FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND FINAL JUDGMENT DENYING RELIEF PRAYED FOR BY PLAINTIFFS
JOHN W. OLIVER, District Judge.
I.
Plaintiffs challenge those statutes of the State of Missouri which provide for transportation of public school pupils to and from school but which do not provide like transportation for the pupils of church-related schools. Plaintiffs contend that this denial of transportation violates particular provisions of the United States Constitution. We disagree.
Plaintiffs Urban Luetkemeyer and his children reside in the Cole County, Missouri, R-III School District. That school district transports to and from school at public expense children attending the public school. It refused, however, to transport plaintiffs’ children to and from St. Martin’s School, which is operated by the local parish of the Catholic Church and which they attend. That refusal was based upon the absence of any specific statutory authority to expend public funds for such transportation; upon provisions of the Missouri Constitution prohibiting the use of state funds, directly or indirectly, in aid of religion or religious institutions; and upon the decision of McVey v. Hawkins, 364 Mo. 44, 258 S.W.2d 927 (1953), which declared that the expenditure of public funds for the transportation of school children was not lawful under the Constitution and laws of the State of Missouri.
The plaintiffs contend that the transportation of school children is a public service primarily benefiting children and their parents and not parochial schools. The denial of that benefit, plaintiffs contend, results in an arbitrary and capricious classification which unconstitutionally denies plaintiffs equal protection of the laws, denies plaintiffs of liberty without due process of law, in that it forces them to forego the exer[378]*378cise of their right to freely exercise their religion in order to secure a public benefit, and penalizes the free exercise of religion in violation of the First Amendment to the Constitution.
The basic questions presented are whether the State of Missouri, once it determines to provide bus transportation only to public school students, is compelled by the Constitution of the United States to also provide like transportation to students who attend a parochial school; and whether the Missouri law which does not so provide must be declared to be repugnant to the Federal Constitution.
The relevant facts were wholly stipulated. Our findings of fact therefore quote or paraphrase the stipulation of the parties.
II. FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The plaintiffs are Urban Luetkemeyer and his children, Kennan and Jacqueline, ages 14 and 10, respectively. The Luetkemeyers live in a rural area of Cole County, Missouri, adjacent to U. S. Highway 50. Their home is approximately 200 yards from the highway.
2. The Luetkemeyers are members of the Catholic Church and the Luetkemeyer children attend St. Martins School which is operated by St. Martins Parish of the Catholic Church. The school is located in the unincorporated village of St. Martins on U.S. Highway 50, approximately 2 miles west of the Luetkemeyer home. St. Martins School is an elementary school which offers a curriculum for grades 1 through 8. It would violate the religious conscience of Urban Luetkemeyer to send his children to public schools for their education as long as a Catholic church-related school is available on a day school basis for the education of his children.
3. Cole County R-III School District is a public school district which operates an elementary school in Centertown, a village located on U. S. Highway 50, approximately 7 miles west of the Luetkemeyer home. Both St. Martins School and the Luetkemeyer home are within the boundaries of Cole County R-III School District. During the 1970-1971 school year, there were 207 children enrolled in grades 1 through 8 in attendance at Cole County R-III School. During the 1970-1971 school year there were 205 children enrolled in grades 1 through 8 in St. Martins School.
4. Local public school districts with the assistance and cooperation of the State of Missouri through the State Board of Education must provide transportation to and from home and school for all children living more than 3% miles from school and may provide transportation for all children living one mile or more from school pursuant to Section 167.231, R.S.Mo., 1969, V.A.M. S. The expense of the transportation is paid by state funds and local funds derived from state and local taxes pursuant to Sections 162.161 and 167.251, R.S. Mo., 1969, V.A.M.S.
5. Cole County R-III School District with the assistance and cooperation of the State Board of Education has established and operates a system of school bus transportation to and from home and school for children who attend the public school maintained and operated by the district. Free transportation is offered to all children who live one mile or more from school. During the 1970-1971 school year, the average daily number of children enrolled in grades 1 through 8 of the Cole County R-III School District who were transported to and from home and school was 130.35. Five buses with passenger capacity ranging from 66 to 48 passengers each and four other vehicles with the capacity of 12 passengers each are operated by the district for the transportation of children to and from school. Cole County R-III School District was reimbursed by the State of Missouri for all of the total cost of providing said transportation (except for $126.96, which was the cost of transporting two pupils who were not eligible for state transportation).
6. In 1970 Urban Luetkemeyer paid more than $985.00 in real and personal [379]*379property taxes to Cole County, more than $625.00 in income taxes to the State of Missouri, and more than $250.-00 in sales taxes to the State of Missouri. As the owner and operator of a retail business establishment, he collected from his customers and paid to the State of Missouri more than $4,250 in sales taxes in 1970. The income taxes and sales taxes paid by Urban Luetkemeyer and the sales taxes collected by him from his customers have been paid to the State of Missouri and deposited in the General Revenue Fund of the State of Missouri, and a portion of that fund has been appropriated to the Public School Fund of the State of Missouri. A portion of the Public School Fund has been allocated and paid to the Cole County R-III School District in reimbursement of the cost of providing pupil transportation as set forth above.
7. A school bus route established and operated by the Cole County R-III School District passes by a point on U.S. Highway 50 which is approximately 200 yards from the Luetkemeyer home and continues on U. S. Highway 50 and passes directly by St. Martins School which is attended by the Luetkemeyer children. The Luetkemeyers have demanded of the members of the Cole County R-III School Board that transportation be provided to the Luetkemeyer children to and from their home and St. Martins School on the existing facilities and routes operated and maintained by Cole County R-III School District. On January 12, 1971, the Luetkemeyers made an unsuccessful effort to board a Cole County R-III bus for transportation to St. Martins School. The school district’s officers and employees have refused to allow the Luetkemeyer children to use the school district bus facilities for the purpose of going to and from St. Martins School from the Luetkemeyer home. The officials of Cole County R-III School District refused to allow the Luetkemeyer children to use the bus facilities in going to and from St. Martins School for the reason that in their opinion the law of the State of Missouri prohibits the transportation at public expense of children to and from a non-public school. The school district is supported in its refusal to provide transportation of children going to and from a non-public school by the Executive Department of the State of Missouri in its administration of the statutes, by the Judicial Department of the State of Missouri in its interpretation of the statutes, and by the Legislative Department of the State of Missouri in its appropriation of tax moneys to fund the transportation of children to and from home and school.
8. The route which the Luetkemeyer children must follow in going to and from home and St. Martins School is on U.S. Highway 50 in a rural area. There are no paved sidewalks or walkways, traffic control devices, and protected pedestrian crosswalks on the route. There are generally no sidewalk or walkways, traffic control devices and protected pedestrian crosswalks on the streets, roads and highways through the Cole County R-III School District. The average daily traffic on the route is 5,650 vehicles.
9. St. Martins School is a nonprofit school operated by St. Martins Parish of the Catholic Church. The sole source of income for the school is the contributions and donations from patrons and friends and fees charged its pupils.
10. The St. Martins School does not provide transportation to and from home and school. The parents or guardians of the children have the sole responsibility of getting the children to and from school. Approximately 100 children attending St. Martins School live more than one mile from that school and if transportation were provided to children attending St. Martins on the same basis as is provided to children attending Cole County R-III School, approximately 100 children would be eligible for transportation. Most of the children attending St. Martins School who live one mile or more from the school are located along existing school bus routes.
11. The free transportation provided to children who attend Cole County R-[380]*380III Public School aids the parents and guardians of these children in complying with the requirements of the Compulsory Attendance Law. This free transportation also relieves the parents and guardians of these children of the cost and expense of transportation to and from school. The parents and guardians of children who attend St. Martins School are denied the benefit • of free transportation in complying with the requirements of the Compulsory Attendance Laws and are burdened with the cost and expense of transporting their children to and from school.
12. School bus transportation is a safer means for pupils to travel to school than private vehicle or pedestrian travel. The evidence shows that buses are subject to statutory and regulatory safety standards to which private vehicles are not subject, school bus traffic is governed by special traffic control requirements, and school bus drivers are subject to special qualification standards. The probability of accident and injury in going to and from school for pedestrian pupils increases with the distance the pupils must travel between home and school, given a certain community with certain hazards of pedestrian travel.
13. The total estimated expenditure for public elementary and secondary education in the State of Missouri in 1970-1971 is $875,300,000. During the 1970-1971 school year the total cost of transporting pupils enrolled in grades Kindergarten through 12, inclusive, of public schools in the State of Missouri by public school districts was $33,-028,006, or 3.7% of total expenditure for public schools. The average cost per pupil for transportation was $66.72.
14. The total cumulative enrollment in public schools, grades Kindergarten through 12, inclusive in the State of Missouri for the 1970-1971 school year was 1,084,833 pupils. During the 1970-1971 school years the number of pupils enrolled in Grades Kindergarten through 12, inclusive, of public schools and transported at one time or another by public school districts in Missouri was 585,650. During the 1970-1971 school year the average daily number of pupils enrolled in Grades Kindergarten through 12, inclusive, of public schools transported by public school districts in the State of Missouri was 495,024. Therefore, 45.6% of the public school pupils were transported.
15. Based upon data reported to the State Department of Education under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, the total number of nonpublic schools in Missouri during the 1969-1970 school year was 553, which number was composed of 385 Catholic schools, 80 Lutheran schools, 3 Jewish schools, 12 Amish schools, 10 Seventh Day Adventist schools, and 63 other nonpublic schools. Based upon data reported to the State Department of Education under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, the total number of nonpublic school pupils during the 1969-1970 school year was 134,593, which number was composed of 116,213 pupils attending Catholic schools, 10,844 pupils attending Lutheran schools, 235 pupils attending Jewish schools, 242 pupils attending Seventh Day Adventist schools, and 7,059 pupils attending other nonpublic schools. These figures are based upon reports from 85% of the nonpublic schools. Of the schools reporting, 94.8% of students attending nonpublic schools are attending church-related schools.
16. As noted above, 45.6% of the children attending public schools in the State of Missouri during the 1970-1971 school year were transported. If the same percentage of children attending nonpublic schools in Missouri would be eligible for transportation, the estimated average daily number of children attending nonpublic schools to be transported would be 61,374. The estimated maximum cost of transporting nonpublic school children, based upon the average cost per child of transporting public school children would be $4,094,872 per year.
[381]*381The total estimated expenditures for public elementary and secondary education in the State of Missouri in 1970-1971 was $875,300,000. The estimated cost of transporting nonpublic school children to and from school would be less than % of 1% (0.46%) of the total annual expenditure for public elementary and secondary education.
17. The transportation of children to and from both public and nonpublic schools at public expense is provided for in 27 states. The 1970-1971 public school enrollment in these states was 30,759,554. The 1970-1971 enrollment in Catholic schools in these states was 3,693,818. Twenty-three states do not provide transportation at public expense for children going to and from nonpublic schools. The public school enrollment in these states for 1970-1971 was 16,-708,281. The 1970-1971 enrollment in Catholic schools in these states was 624,978.
III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Child Benefit Theory
Plaintiffs place great reliance on the “child benefit theory” spelled out in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1946); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 88 S.Ct. 1923, 20 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1968), and other cases. Those cases concluded that States may constitutionally provide particular services to pupils attending religious schools (school bus transportation and school textbooks, respectively) on the theory that such services were for the benefit of the “parents and children, not schools,” Allen, supra, at 392, 88 S.Ct. 1923. Those cases, however, did not relate to the question presented in this case. Principles which state what a State may do may not properly be read as a command to what a State must do.
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 462, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 2809, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973), noted that “appellees intimate that the State must provide assistance to private schools equivalent to that it provides to public schools without regard to whether the private schools discriminate on racial grounds.” In response, the Court stated:
Clearly, the State need not. Even as to church-sponsored schools whose policies are nondiscriminatory, any absolute right to equal aid was negated, at least by implication, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, [91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745] (1971).
See also footnote 7 in Norwood in which the Court explains in detail how appellees in that case, as plaintiffs in this case, “misperceive the ‘child benefit’ theory of our cases decided under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.”
The “child benefit” theory must be considered in the context of the cases which required the Court to define permissible areas of State aid to religious institutions. The language of those cases may not be taken out of context to support the notion that a State must provide transportation for all pupils, regardless of whether they attend a religious or public school. We do not suggest that the fact that state benefits are distributed to children rather than to schools, and the fact that the benefit is essentially nonreligious in character may not be relevant in regard to proper analysis of other constitutional questions presented in this case; we conclude only that the “child benefit theory,” as set out in Everson and Allen, standing alone, does not support plaintiffs’ basic contention.
B. Equal Protection
Plaintiffs contend that the transportation of school children is part of a comprehensive statutory and regulatory scheme designed to provide for the safety and welfare of children traveling to and from school. Plaintiffs argue that the fact that this public service is denied to the plaintiff children solely because they are enrolled in a nonpublic school “is an arbitrary and unreasonable classification and unconstitutionally de[382]*382nies plaintiffs equal protection of the laws” as prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Plaintiffs argue further that the classification involved is invidious because it infringes upon plaintiffs’ fundamental right to select the school of their choice and to freely exercise their religion and that, therefore, a compelling state interest must be shown to justify the classification.
The plaintiffs direct attention to language in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1331, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), which states that “any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of [a constitutional] right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.” The constitutional right claimed is the right to attend a church-sponsored school, as defined in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925). Plaintiffs in this case, as appellees in Norwood v. Harrison, fail to recognize the limited scope of Pierce. In Norwood, appellees suggested that “the rights of parents under Pierce would be undermined were the lending of free textbooks denied to those who attend private schools — in other words, that school children who attend private schools might be deprived of the equal protection of laws were they invidiously classified under the state textbook loan program simply because their parents had exercised the constitutionally protected choice to send their children to private schools.” 93 S.Ct. at 2809.
Chief Justice Burger pointed out in Norwood that Pierce “said nothing of any supposed right of private or parochial schools to share with public schools in state largesse, on an equal basis or otherwise.” He added:
It has never been held that if private schools are not given some share of public funds allocated for education that such schools are isolated into a classification violative of the Equal Protection Clause. It is one thing to say that a State may not prohibit the maintenance of private schools and quite another to say that such schools must, as a matter of equal protection, receive state aid. 93 S.Ct. at 2809.
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973), which held that education was not a federally protected constitutional right, was cited and relied upon in Norwood. If one’s right to a public school education is not within the protection of the Constitution, certainly it cannot be said that one has a federally protected constitutional right to a parochial school education, nor a federally protected constitutional right to receive free public transportation to and from parochial schools.
In regard to the appropriate standard to be applied in a ease involving public education Rodriquez concluded that “this is not a case in which the challenged state action must be subjected to the searching judicial scrutiny reserved for laws that create suspect classifications or impinge upon constitutionally protected rights.” 93 S.Ct. at 1300.
We conclude, consistent with the rationale of Rodriquez, that the proper standard to be applied is the traditional test set out in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961): “The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective.” Plaintiffs therefore have the burden of showing that the classification does not reasonably promote a valid State objective. Plaintiffs must establish as a matter of law that the State of Missouri’s decision to promote the separation of church and state by refusing to provide school bus transportation to church-sponsored school pupils when it does provide that service to public school pupils is irrational, arbitrary, and capricious. We find and conclude that the State’s classification is not irrational, but promotes a legitimate State purpose.
[383]*383Missouri has a long history of maintaining a very high wall between church and state. Much of that history is reviewed in Harfst v. Hoegen, 349 Mo. 808, 163 S.W.2d 609 (en banc, 1942), a case cited in footnote 7 in one of the concurring opinions in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 93 S.Ct. 1463, 36 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973). That case reviewed the numerous constitutional provisions relating to the separation of church and state' and pointed out that Missouri’s Constitution “goes even farther than those of some other states.” That case concluded:
The constitutional policy of our State has decreed the absolute separation of church and state, not only in governmental matters, but -in educational ones as well. Public money, coming from taxpayers of every denomination, may not be used for the help of any religious sect in education or otherwise. [163 S.W.2d at 614]
The Constitution of Missouri, Section 5, Art. IX, Y.A.M.S. provides that tax revenues for schools “shall be faithfully appropriated for establishing and m'aintaining free public schools, and for no other uses or purposes whatsoever.” In McVey v. Hawkins, 364 Mo. 44, 258 S.W.2d 927 (1953), the Supreme Court of Missouri, en banc held that the transportation of children attending private schools provided in Section 165.140, R.S.Mo., 1949, was prohibited by the Constitution of Missouri, 1945. In the general revision of Missouri school laws in 1963, the statute providing for the transportation of private school pupils was deleted. The current school laws relating to transportation, Section 167.-231 et seq., R.S.Mo., therefore, can only be interpreted as permitting transportation only to public school pupils. Missouri, therefore, does have an avowed purpose to prevent State aid to church-sponsored schools.1
A three-judge district court in the Eastern District of Missouri held that this purpose, when implemented to prohibit the use of public funds for private schools, was legitimate and constitutional in Brusca v. State of Missouri ex rel. State Board of Education, 332 F.Supp. 275 (E.D.Mo., 1971), aff’d. 405 U.S. 1050, 92 S.Ct. 1493, 31 L.Ed.2d 786 (1972). Plaintiff in that case made the argument that failure to provide funding out of tax revenues for private schools while providing such funding for public schools was violative of the Equal Protection Clause. The court did not find the argument persuasive:
We find nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in the determination of the State to deny its funds to sectarian schools or for religious instruction. So long as no invidious discrimination exists, the courts may not interfere. Cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393. Here, there is no discrimination in the legal sense. All children of every or no religious denomination have the same right to attend free secular public schools maintained with tax funds. The fact that a child or his parent for him voluntarily chooses to forego the exercise of the right to educational benefits provided in the public school systems does not deprive him of anything by State action. [332 F.Supp. at 279],
Plaintiffs base a large portion of their argument on their reading of Everson v. Board of Education, supra, and Board of Education v. Allen, supra.
The Court’s discussion of those cases in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), and its most recent church and' state cases, Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973); Levitt v. Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 93 [384]*384S.Ct. 2814, 37 L.Ed.2d 736 (1973); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 93 S.Ct. 2982, 37 L.Ed.2d 939 (1973); Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 93 S.Ct. 2955, 37 L.Ed.2d 948 (1973); and Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 93 S.Ct. 1463, 36 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973), make further discussion of the equal protection question redundant.
C. Due Process
Three of the six points of plaintiffs’ brief purport to present due process questions. Plaintiffs contend that they were denied due process (a) “for the reason that in order to obtain the benefits of this public service (transportation of school children) plaintiffs must wholly forego their fundamental constitutional right to select the school of their choice;” (b) “for the reason that the State conditions the receipt of the benefits of this public service (transportation of school children) upon plaintiffs’ foregoing the fundamental constitutional right to free exercise of their religion;” and (c) for the reason that the denial to plaintiffs of bus service “on an equal basis with other citizens constitutes the arbitrary taking of his property without compensation and deprives him of his property without due process of law.”
Plaintiffs cite and rely primarily on their reading of Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925); and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963). The cases upon which plaintiffs place principal reliance make clear that the due process label which plaintiffs place on the arguments made under these three points is quite incidental and that plaintiffs’ reference to due process more or less follows the pattern apparently followed in Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 81 S.Ct. 1135, 6 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961). That case involved an equal protection attack upon Pennsylvania’s Sunday closing law. Plaintiffs’ contentions were summarized on page 589, 81 S.Ct. on page 1139, and the Court noted in footnote 5 on that page that “concomitantly, appellant states the statute violates due process for these same reasons.” Regardless of what label may be placed on plaintiffs’ argument, it is clear that the rationale of the cases relied upon do not afford plaintiffs any ground for relief.
The foundation upon which plaintiffs’ school choice argument rests is that Pierce either created or recognized the notion that the constitutional prohibition which voids a state requirement that all children attend a public school commands a further conclusion that there is something in the Constitution which requires that all services, specifically, bus transportation, which the State may decide to furnish public school pupils must also be furnished parochial school pupils.
Pierce, in our judgment, cannot be so broadly read. Indeed, the Court in Norwood v. Harrison stated that “the Court’s holding in Pierce is not without limits.” Indeed, Norwood expressly adopted Mr. Justice White’s observation in his concurring opinion in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15, 239 (1972), that Pierce “held simply that while a State may posit [educational] standards, it may not pre-empt the educational process by requiring children to attend public schools.” 93 S.Ct. at 2809. When the Pierce foundation upon which plaintiffs’ first “due process” argument is based is thus removed, all that remains to support plaintiffs’ argument is their reading of Sherbert. Indeed, Sherbert is the sole basis for the plaintiffs’ second “due process” argument, other than a number of state cases, which are clearly inapposite.
But Sherbert also presented a very narrow question under the Free Exercise clause and does not support plaintiffs’ argument that the receipt of a public service is unconstitutionally burdened. The Court made clear in Sherbert that:
Our holding today . . . but reaffirms a principle that we an[385]*385nounced a decade and a half ago, namely that no State may ‘exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.’ Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16, [67 S.Ct. 504, 512, 91 L.Ed. 711]. (emphasis the Court’s.) [374 U.S. at 410, 83 S.Ct. at 1797].
Sherbert involved a request for dispensation from a general regulatory law; not a request or demand for a public service. While the exemption or dispensation would clearly result in some aid to a particular individual, it did not involve the expenditure of state funds which would, in fact, indirectly aid a religious institution. The Court simply did not have the latter question before it. Justice Douglas appropriately pointed out in his concurring opinion, that “this case does not involve the problems of direct or indirect state assistance to a religious organization.” [374 U.S. at 413, 83 S.Ct. at 1798].
In the final analysis, it must be recognized that Sherbert simply held that the disqualification of the Seventh Day Ad^ ventist plaintiff as a beneficiary under the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act could not withstand constitutional challenge because South Carolina could not justify that disqualification by a “compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State’s constitutional power to regulate .,” within the meaning of the familiar standard articulated in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 at 438, 83 S.Ct. 328 at 341, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963). Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961), also involving the Free Exercise clause, represents another case in the same line of cases which reached a different result. Braunfeld repeatedly recognized that a valid State statute may well place an economic burden upon persons who may wish to follow their religious convictions. Chief Justice Warren stated that the Pennsylvania closing law, so far as members of the Orthodox Jewish faith, “operates so as to make the practice of their religious beliefs more expensive.” The Court concluded, however, that “[f]ully recognizing that the alternatives open to appellants and others similarly situated . . . may well result in some financial sacrifice in order to observe their religious beliefs, still the option is wholly different than when the legislation attempts to make a religious practice itself unlawful.” [366 U.S. at 605-606, 81 S.Ct. at 1147].
Braunfeld makes clear that the economic effect of a statute is not an appropriate test for determining whether the challenged legislation violates the Constitution. The Court took note of the fact that “we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost every conceivable religious preference” and that “[Consequently, it cannot be expected, much less required, that legislators enact no law regulating conduct that may in some way result in an economic disadvantage to some religious sects and not to others because of the special practices of the various religions.” [366 U. S. at 606, 81 S.Ct. at 1147]
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968), rejected a First Amendment attack upon the 1965 amendment to the Selective Service Act. Apparent limitations upon First Amendment freedoms were held to be justified by the quality of the governmental interest involved. The Court commented on the long line of cases of which Sherbert is only one, when it stated that:
To characterize the quality of the governmental interest which must appear, the Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong. Whatever imprecision inheres in these terms, we think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the [386]*386Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest ; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. [391 U.S. at 376-377, 88 S.Ct. at 1679]
The most recent case which, as a matter of result, fell on the same side of the line as Sherbert, is Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). That case concluded that the State’s interest in universal education was not sufficient to justify the impingement upon the religious convictions of the Old Order Amish against formal education beyond the eighth grade. Yoder added to the descriptive terms used to characterize the quality of the governmental interest which must appear. Chief Justice Burger stated that “the essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.” [406 U.S. at 215, 92 S.Ct. at 1533]
We conclude without hesitation that the long established constitutional policy of the State of Missouri, which insists upon a degree of separation of church and state to probably a higher degree than that required by the First Amendment, is indeed a “compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State’s constitutional power,” within the standard enunciated in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438, 83 S.Ct. 328, 341, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963), and applied in Sherbert. That interest, in our judgment, satisfies any possible infringement of the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment or of any other prohibition in the Constitution of the United States. We likewise find and conclude that Missouri’s interest in that subject is within Missouri’s constitutional power and that such interest may properly be described as an “interest of the highest order” within the meaning of Yoder and within the meaning of all the other various descriptive terms set forth in United States v. O’Brien above quoted.
The fact that Missouri has determined to enforce a more strict policy of church and state separation than that required by the First Amendment does not present any substantial federal constitutional question. The Supreme Court has clearly indicated-that there is an area of activity which falls between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause in which action by a State will not violate the former nor inaction, the latter. For example, Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970), concluded that a State may or may not tax church property. “The limits of permissible state accommodation to religion are by no means co-extensive with the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause” [397 U.S. at 673, 90 S.Ct. at 1413]. Likewise, Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 91 S.Ct. 2091, 29 L.Ed.2d 790 (1972), established that a State may or may not grant funds to church-related schools for construction of buildings for secular use.
Much the same argument as that made by plaintiffs in this case was made in Di Censo v. Robinson, 316 F.Supp. 112 (D.R.I.1970), aff'd. 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1972). The Court there rejected the claim that free exercise benefits which flow from aid to parochial education should prevail over the establishment clause values protected by strict separation, stating:
We reject the notion that the Free Exercise Clause demands affirmative state action to accommodate . personal evaluations when society at large has accepted the premise that religious and secular education can be successfully separated. [316 F.Supp. at 123].
Missouri has determined that it will not extend bus transportation to parochial school students. Nothing in the federal Constitution requires that it do [387]*387so. Plaintiffs’ arguments under the first two of the three points under discussion are untenable.
The plaintiffs’ final argument under the last point of their “due process” arguments is that there is an unconstitutional taking of the plaintiff’s share of tax revenues when he does not receive benefits provided from the general tax revenues. The only case cited by the plaintiffs, Detroit Edison Co. v. East China T. P. School District No. 3, 247 F.Supp. 296, (E.D.Mich.1965), aff’d. 6 Cir., 378 F.2d 225, cert. den. 389 U.S. 932, 88 S.Ct. 296, 19 L.Ed.2d 284 (1967), does not support plaintiffs’ novel theory. Indeed, the district court’s order dismissing plaintiff’s complaint was affirmed on appeal. The general principle stated in the leading case of Union Refrigerator Transit Company v. Com. of Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 26 S.Ct. 36, 50 L.Ed. 150 (1905), that “a general tax cannot be dissected to show that, as to certain constituent parts, the taxpayer receives no benefit,” is applicable. Plaintiffs’ last argument is untenable.
IV. CONCLUSION
We find and conclude that the Constitution of the United States does not compel the State of Missouri to provide equal transportation services to private and church-sponsored schools and that it may, as it has, elect to provide such service only for its public schools. While we recognize that some of plaintiffs’ arguments may be based upon grounds other than the First Amendment, we nonetheless deem it appropriate to state that the following language from Mr. Justice Douglas’ concurring opinion in Sherbert is generally applicable to this case:
This ease is resolvable not in terms of what an individual can demand of government, but solely in terms of what government may not do to an individual in violation of his religious scruples. The fact that government cannot exact from me a surrender of one iota of my religious scruples does not, of course, mean that I can .demand of government a sum of money, the better to exercise them. For the Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can exact from the government. [374 U.S. at 412, 83 S.Ct. at 1798]
Accordingly, and for the reasons indicated, it is
Ordered and adjudged that Sections 167.231, 167.251, 163.161) 163.061, 165.-011, R.S.Mo., V.A.M.S., and related statutes should be and are hereby declared not to be unconstitutional. It is further
Ordered and adjudged that the plaintiffs’ demand for an injunction enjoining the enforcement of Missouri Statutes 167.231, 167.251, 163.161, 163.061 and 165.011, R.S.Mo., V.A.M.S., should be and is hereby denied. It is further
Ordered and adjudged that the plaintiffs’ prayer for damages should be and is hereby denied.
COLLINSON, District Judge, concurs.