., 2025 WL 3539156, at *3 (explaining 16 that the Supreme Court “stayed the [district court’s] final judgment setting aside the agency 17 actions but still left open the door to declaratory relief”). Instead, the district court issued 18 declaratory relief to “help preserve the pending status quo for individual members of the 19 NTPSA. . . . possibly in individual actions where an individual member might receive some 20 benefit from the declaratory judgment.” Id. at *2. “This creates a thorny question as to 21 whether [Petitioner] is entitled to release on the basis of his TPS; the declaratory judgment 22 decision held that the termination of TPS was unlawful, but the Supreme Court has stayed 23 any coercive effect of the holdings, meaning [Petitioner] does not currently hold valid 24 TPS.” O.G.M. v. Sage, No. 4:26-CV-00780, 2026 WL 1242754, at *3 n. 35 (M.D. Pa. May 25 6, 2026); see Nava v. Warden of Port Isabel Serv. Processing Ctr., CIVIL ACTION NO. 26 27 28 3 1 1:26-CV-230, 2026 WL 1018343, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 15, 2026) (“Through this 2 argument, Petitioner[ ] effectively request[s] that the Court go beyond the Declaratory 3 Judgment and render the coercive relief that the [December 10th Order] did not include.”). 4 As such, the impact of the ongoing litigation in National TPS Alliance remains 5 uncertain. See Mendez Nava v. Noem, Case No. 1:26-cv-01716-JLT-SAB-HC, 2026 WL 6 981167, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2026), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:26- 7 CV-01716 JLT SAB (HC), 2026 WL 1049042, at *4 n.5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2026) 8 (declining to address a habeas petitioner’s TPS claim “given the ‘winding history,’ 9 ‘prolonged litigation,’ . . . and uncertainty regarding the impact of the Ninth Circuit 10 affirming the district court’s partial summary judgment and setting aside the Secretary’s 11 vacatur and termination of Venezuela’s TPS designation, . . . and the district court’s 12 declaratory judgment . . . in light of the Supreme Court’s prior grant of a stay”) (internal 13 citations omitted). 14 Even if Respondents are precluded from arguing that DHS’s vacatur and termination 15 orders are lawful, and assuming the Supreme Court’s stay is lifted, the Court finds that 16 Petitioner’s release on the basis of his prior TPS is not appropriate at this time. Petitioner 17 advances no argument or evidence demonstrating that his TPS extended beyond its original 18 expiration on April 2, 2025, without USCIS’s approval of his re-registration application. 19 The 2025 Extension allowed for “existing TPS beneficiaries to retain TPS through October 20 2, 2026, if they otherwise continue to meet the eligibility requirements” and if they 21 “appropriately . . . re-register under this Notice and are approved by USCIS.” 90 Fed. Reg. 22 at 5962–63 (emphasis added). Although Petitioner’s re-registration application was timely 23 under the 2025 Extension,4 the Court cannot assume that it would have been approved or 24 that Petitioner remains eligible based on the current record. See Ramirez Perez v. Schmidt, 25 No. 26-CV-0158-BHL, 2026 WL 867765, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 30, 2026) (“There is no 26

27 4 The 2025 Extension’s “re-registration period for existing beneficiaries [ran] from January 28 1 authority that suggests TPS is established by virtue of a petitioner filing an application and 2 . . . determining whether a foreign national is prima facie eligible for TPS is a decision for 3 USCIS, not a federal district court.”); Guevara v. Warden, Fla. Soft Side S., Case No.: 2:26- 4 cv-01193-SPC-DNF, 2026 WL 1191016, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 1, 2026) (denying habeas 5 relief and finding that petitioner did not have TPS, even if the Supreme Court stay expired, 6 because his renewal application had not been approved and petitioner made “no effort to 7 explain how his TPS could have extended beyond April 2, 2025, without USCIS 8 approval.”). As § 1254a(d)(4) only applies to TPS recipients, not applicants, Petitioner has 9 not demonstrated that he had valid TPS and its protections against detention at the time of 10 his most recent re-detention. See Geincharles v. Rokosky, Case No. 26-cv-00150-ESK, 11 2026 WL 266093, at *3 (D.N.J. Feb. 2, 2026) (“By its plain language, § 1254a(d)(4) only 12 applies to noncitizens who are TPS recipients; TPS applicants are protected from removal 13 while their applications were being considered, but not detention.”). 14 Petitioner therefore fails to establish that he was detained in violation of the TPS 15 statute. See Rokhfirooz v. Larose, 804 F. Supp. 3d 1095, 1097 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (“A 16 prisoner bears the burden of demonstrating that ‘he is in custody in violation of the 17 Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’”) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)). 18 B. Due Process 19 Petitioner claims his detention violates his substantive due process rights because he 20 cannot be removed under the TPS statute. (See Doc. 1 ¶¶ 40–44, 49–51; Doc. 2 at 12–13.) 21 Respondents do not address Petitioner’s due process claim. (See generally Doc. 5.) 22 Instead, “Respondents acknowledge that Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) 23 and is entitled to an order from this Court directing a bond hearing be held pursuant to 8 24 U.S.C. § 1226(a).” (Id. at 2.) 25 “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, 26 including [noncitizens], whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or 27 permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[S]ubstantive due 28 process prevents the government from engaging in conduct that shocks the conscience, or 1 interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” United States v. Salerno, 2 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (cleaned up). Governmental action that infringes a fundamental 3 right is constitutional only if “the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 4 state interest.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993). By contrast, governmental action 5 that does not infringe a fundamental right survives “substantive-due-process scrutiny so 6 long as [the action is] rationally related to legitimate government interests.” Stormans, Inc. 7 v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064, 1085 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). 8 Substantive due process requires that all forms of civil detention, including 9 immigration detention, bear a “reasonable relation” to a legitimate, non-punitive purpose. 10 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). “A due process violation occurs when 11 detention becomes punitive rather than regulatory, meaning there is no regulatory purpose 12 that can rationally be assigned to the detention or the detention appears excessive in relation 13 to its regulatory purpose.” United States v. Torres, 995 F.3d 695, 708 (9th Cir. 2021) 14 (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747). In the immigration context, “[d]ue process protects 15 against immigration detention that is not reasonably related to the legitimate purpose of 16 effectuating removal or protecting against danger and flight risk.” Padilla v. U.S. Immigr. 17 & Customs Enf’t, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023) (citing Zadvydas, 533 18 U.S. at 690–91). “[T]he government has no legitimate interest in detaining individuals 19 who have been determined not to be a danger to the community and whose appearance at 20 future immigration proceedings can be reasonably ensured by a lesser bond or alternative 21 conditions.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 994 (9th Cir. 2017). 22 In this case, Petitioner was detained upon his initial entry into the United States in 23 November 2021 and released on his own recognizance shortly thereafter. (Doc. 1 ¶ 16.) 24 His release “reflects a determination by the government that the noncitizen is not a danger 25 to the community or a flight risk.” Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. 26 Cal. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v. Sessions, 905 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2018). 27 Petitioner therefore “gained a liberty interest in [his] continued freedom when DHS elected 28 to release [him] on [his] own recognizance under section 1226(a), which implied a promise 1 that [he] would not be re-detained so long as [he] abided by the terms of [his] release.” 2 Valencia Zapata v. Kaiser, 801 F. Supp. 3d 919, 934 (N.D. Cal. 2025). Thus, Petitioner 3 has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in his release. 4 “Once a noncitizen has been released, [the Government] must be able to present 5 evidence of materially changed circumstances—namely, evidence that the noncitizen is in 6 fact dangerous or has become a flight risk, or is now subject to a final order of removal.” 7 Saravia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 1176. The record before the Court, however, indicates at least 8 some evidence of a material change of circumstances. In June 2025, Petitioner was 9 detained by ICE after his DUI conviction and released in October 2025 subject to certain 10 conditions, including an ankle monitor, regular ICE check-ins, and enrollment in an ATD 11 program. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 21–23; Doc. 10-2 at 3.) Petitioner was re-detained on January 4, 12 2026, while he was in the Nassau County Police Department’s custody following his arrest 13 and misdemeanor charges for operating a motor vehicle without a court-ordered ignition 14 interlock device and aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle. (Doc. 1 ¶ 24.) 15 Petitioner’s criminal history and potential noncompliance with release conditions may 16 warrant reassessment of his risk of flight or dangerousness. See Chateauneuf v. Chestnut, 17 No. 1:26-cv-01073-DC-JDP (HC), 2026 WL 523695, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2026) 18 (holding the government “alleged some reason why circumstances warrant” the petitioner’s 19 detention because she “was detained directly following her arrest for driving without a 20 license”); Peralta Ayala v. Wofford, No. 1:26-cv-00555-DJC-AC, 2026 WL 249567, at *2 21 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2026) (finding petitioner’s arrest “in connection with unrelated criminal 22 offenses . . . are the sorts of subsequent events that might constitute a change in 23 circumstances.”).5 24

25 5 The Court notes this may also indicate another basis for Petitioner’s re-detention, aside 26 from his immigration status, which further undermines his claim for violations of the TPS 27 statute. See Ladouceur v. Warden, Golden State Annex, No. 1:26-cv-00881-DJC CSK, 2026 WL 693976, at *2 & n.4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2026), report and recommendation 28 1 Because Petitioner is subject to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and 2 Respondents concede that he is entitled to a bond hearing (see Doc. 5 at 2), the Court finds 3 an initial bond hearing is the appropriate remedy to determine whether Petitioner is a flight 4 risk or danger to the community. See Chateauneuf, 2026 WL 523695, at *4 (“[W]here . . 5 . a changed circumstance warrants a petitioner’s immigration detention, the proper remedy 6 for a failure to provide a bond hearing is a post-deprivation bond hearing, not immediate 7 release.”) (citations omitted); see also Padilla, 704 F. Supp. 3d at 1172 (recognizing 8 substantive due process necessitates bond hearings because “non-punitive detention 9 violates the Constitution unless it is strictly limited, and, typically, accompanied by a 10 prompt individualized hearing before a neutral decisionmaker to ensure that the 11 imprisonment serves the government’s legitimate goals”). 12 IV. CONCLUSION 13 Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED IN PART. To 14 the extent that Petitioner requests to be released from custody, the Petition is DENIED 15 WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Accordingly, the Court further ORDERS as follows: 16 1. Respondents are ORDERED to provide Petitioner with an individualized bond 17 hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within ten (10) days of the entry of this Order, to 18 the extent Petitioner has not already received such a bond hearing. 19 2. At the bond hearing, Respondents shall bear the burden of establishing, by clear and 20 convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a risk of 21 flight. 22

23 that while the parties addressed the status of petitioner’s TPS, respondents claimed 24 petitioner with valid TPS “was detained for violating the terms of his release, and 25 confirm[ed] that he was not for his TPS immigration status”); see also Gudino v. Lowe, CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:25-CV-00571, 2026 WL 526366, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2026) 26 (“TPS status does not prevent ICE from detaining noncitizens based on a violation of [a 27 post-removal] order of supervision.”); cf. Salas Leon v. Chestnut, No. 1:26-cv-01080-DC- AC (HC), 2026 WL 523231, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2026) (noting petitioner asserting 28 1 3. Respondents SHALL FILE a status report on or before May 29, 2026, indicating 2 whether and when Petitioner recetved a bond hearing and the outcome of such 3 hearing. 4 4. The TRO Motion (Doc. 2) is thereby DENIED AS MOOT. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 || DATE: May 13, 2026 pt Barra Moye HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12