[676]*676OPINION
By the Court,
Cherry, J.:
Under the Nevada Constitution, when a district judge’s office is vacated before the office’s term expires, the Governor may appoint an individual to temporarily fill the office until “the first Monday of January following the next general election.” Nev. Const, art. 6, § 20(1) and (2). In July 2008, a district judge vacated the office, and a temporary appointment later was made, several weeks before the November general election. The judge’s office, however, was not included on the 2008 ballot. Instead, the appointed judge was commissioned to serve until the office could be filled by virtue of the 2010 general election, giving rise to the question of concern to this court: whether the commission’s extension beyond the first Monday in January following the 2008 general election is valid.
That question initially was brought to this court’s attention when movant, a private Nevada citizen, sought leave to file a petition on behalf of the State of Nevada for a writ of quo warranto removing the judge from office. As we conclude that movant lacks standing, however, we consider the merits of the judge’s commission under our supervisory responsibilities over the judicial branch.
The legitimacy of the extended commission depends on the meaning of “next general election,” as used in the Nevada Constitution provision noted above. Thus, in resolving this issue, we address whether “next general election” means the election most immediately following the appointment or, as has been asserted, the next general election in which the vacancy may be filled in strict compliance with all election deadlines. In view of the apparent intent behind the Nevada Constitution’s “next general election” language to [677]*677allow Nevada citizens to elect a new district judge as soon as possible after an office becomes vacant and to correspondingly limit the Governor’s appointment powers, we conclude that judicial vacancy appointments expire on the first Monday in January after the first general election following that appointment, without exception. Here, then, with regard to the temporary appointment at issue, the appointment expired on the first Monday in January after the November 2008 general election.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In July 2008, a district judge serving the Family Court Division of the Eighth Judicial District Court resigned, resulting in a vacancy approximately two and one-half years before that office’s term was set to expire. The vacancy was filled by temporary appointment in August 2008, when Governor Jim Gibbons appointed Judge Robert W. Teuton to the office, beginning August 22, 2008. Judge Teuton’s written commission designates the first Monday in January 2011 as its expiration date. Although a general election was held in November 2008, the district judge office was not included on the ballot. Thus, Judge Teuton has continued to serve in the office since 2008.
Under Article 6, Section 20(2) of the Nevada Constitution, when the Governor fills a vacant district judge office, the office’s term ‘ ‘expires on the first Monday of January following the next general election.” Arguing that, here, “next general election” meant the 2008 general election, rendering Judge Teuton’s commission invalid beyond January 5, 2009, a private Nevada citizen, movant Robert W. Lueck, moved this court for leave to seek a writ of quo warranto to remove Judge Teuton from office, after the attorney general denied Lueck’s written requests that she institute such quo warranto proceedings. Judge Teuton opposed the motion, primarily contesting Lueck’s standing to file a petition for a writ of quo warranto, as Lueck has only a “private citizen” interest in obtaining the requested relief. Lueck replied to Judge Teuton’s opposition, as permitted. After reviewing those initial filings, we directed Lueck and Judge Teuton to file supplements further addressing the standing issue.
Concerned with Lueck’s standing and cognizant that the question posed by his motion raised concerns of statewide importance regarding the validity of Judge Teuton’s continued service as a district judge, and based on this court’s responsibility to oversee the judiciary, we concluded that further inquiry was warranted. See Nev. Const, art. 6, § 19; Halverson v. Hardcastle, 123 Nev. 245, 261-62, 266, 163 P.3d 428, 440, 443 (2007) (noting that courts have “inherent power to . . . preserve the integrity of the judicial process” and that this court possesses “supervisory authority and duties over the proper administration of justice”); Goldman v. Bryan, 104 Nev. [678]*678644, 654, 764 P.2d 1296, 1302 (1988) (stating that “under its general power of superintendence,” this court “may exercise its administrative authority to conduct an inquiry and take such action as deemed necessary, short of removal of a judge from office”), abrogated on other grounds by Halverson, 123 Nev. 245, 163 P.3d 428; see also NRS 34.160 (recognizing that this court may issue a writ of mandamus to require a public officer to perform an act legally required by his or her office); cf. Nev. Const, art. 6, § 4 (providing that this court has the power to issue writs of mandamus). Accordingly, this court entered an order directing the Governor and Judge Teuton to show cause why Judge Teuton’s commission and service in office beyond January 5, 2009, should not be declared invalid under Section 20(2), and why this court should not issue a writ of mandamus directing the Governor to declare Judge Teuton’s office vacant. See NRS 3.080(1) (stating that “[t]he Governor shall declare vacant the office of district judge”). We also invited the Family Law Section of the State Bar of Nevada to file an amicus curiae brief addressing the validity of Judge Teuton’s commission and service in office beyond January 5, 2009. Governor Gibbons, Judge Teuton, and the Family Law Section have timely responded to our order, arguing that interpreting Section 20(2) as mandating the office’s placement on the 2008 general election ballot would be unworkable under Nevada’s election laws, and therefore, that Judge Teuton should hold office until after the next election in 2010.
DISCUSSION
Currently before this court, then, are two subjects. First, does Lueck have standing to pursue quo warranto proceedings and, if so, should leave to file the petition be granted? Second, what is the meaning of Section 20(2) and what is the provision’s effect on the validity of Judge Teuton’s continuing service in office?
Lueck’s motion
Quo warranto generally is available to challenge an individual’s right to hold office and to oust the individual from the office if the individual’s claim to it is invalid or has been forfeited. See Secretary of State v. Nevada State Legislature, 120 Nev. 456, 93 P.3d 746 (2004). This court is vested with original “power to issue writs of . . . quo warranto” by the Nevada Constitution Article 6, Section 4. Quo warranto proceedings typically are governed by NRS Chapter 35, which provides for “civil actions” against persons who unlawfully hold a public office, NRS 35.010(1); see State Et Al. v. City of Reno, 70 Nev. 167, 262 P.2d 953 (1953), unless that chapter fails to provide adequate relief. See Halverson, 123 Nev. at 257 n.8, 163 P.3d at 437 n.8 (stating that, “while NRS Chapter 35 creates an al[679]*679ternative remedy, it does not impact this court’s original power [under Nevada Constitution Article 6, Section 4] to consider writ petitions seeking quo warranto relief”); State v. Sadler, 25 Nev. 131, 58 P. 284 (1899) (recognizing that, under the circumstances asserted therein, the statutes preceding NRS Chapter 35 failed to provide adequate relief in the event that the attorney general refused to institute quo warranto proceedings and, in light of this court’s original constitutional jurisdiction over writs of quo warranto, allowing a private individual claiming title to the office to pursue such relief on behalf of the state).
The Legislature has not authorized quo warranto petitions by private citizens with only a general interest in seeing this state’s laws upheld. Under NRS Chapter 35, only persons “claiming to be entitled to a public office,” NRS 35.050, or otherwise through the attorney general and “on the leave of the court,” NRS 35.040, may commence a quo warranto action against the alleged unlawful officeholder or usurper. See Harvey v. Dist. Ct., 117 Nev. 754, 759-60, 32 P.3d 1263, 1267 (2001). Thus, the NRS Chapter 35 provisions that address who may institute a quo warranto action to oust an individual from office do not permit a person with only a general interest in quo warranto relief to pursue such a remedy, absent participation from the attorney general and leave of the court.
Here, the attorney general declined to institute a civil action in the nature of quo warranto against Judge Teuton, and Lueck does not claim to be entitled to Judge Teuton’s office. Lueck therefore does not fit within either provision of NRS Chapter 35 that addresses who may institute a quo warranto action to oust an individual from office, and consequently, he does not have standing to institute such an action under that chapter. And Lueck has not demonstrated that he has an interest in obtaining quo warranto relief sufficient to except him from NRS Chapter 35’s provisions. See, e.g., State v. City of Sarasota, 109 So. 473, 478 (Fla. 1926); Toncray v. Budge, 95 P. 26, 32-33 (Idaho 1908); People v. Tighe, 135 N.E.2d 811 (Ill. App. Ct. 1956); State v. Winneshiek Co-Op. Burial Ass’n, 15 N.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Iowa 1944) (Bliss, J., dissenting) (relying in part on the Statute of Anne, 9 Ann., c. 20 (1710) (Eng.)); King v. Kahne, 87 S.W. 807 (Ky. 1905); State ex rel. Wasson v. Taylor, 38 N.E. 24 (Ohio 1893); Bolus v. Murphy, 823 A.2d 1075, 1079 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003); State v. Ryan, 125 P. 666 (Utah 1912). Accordingly, Lueck’s motion must be denied.
Section 20(2) ’s meaning
Although Lueck lacks standing to raise it, the issue of Judge Teuton’s continuing service in office still deserves our attention. That [680]*680issue, which we directed Judge Teuton, Governor Gibbons, and the Family Law Section to address, concerns the meaning of the term “next general election,” as it is used in the Nevada Constitution Article 6, Section 20(2). That is, does that term necessarily refer to the general election closest after the appointment, or does it mean, as Governor Gibbons, Judge Teuton, and the Family Law Section assert, the first general election at which the vacancy may be filled in strict compliance with Nevada election procedures?
In answering that question, we first note principles that guide this court’s constitutional language analysis. We then apply those rules to ascertain Section 20(2)’s meaning, specifically analyzing the history of the term “next general election” in the constitution and caselaw. Finally, after discerning the meaning of “next general election” in light of that analysis, we apply that meaning to the facts of this case.
The term “next general election’’ in Section 20(2) is ambiguous
As noted, the provision at issue here, Nevada Constitution Article 6, Section 20(2), provides that “[t]he term of office of any justice or judge [appointed by the Governor to fill a Supreme Court or district judge vacancy] expires on the first Monday of January following the next general election.” To determine Section 20(2)’s meaning, we turn first to its language. In so doing, we give Section 20(2)’s language its plain meaning, unless the language is ambiguous. Secretary of State v. Burk, 124 Nev. 579, 590, 188 P.3d 1112, 1119-20 (2008). If Section 20(2)’s language is ambiguous, meaning that it is susceptible to “ ‘two or more reasonable but inconsistent interpretations,’ ” id. at 590, 188 P.3d at 1120 (quoting Gallagher v. City of Las Vegas, 114 Nev. 595, 599, 959 P.2d 519, 521 (1998)), we may look to Section 20(2)’s history, public policy, and reason to determine what those who enacted it intended. See id.; Nevada Mining Ass’n v. Erdoes, 117 Nev. 531, 538, 26 P.3d 753, 757 (2001). Whatever meaning ultimately is attributed to Section 20(2) may not violate the spirit of that provision. Burk, 124 Nev. at 590-91, 188 P.3d at 1120.
Section 20(2)’s “next general election” language can be read as referring to either the general election closest in time after the appointment, regardless of the election’s proximity to the appointment, or the next general election at which Nevada’s election deadlines can be fully carried out, meaning that the appointment could actually extend beyond the general election immediately following the appointment, as the Governor, Judge Teuton, and the Family Law Section suggest. Since both interpretations are reasonable but inconsistent, Section 20(2)’s “next general election” language is ambiguous. Accordingly, we turn next to that provision’s history to de[681]*681termine what those who enacted it intended. See id. at 590, 188 P.3d at 1120; Nevada Mining Ass’n, 117 Nev. at 538, 26 P.3d at 757.
Section 20(2)’s “next general election’’ language was intended to preserve Nevada’s long-standing policy to fill judicial vacancies at the next ensuing general election
Originally, “next general election’’ was intended to safeguard Nevadans’ right to elect state offices
Section 20(2)’s “next general election” language originated at the debates and proceedings of Nevada’s 1864 constitutional convention. See Debates & Proceedings of the Nevada State Constitutional Convention of 1864, at 702 (Andrew J. Marsh off. rep., 1866). At that time, the Constitution’s drafters considered adding to the article governing the executive department the following provision for filling vacancies:
When any office shall, from any cause, become vacant, and no mode is provided by the Constitution and laws for filling such vacancy, the Governor shall have power to fill such vacancy by granting a commission, which shall expire at the next election and qualification of the person entitled to such office.
Id. After that language was presented, one of the delegates questioned whether the provision’s language allowed the Governor to appoint an individual to fill a judicial vacancy for the remainder of the office’s term, although the intent was to expire the appointment’s term at the closest election. Id. at 702-03.
The delegate posed a situation in which a vacancy arose in a supreme court justice office three or four years before the office’s term expired, and stated the following: “It is not intended, I apprehend, that the Governor shall, in such a case, fill [the office] for the rest of the term; and yet I do not see why he may not do it under that section,” to which another participant responded, “It says the commission shall expire at the general election and qualification of the person elected.” Id. at 702. The delegate replied:
Then the office would have to be filled by election, and I do not see but the man elected would hold the office for the next six years. In that manner the whole system might become deranged. The vacancy should only be supplied, by appointment, until the election, and then a judge should be elected merely for the unexpired term of the incumbent who has vacated the office.
Id. at 702-03.
Then, the delegate proposed language to ensure that appointments to fill vacancies in judicial offices lasted only until the most [682]*682immediate general election following the appointment. Id. at 703. The delegate’s proposed language provided this:
In case the office of any Justice of the Supreme Court, or District Judge, shall become vacant before the expiration of the regular term for which he was elected, the vacancy may be filled by appointment by the Governor, until it shall be supplied at the next general election, when it shall be filled by election, for the residue of the unexpired term.
Id. (Emphasis added.) The debate surrounding the delegate’s proposed provision makes clear that the suggested language was intended to preserve the people’s constitutional right to elect their own officers, see Nev. Const, art. 6, § 5; State v. Arrington, 18 Nev. 412, 417, 4 P. 735, 739 (1884) (recognizing that “the framers of the constitution intended to [carefully] guard what, in free governments, has always been considered an inestimable privilege — the right of the people to select their own officers”), by precluding the Governor from appointing an individual to fill a judicial vacancy beyond the time when Nevadans could themselves fill the vacancy by election. Debates & Proceedings of the Nevada State Constitutional Convention of 1864, at 702-03.
The delegates of the 1864 constitutional convention clearly favored the proposed provision, as they not only agreed to include it in the constitution, but also determined it should be considered for application to all state officers. Id. Because the addition of all state officers broadened its application, rather than placing the provision within the article pertaining to the executive or judicial department, the delegates included the provision among other miscellaneous provisions of a different article. Id. More specifically, the provision was set forth under Article 17, Section 22.
Decisional law initially focused on the context of “next general election” language
Since Article 17, Section 22’s enactment, the meaning of “next general election” in that provision and others have been interpreted several times by this court. For example, in 1924, in a case concerning vacancies in county clerk and treasurer offices, Ex Rel. Bridges v. Jepsen, 48 Nev. 64, 70, 227 P. 588, 590 (1924) (citing State of Nevada v. Collins, 2 Nev. 351 (1866)), this court determined that “next general election” in a statute pertaining to vacancies in certain county offices referred to the general election when the office at issue normally would be filled. One year later, in Ex. Rel. Penrose v. Greathouse, 48 Nev. 419, 422, 233 P. 527, 528 (1925), however, this court noted that “next general election,” as it is used in Article 17, Section 22, meant that an office vacancy should be filled “by election as soon practicable after the vacancy occurs,” [683]*683without consideration of when the office normally would be filled by election.
This court clarified the distinction between Bridges and Penrose in a 1940 case, Grant and McNamee v. Payne, 60 Nev. 250, 256, 107 P.2d 307, 310 (1940). Specifically, this court pointed out that Article 17, Section 22, addressed in Penrose, “declares what is meant by general election, by stating that at the next general election the vacancy shall be filled by election for the residue of the unexpired term.” Id. at 255, 107 P.2d 309. But, the court noted, in the provision in Bridges, “[n]o such declared intention appears[, t]he term general election stands alone” and thus refers to “an election for the purpose of selecting officers who are by law authorized to be elected at that time.” Id.
Decisional law ultimately reaffirmed that the intent behind “next general election” is the interpretative foundation for the phrase
Then, in Brown v. Georgetta, 70 Nev. 500, 275 P.2d 376 (1954), this court, noting Grant and McNamee's, analysis, emphasized that the intent behind utilizing “next general election” language, not solely the language itself, stands as the interpretive foundation. Specifically, Brown concerned a vacancy in the office of United States Senator, which the governor filled by appointment pursuant to a statute that provided for an appointee to serve “ ‘until the next general election, and until his successor shall be elected and qualified.’ ” Id. at 501-02, 275 P.2d at 376-77 (quoting 1929 NCL § 2593). At issue in Brown, then, was whether “until the next general election” caused the governor’s appointee’s term to extend to “the entire unexpired term of office or . . . only until the ensuing biennial election.” Id. at 501, 275 P.2d at 376-77.
While noting that similar language, without more, previously had been interpreted as meaning the next general election at which the office would normally be filled, the court recognized that in all of the prior cases, the language itself was not so much at issue as intent. Id. at 503-04, 275 P.2d at 377-78. With intent in mind, the court analyzed the United States Constitutional provision pursuant to which Nevada’s statute for filling such vacancies was enacted. Id. at 503-04, 275 P.2d at 377. In particular, the United States Constitution provided that “ ‘the legislature of any State, may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.’ ” Id. at 504, 275 P.2d at 378 (quoting U.S. Const, amend. XVII). This court determined that the clear intent of that language was that vacancies in United States Senate offices “shall be filled by election of the people . . . subject only to temporary executive appointment.” Id. at 505, 275 P.2d at 378. Further, the court noted, because [684]*684Nevada’s statute “must have been enacted with such policy in mind,” that statute, including its “next general election” language, must be read with the same intent. Id. Thus, the term “next general election,” the court concluded, “must be construed to mean the ensuing biennial election.” Id. at 506, 275 P.2d at 379. Thus, in that case, this court ordered the election for a new senator to proceed, even though, by that point, absentee ballots omitting the office already had been issued. Id. at 506-07, 275 P.2d at 379.
After this court’s analyses of “next general election” language, Article 17, Section 22, was amended in 1976, when Nevada adopted Article 6, Section 20’s judicial selection process for filling vacancies that arise injudicial offices. Hearing on A.J.R. 14 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 57th Leg. (Nev., April 14, 1973). Specifically, in creating provisions for a judicial selection process, the drafters removed judicial officers from the provisions of Article 17, Section 22, instead addressing judicial vacancies within the context of the judicial selection process, in Article 6, Section 20(2). Id. In so doing, Section 20(2)’s drafters preserved some of the key language that the delegates had added at the constitutional debates and proceedings to ensure that the Governor could not fill a vacancy beyond the closest election following the appointment. Id. Indeed, although an early draft of the judicial selection process provisions provided that the individual appointed would serve the remainder of the unexpired term, that provision was amended to ensure that the individual appointed through the judicial selection process would not serve beyond the “next general election.” Id.
In light of the constitutional framers’ original intent to safeguard the people’s election prerogative, preserved by the most recent amendments, Section 20(2) must be read so as to effectuate the election policy of this state — gubernatorial appointments of judges last only until the January after the “next general election,” meaning the general election most immediately following the appointment.1 Under that provision, the appointment of a constitutional judicial officer can last no longer than the first Monday in January following the first general election to take place after the appointment.2
[685]*685
Under Section 20(2), Judge Teuton’s term expired in January 2009
As noted, the first Monday in January following the November 2008 general election was January 5, 2009. Accordingly, Judge Teuton’s term ended on January 5, 2009. Even though the statutory deadline for altering the general election ballot was not until August 19, 2008, NRS 293.165(4), after the office became vacant, no candidate’s name appeared on the general election ballot. As no individual was elected to fill the office in 2008, the office became vacant as of January 5, 2009, when Judge Teuton’s term expired.3
CONCLUSION
First, in the absence of the attorney general’s participation and leave of court, NRS Chapter 35 does not authorize an individual with only a general interest in the outcome, such as Lueck, to pursue quo warranto proceedings on behalf of the state to remove a person from public office. Therefore, because the attorney general declined to pursue such an action on Lueck’s request and he has no special interest in obtaining quo warranto relief sufficient to justify excepting him from NRS Chapter 35’s provisions, we deny Lueck’s motion for leave to institute quo warranto proceedings. The clerk of this court shall return, unfiled, Lueck’s proposed petition for a writ of quo warranto.
Second, under Nevada Constitution Article 6, Section 20(2), an individual appointed to fill a vacancy in a district court judge office serves until “the first Monday of January following the next general election.” According to the history of that provision, the term “next general election” means the general election that most immediately follows the appointment. Such a construction supports Nevada’s long-standing policy in favor of filling vacancies in judicial office through election, subject only to the Governor’s power to temporarily appoint an individual to fill a vacancy until the next ensuing general election.
[686]*686Under Section 20(2), then, Judge Teuton’s appointment expired on January 5, 2009 — the first Monday of January after the 2008 general election. Accordingly, Judge Teuton’s commission and service in office after that date is invalid. In light of this court’s duty to administrate Nevada’s judicial system and ensure the integrity of the judicial process, we conclude that a writ of mandamus directing the Governor to declare Judge Teuton’s office vacant under NRS 3.080(1) is warranted. We thus direct the clerk of this court to issue a writ of mandamus to Governor Jim Gibbons directing him to declare Judge Robert W. Teuton’s office vacant.
Hardesty, C.J., Parraguirre, Douglas, Saitta, and Pickering, JJ., concur.