DOYLE, President Judge.1
Michael Brian Lueth (Appellant) appeals a Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas order that dismissed his statutory appeal from the one-year suspension of his motor vehicle operating privilege imposed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (Department), pursuant to Section 1532(b)(3) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1532(b)(3).2 Because our decision in Laughlin v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 719 A.2d 850 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 559 Pa. 670, 739 A.2d 168 (1999), is controlling in this matter, we reverse.
Appellant was arrested on March 20, 1997, and charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI) in violation of Md.Code, Transp. § 21-902(a).3 Following a trial in the District Court of Maryland for Carroll County, Appellant was convicted on June 18, 1997, of that offense. Thereafter, Appellant filed an application with the Maryland Court to be admitted into Maryland’s “probation prior to judgement” program under the provisions of Md.Code, Crimes and Punishments, Article 27, § 641(a)(l)(i)(l). That section of Maryland law permits the court to place a person who “pleads guilty or nolo contendere or is found guilty of an offense” on probation, and to “stay the entering of judgment.” Id. If the individual successfully completes the probation period, the court discharges the person from probation. Md.Code, Crimes and Punishments, Article 27, § 641(c). The statute further provides that discharge of the individual, upon successful completion of the probation period, is “without judgment of conviction and is not a conviction for purposes of any disqualification or disability imposed by law because of conviction of crime.” Id. The defendant in a matter of this type must consent to the entry of the stay and, by so doing, “waives the right to appeal from the judgment of guilt by the court at any time.” Md.Code, Crimes and Punishments, Article 27, § 641(a)(l)(iv)(5). Finally, the statute provides that if the term of probation is violated, “the court may enter judgment and proceed with disposition of the person as if the person had not [135]*135been placed on probation.” Md.Code, Crimes and Punishments, Article 27, § 641(b). On February 3, 1998, the Maryland Court placed Appellant in the “program” and on probation for a period of twenty-four months.
Maryland is a party state to the Driver License Compact of 1961 (Compact),4 and reported a DWI conviction for Appellant to the Department. The Commonwealth, also a party state, suspended Appellant’s operating privilege for one year pursuant to Sections 1532(b)(3) and 1581 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1532(b)(3)5 and 75 Pa.C.S. § 1581. Thereafter, the Department notified Appellant that his license was suspended for one year pursuant to the Compact, because it was treating his Maryland DWI notification as a conviction for violating Section 3731(a) of the Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731(a).
On August 8, 1997, Appellant filed an appeal of the Department’s one-year operating privilege suspension with the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas. A de novo hearing was held on the matter on February 11, 1998. At the hearing, Appellant conceded that he was found guilty of the Maryland DWI charge, but asserted that because he had been admitted into the probation prior to judgment program, the disposition of his case did not constitute a conviction under the Compact. The trial court was unconvinced and on July 15, 1998, entered an order and opinion dismissing the appeal. This appeal ensued.6
Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed his appeal. Specifically, he argues that because judgment was not entered on the Maryland court’s finding that he was guilty of DWI, he should not be considered “convicted” of the Maryland DWI charge for purposes of the Compact. He asserts that the Maryland program is akin to Pennsylvania’s Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) program for first time DUI offenders under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731, and that he should not be considered “convicted” because under Maryland law he has an opportunity to gain a discharge if he successfully completes his twenty-four month probationary sentence. We agree.
Section 1581 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1581, is the legislative enactment of the Compact into which the Commonwealth entered, with other jurisdictions, on December 10, 1996. Article III of the Compact (Reports of Conviction) states in part that “[t]he licensing authority of a party state shall report each conviction of a person from another party state occurring within its jurisdiction to the licensing authority of the home state of the licensee.” Therefore, the Department counters, because Maryland reported the offense as a conviction, under the Compact and Pennsylvania law, it is, and must be [136]*136treated as, a conviction by the Pennsylvania licensing authority. We disagree.
In Laughlin, the licensee was charged and convicted, inter alia, of driving under the influence of alcohol. He pled guilty to this charge with the understanding that if he completed a drag and alcohol program, with no other charges or convictions, the district court would amend his sentence and grant him probation prior to judgment. Laughlin, 719 A.2d at 851. After he pled guilty, Maryland discharged its responsibilities under the Compact and forwarded notice of his conviction to the Department. The Department then notified Laughlin that it had suspended his driver’s license for one year. The trial court concluded that Maryland had provided administrative, not judicial, notice; deferred its decision; and thereby afforded Laughlin the opportunity to submit notice of his decertification of the Maryland conviction. On appeal to this Court, we affirmed and held that a Pennsylvania licensee’s plea of guilty in Maryland to a charge of driving under the influence of alcohol could not form the basis of the Depart- ' ment’s license suspension, when the law of Maryland authorizes discharge of the conviction upon successful completion of a probationary anti-drag and alcohol program. Responding directly to Md. Code, Article 27, § 641, which is specifically at issue here, we said:
Therefore, giving full faith and credit to Maryland’s law, as did the common pleas court, we hold that the Department’s suspension of Laughlin’s driver’s license was, in these circumstances, an impermissible disqualification from his motor vehicle operating privileges, since his discharge in Maryland cannot be a conviction for such purposes.
Laughlin, 719 A.2d at 852. We further note that, as in Laughlin, both licensees were convicted of driving under the influence. Both were enrolled in the probation prior to judgment program pursuant to Md.Code, Article 27, § 641. Notification was made to the Department in both instances prior to entry of judgment. Neither Appellant nor Laughlin completed his probationary period before the appeals in Pennsylvania were filed.
The Department contends that Md.
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DOYLE, President Judge.1
Michael Brian Lueth (Appellant) appeals a Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas order that dismissed his statutory appeal from the one-year suspension of his motor vehicle operating privilege imposed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (Department), pursuant to Section 1532(b)(3) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1532(b)(3).2 Because our decision in Laughlin v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 719 A.2d 850 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 559 Pa. 670, 739 A.2d 168 (1999), is controlling in this matter, we reverse.
Appellant was arrested on March 20, 1997, and charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI) in violation of Md.Code, Transp. § 21-902(a).3 Following a trial in the District Court of Maryland for Carroll County, Appellant was convicted on June 18, 1997, of that offense. Thereafter, Appellant filed an application with the Maryland Court to be admitted into Maryland’s “probation prior to judgement” program under the provisions of Md.Code, Crimes and Punishments, Article 27, § 641(a)(l)(i)(l). That section of Maryland law permits the court to place a person who “pleads guilty or nolo contendere or is found guilty of an offense” on probation, and to “stay the entering of judgment.” Id. If the individual successfully completes the probation period, the court discharges the person from probation. Md.Code, Crimes and Punishments, Article 27, § 641(c). The statute further provides that discharge of the individual, upon successful completion of the probation period, is “without judgment of conviction and is not a conviction for purposes of any disqualification or disability imposed by law because of conviction of crime.” Id. The defendant in a matter of this type must consent to the entry of the stay and, by so doing, “waives the right to appeal from the judgment of guilt by the court at any time.” Md.Code, Crimes and Punishments, Article 27, § 641(a)(l)(iv)(5). Finally, the statute provides that if the term of probation is violated, “the court may enter judgment and proceed with disposition of the person as if the person had not [135]*135been placed on probation.” Md.Code, Crimes and Punishments, Article 27, § 641(b). On February 3, 1998, the Maryland Court placed Appellant in the “program” and on probation for a period of twenty-four months.
Maryland is a party state to the Driver License Compact of 1961 (Compact),4 and reported a DWI conviction for Appellant to the Department. The Commonwealth, also a party state, suspended Appellant’s operating privilege for one year pursuant to Sections 1532(b)(3) and 1581 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1532(b)(3)5 and 75 Pa.C.S. § 1581. Thereafter, the Department notified Appellant that his license was suspended for one year pursuant to the Compact, because it was treating his Maryland DWI notification as a conviction for violating Section 3731(a) of the Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731(a).
On August 8, 1997, Appellant filed an appeal of the Department’s one-year operating privilege suspension with the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas. A de novo hearing was held on the matter on February 11, 1998. At the hearing, Appellant conceded that he was found guilty of the Maryland DWI charge, but asserted that because he had been admitted into the probation prior to judgment program, the disposition of his case did not constitute a conviction under the Compact. The trial court was unconvinced and on July 15, 1998, entered an order and opinion dismissing the appeal. This appeal ensued.6
Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed his appeal. Specifically, he argues that because judgment was not entered on the Maryland court’s finding that he was guilty of DWI, he should not be considered “convicted” of the Maryland DWI charge for purposes of the Compact. He asserts that the Maryland program is akin to Pennsylvania’s Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) program for first time DUI offenders under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731, and that he should not be considered “convicted” because under Maryland law he has an opportunity to gain a discharge if he successfully completes his twenty-four month probationary sentence. We agree.
Section 1581 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1581, is the legislative enactment of the Compact into which the Commonwealth entered, with other jurisdictions, on December 10, 1996. Article III of the Compact (Reports of Conviction) states in part that “[t]he licensing authority of a party state shall report each conviction of a person from another party state occurring within its jurisdiction to the licensing authority of the home state of the licensee.” Therefore, the Department counters, because Maryland reported the offense as a conviction, under the Compact and Pennsylvania law, it is, and must be [136]*136treated as, a conviction by the Pennsylvania licensing authority. We disagree.
In Laughlin, the licensee was charged and convicted, inter alia, of driving under the influence of alcohol. He pled guilty to this charge with the understanding that if he completed a drag and alcohol program, with no other charges or convictions, the district court would amend his sentence and grant him probation prior to judgment. Laughlin, 719 A.2d at 851. After he pled guilty, Maryland discharged its responsibilities under the Compact and forwarded notice of his conviction to the Department. The Department then notified Laughlin that it had suspended his driver’s license for one year. The trial court concluded that Maryland had provided administrative, not judicial, notice; deferred its decision; and thereby afforded Laughlin the opportunity to submit notice of his decertification of the Maryland conviction. On appeal to this Court, we affirmed and held that a Pennsylvania licensee’s plea of guilty in Maryland to a charge of driving under the influence of alcohol could not form the basis of the Depart- ' ment’s license suspension, when the law of Maryland authorizes discharge of the conviction upon successful completion of a probationary anti-drag and alcohol program. Responding directly to Md. Code, Article 27, § 641, which is specifically at issue here, we said:
Therefore, giving full faith and credit to Maryland’s law, as did the common pleas court, we hold that the Department’s suspension of Laughlin’s driver’s license was, in these circumstances, an impermissible disqualification from his motor vehicle operating privileges, since his discharge in Maryland cannot be a conviction for such purposes.
Laughlin, 719 A.2d at 852. We further note that, as in Laughlin, both licensees were convicted of driving under the influence. Both were enrolled in the probation prior to judgment program pursuant to Md.Code, Article 27, § 641. Notification was made to the Department in both instances prior to entry of judgment. Neither Appellant nor Laughlin completed his probationary period before the appeals in Pennsylvania were filed.
The Department contends that Md. Code, Article 27, § 641, requires both a plea and a judicial finding of guilt to the underlying DUI charge as a condition to a “probation prior to judgment” disposition, and further contends that such disposition, for the purposes of Pennsylvania law, constitutes a “conviction” of the underlying charge and serves as a basis for the license suspension, relying on our decision in Casey v. Department of Transportation, 132 Pa.Cmwlth. 332, 572 A.2d 865 (1990). We find this argument unavailing.
In Laughlin, we discussed this same argument and Casey’s relevance to the subject matter and issue before us now. In Casey, a licensee appealed the one-year suspension of his operating privilege following a similar incident in Delaware. He argued that the charges against him were dismissed pursuant to Delaware’s First Offender Program, which provides for disposition without an entry of judgment. While we noted that the lower court did not decide the question of whether election of Delaware’s First Offender disposition constituted a conviction, we went on to conclude that the Department properly suspended his license, as documentary evidence showed that he had pled guilty to the underlying offense. However, in Laughlin we distinguished Casey primarily because it was decided prior to the enactment of the Compact by this Commonwealth, and impliedly, the terms of the Compact and those -of the prior arrangement with Delaware were not identical.
[137]*137Article II of the Compact defines “conviction” to mean:
[A] conviction of any offense related to the use or operation of a motor vehicle which is prohibited by state law, municipal ordinance or administrative rule or regulation or a forfeiture of bail, bond or other security deposited to secure appearance by a person charged with having committed any such offense and which conviction or forfeiture is required to be reported to the licensing authority.
75 Pa.C.S. § 1581. The Article does not define the point in the judicial process at which a conviction occurs. Article III then goes on to state:
The licensing authority of a party state shall report each conviction of a person from another party state occurring within its jurisdiction to the licensing authority of the home state of the licensee. Such report shall clearly identify the person convicted, describe the violation specifying the section of the statute, code or ordinance violated, identify the court in which action was taken, indicate whether a plea of guilty or not guilty was entered or the conviction was a result of the forfeiture of bail, bond or other security and shall include any special findings made in connection therewith.
75 Pa.C.S. § 1581 (emphasis added).
In Laughlin, we noted the trial court’s determination that Maryland authorities had erroneously reported a conviction for Laughlin and its reading of the statute as indicating that “‘no record of conviction exists in Maryland.’ ” Laughlin, 719 A.2d at 851 (citing to the Court of Common Pleas opinion, Commonwealth v. Laughlin, No. 97 GN2928, filed April 3, 1998, p. 4). This is further substantiated by Maryland jurisprudence. In Jones v. Baltimore City Police Dept., 326 Md. 480, 606 A.2d 214 (1992), the State’s highest court reiterated:
[W]e hold that probation before judgment under § 641 is not a “conviction,” and a person who receives probation before judgment is not convicted of the crime for which he has been found guilty, unless the person violates the probation order and a court enters a judgment on the finding of guilt.
Id. at 216 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). That court has also held that, “a person is not ‘convicted’ of an offense until the court enters a judgment upon the verdict of guilty.” Id. (Citation omitted.) No “judgment upon the verdict” existed in the State of Maryland at the time the Department suspended Appellant’s license. We concur in the assessment of the Laughlin court that notice in this instance was an administrative notice. Therefore, because Appellant does not stand convicted under Maryland law, and because only the reporting of convictions triggers the provisions of the Compact, we conclude that the Department impermissibly suspended Appellant’s operating privilege. Moreover, we observe that if Appellant successfully fulfills the terms of his probation, no conviction will ever result from this incident.7
Accordingly, based on the foregoing rationale, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County is reversed.
ORDER
NOW, October 17, 2001, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County in the above-captioned matter is hereby [138]*138reversed and the operating privilege of Michael Brian Lueth is reinstated.