Lucy Taylor v. Universal City Studios LLC

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: May 8, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01780
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

O 1 JS-6 2 3 4 5 6 7

8 United States District Court 9 Central District of California

11 LUCY TAYLOR, Case № 2:25-cv-01780-ODW (SKx)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

13 v. MOTION TO REMAND [8]

14 UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, LLC et al., 15

Defendants. 16

17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 Plaintiff Lucy Taylor brings this action against Defendant Universal City Studios, 19 LLC (“Universal”) for negligence and premises liability, after she tripped and fell over 20 a dolly on Universal’s premises. (Decl. Jaion Chung ISO Notice of Removal (“Chung 21 Decl.”) Ex. A (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1-2.) Universal removed the case from state to 22 federal court, (Notice of Removal (“NOR”), ECF No. 1), and Taylor now moves to 23 remand back to Los Angeles County Superior Court based on Universal’s untimely 24 removal, (Mot. Remand (“Motion” or “Mot.”), ECF No. 8). For the reasons that follow, 25 the Court GRANTS Taylor’s Motion.1 26 27

28 1 Having carefully considered the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 1 II. BACKGROUND 2 On September 6, 2024, Taylor initiated this action against Universal in Los 3 Angeles County Superior Court. (See Compl.) On September 10, 2024, Taylor served 4 Universal with the Summons and Complaint. (Chung Decl. Ex. B (“Proof of Service”), 5 ECF No. 1-2.) In the Complaint, Taylor does not state a damages figure. (See generally 6 Compl.) 7 On September 17, 2024, Taylor’s counsel emailed a demand letter to Universal’s 8 third-party claims adjuster, demanding “$435,000.00 to resolve this matter” and 9 requesting a response by October 7, 2024. (Decl. Joshua W. Glotzer ISO Mot. (“Glotzer 10 Decl.”) Ex. A (“Settlement Demand”) 5, Ex. B (“Sept. 17, 2024 Email”), ECF Nos. 8, 11 8-1.) The adjuster responded the following day and copied Universal’s counsel in the 12 email. (Sept. 17, 2024 Email.) In the Settlement Demand, Taylor detailed her specific 13 injuries and treatments, which reflected a total of $71,160.53 in medical expenses as of 14 the date of the letter. (Settlement Demand 2–4.) Taylor also stated that her injuries 15 would require future medical treatment and “demand a significant general damages 16 award at trial.” (Id. at 4.) On October 7, 2024, Universal rejected Taylor’s Settlement 17 Demand. (Glotzer Decl. Ex. C (“Demand Rejection”), ECF No. 8-1.) 18 Subsequently, on February 3, 2025, in response to Universal’s discovery 19 requests, Taylor provided a Statement of Damages reflecting the same medical expenses 20 and damages as in the Settlement Demand. (Chung Decl. ¶¶ 8–9, Ex. D (“Taylor 21 Interrog. Resp.”), Ex. E (“Statement Damages”), ECF No. 1-2.) Twenty-five days later, 22 on February 28, 2025, Universal removed the case to federal court based on Taylor’s 23 February 3, 2025 responses. (NOR ¶¶ 17, 27.) 24 Taylor now moves to remand arguing that Universal removed the case more than 25 thirty days after receiving notice of removability. (See Mot.) The Motion is fully 26 briefed. (See Opp’n, ECF No. 9; Reply, ECF No. 10.) 27 28 1 III. LEGAL STANDARD 2 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and possess only that jurisdiction 3 as authorized by the Constitution and federal statute. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. 4 Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a party may remove 5 a civil action brought in a state court to a district court only if the plaintiff could have 6 originally filed the action in federal court. Federal district courts have original 7 jurisdiction where an action arises under federal law, or where each plaintiff’s 8 citizenship is diverse from each defendant’s citizenship (i.e., diversity is “complete”), 9 and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a). 10 Two thirty-day periods govern a defendant’s time to remove a case. 28 U.S.C. 11 § 1446(b). “[T]he first thirty-day requirement is triggered by defendant’s receipt of an 12 ‘initial pleading’ that reveals a basis for removal.” Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 13 425 F.3d 689, 694 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1)). “If no ground 14 for removal is evident” “through examination of the four corners” of that pleading, the 15 case is not removable at that time. Id. The second thirty-day period is triggered by 16 defendant’s receipt of “an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper” that reveals 17 a basis for removal. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3)). “[T]he [thirty-day] statutory 18 time limit for removal petitions . . . is not jurisdictional,” but it “is mandatory and a 19 timely objection to a late petition will defeat removal.” Smith v. Mylan Inc., 761 F.3d 20 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2014) (second alteration in original) (quoting Fristoe v. Reynolds 21 Metals Co., 615 F.2d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1980)). 22 IV. DISCUSSION 23 Neither party disputes that this case satisfies the requirements for subject matter 24 jurisdiction based on the parties’ diversity and the amount in controversy. (See Mot. 2 25 (“[Universal] was on notice that Plaintiff’s damages reasonably exceeded $75,000 and 26 had 30 days to seek removal.”); Opp’n 6 (“The amount in controversy exceeded 27 $75,000.00 and . . . [Universal] . . . had grounds for removal.”).) Rather, Taylor moves 28 to remand the case to state court on the grounds that Universal removed too late. 1 (Mot. 4.) She also contends that, because Universal was objectively unreasonable to 2 remove so late, she is entitled to her attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id. at 13–14.) 3 A. Timeliness of Removal 4 Taylor argues removability was apparent from her Complaint served on 5 September 10, 2024, which triggered the first thirty-day removal period under 6 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), and from her Settlement Demand emailed on September 17, 2024, 7 which triggered the second. (See id. at 8–13.) The Court need not evaluate whether the 8 Complaint provided notice of removability because, even if it did not, the Settlement 9 Demand did. 10 The plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) states that the second thirty-day 11 window begins when a defendant receives “other paper” “through service or 12 otherwise . . . from which it may first be ascertained that the case is . . . removable.” 13 Relevant here, “a demand letter sent during the course of the state court action can 14 constitute ‘other paper’ within the meaning of section 1446(b) if it reflects a reasonable 15 estimate of the plaintiff’s claim.” Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 16 885 (9th Cir. 2010). 17 On September 17, 2024, Taylor emailed the Settlement Demand to Universal’s 18 third-party claims adjuster, who confirmed receipt and copied Universal’s counsel the 19 following day. (Sept. 17, 2024 Email.) In the Settlement Demand, Taylor listed 20 specific injuries, described the treatments Taylor had received to date, and itemized the 21 $71,160.53 in costs associated with her then-current medical care. (Settlement 22 Demand 2–4.) Taylor advised Universal that she required additional medical treatment 23 and asked for “$435,000.00 to resolve this matter.” (Id. at 5.) The Settlement Demand 24 thus provided a reasonable estimate of Taylor’s claims and qualified as “other paper” 25 under § 1446(b)(3). Carvalho, 629 F.3d at 885. 26 Further, on October 7, 2024, Universal rejected Taylor’s Settlement Demand. 27 (Demand Rejection.) This shows that Universal was aware, through the Settlement 28 Demand, that Taylor sought damages in excess of $75,000 by October 7, 2024, at the 1 latest, when it rejected her Settlement Demand, and by September 18, 2024, at the 2 earliest, when it received Taylor’s Settlement Demand through its claims adjuster. (See 3 Demand Rejection (dated Oct. 7, 2024); see also Sept. 17, 2024 Email (copying 4 Settlement Demand to Universal’s counsel on Sept. 18, 2024).) As the Settlement 5 Demand qualified as an “other paper” from which Universal could ascertain 6 removability, Universal’s receipt triggered the second thirty-day removal period under 7 § 1446(b)(3). 8 Universal disputes that the Settlement Demand triggered the second removal 9 period on two grounds: (1) in sending the Settlement Demand to Universal’s third-party 10 claims adjuster, Taylor did not properly serve it on Universal; and (2) the amounts in 11 the Settlement Demand are from lien-based medical bills and therefore do not reflect 12 the reasonable value of the services. (Opp’n 4–6.) 13 First, Universal argues that Taylor “did not properly serve the demand on” 14 Universal. (Opp’n 4.) However, as noted, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) permits notice of 15 removability based on “other paper” “through service or otherwise.” (Emphasis added). 16 Universal provides no case law supporting its claim that formal service of the demand 17 was required to start the second removal period when Taylor had already formally 18 served the Complaint, and the Court declines to read out of the statute the language “or 19 otherwise.”2 20 21

22 2 To the extent binding authority addresses the phrase “through service or otherwise,” it applies only to the first paragraph of section 1446(b), not to the third paragraph at issue here. See Murphy Bros. v. 23 Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 355 (1999) (holding that the use of the phrase “through service or otherwise” under section 1446(b)(1) “was not intended to bypass service as a starter for 24 § 1446(b)’s clock”). Courts in the Ninth Circuit have declined to extend Murphy’s holding to the 25 second thirty-day window under section 1446(b)(3). See, e.g., Lucente S.P.A. v. Apik Jewelry, Inc., No. 2:07-cv-04005-MMM (RZx), 2007 WL 7209938, at *2 n.11 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2007) (“The logic 26 of Murphy Bros. is applicable only to removal under paragraph one of § 1446(b) because . . . [o]nce a party is subject to the court’s jurisdiction, the requirement that the time period for removal run from 27 formal service makes little sense.”); TIG Ins. Co. v. Aon Re, Inc., No. C-06-848 MMC, 2006 WL 28 954177, at *1 n.2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2006) (“Personal service of papers other than the summons and complaint is not required.”). 1 Second, Universal argues the Settlement Demand did not reflect a reasonable 2 estimate of Taylor’s claims, and thus did not trigger the second thirty-day removal 3 period, because the lien-based medical expenses in Taylor’s Settlement Demand are 4 “greater than the amount tha[t] will actually be paid and accepted as full payment.” 5 (Opp’n 4–6.) Taylor asserts that she “received care that was not subject to preexisting 6 contractual adjustments,” so “there is no obligation for the providers to accept one 7 penny less than the full amount owed.” (Reply 3.) She contends that “the amounts 8 billed for medical services” are thus sufficient “to prove the services’ reasonable value.” 9 (Id. at 4 (quoting Pebley v. Santa Clara Organics, LLC, 22 Cal. App. 5th 1266, 1269 10 (2018)).) Indeed, a medical lien may reflect a reasonable estimate of the plaintiff’s 11 claim, “as long as the plaintiff legitimately incurs those expenses and remains liable for 12 their payment.” Moore v. Mercer, 4 Cal. App. 5th 424, 440 (2016) (emphasis omitted). 13 Despite bearing the burden to establish removal jurisdiction, Universal offers 14 nothing to show that the medical bills reflected in Taylor’s Settlement Demand will, for 15 any reason, be discounted. (See Opp’n 4–6.) Moreover, Universal’s argument, that the 16 amounts in the Settlement Demand are unreasonable, is belied by Universal’s reliance 17 on the very same figures in its Notice of Removal. (Compare Settlement Demand 4 18 (itemizing $71,160.53 in incurred expenses and “unknown” amount in “[f]uture 19 [m]edical [c]are”), with NOR ¶ 18 (relying on Taylor’s Statement of Damages and 20 Interrogatory Responses itemizing $71,160.53 in incurred expenses and “an 21 undisclosed amount in future medical treatment”).) Accordingly, Universal fails to 22 establish that the Settlement Demand was unreasonable on the basis that it reflected 23 lien-based medical bills. 24 The cases upon which Universal relies for the contrary proposition are inapposite. 25 (Opp’n 4–5 (discussing Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., 52 Cal. 4th 541 26 (2011), and Corenbaum v. Lampkin, 215 Cal. App. 4th 1308 (2013), as modified 27 (May 13, 2013)).) Neither case addresses removal and both are distinguishable, as the 28 plaintiffs were insured and not subject to the providers’ full bills because plaintiffs’ 1 insurers had negotiated contractually reduced amounts. See Howell, 52 Cal. 4th at 567 2 (finding the medical provider agreed to accept “an amount less than the provider’s full 3 bill”); Corenbaum, 215 Cal. App. 4th at 1329 (finding the insurer “negotiated and paid” 4 a lower amount than the full bill). Universal offers nothing to suggest that Taylor is 5 insured, that her medical providers have accepted negotiated-fee agreements, or that 6 they will require Taylor to pay any less the entire amount billed for treatment. As such, 7 Howell and Corenbaum do not help Universal here. 8 Having established that the Settlement Demand qualified as an “other paper” 9 from which Universal could ascertain removability, and that Universal’s receipt of the 10 Settlement Demand triggered the second thirty-day removal period under § 1446(b)(3), 11 all that remains is arithmetic. Using the more-generous triggering date of October 7, 12 2024, Universal had until November 6, 2024, to timely remove the case within the 13 second thirty-day period. However, Universal did not remove until February 28, 2025, 14 three months too late. (See NOR.) Accordingly, removal was untimely, and the Court 15 must remand. 16 B. Attorney’s Fees 17 Taylor also seeks attorneys’ fees and costs associated with removal and remand. 18 (Mot. 13–14.) However, “[a]bsent unusual circumstances, courts may award attorney’s 19 fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable 20 basis for seeking removal.” Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005). 21 Because neither party disputes that this case would be removable if done in a timely 22 manner, and because Universal’s basis for arguing that its removal was timely is not 23 wholly unreasonable, the Court declines to award fees and costs in this case. 24 V. CONCLUSION 25 For the reasons above, the Court finds Universal’s removal untimely and 26 accordingly GRANTS Taylor’s Motion. (ECF No. 8.) This action is hereby 27 REMANDED to the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, Alhambra 28 Courthouse, 150 West Commonwealth Avenue, Alhambra, CA 91801, Case 1 | No. 24NNCV04058. All dates and deadlines are VACATED. The Clerk of the Court 2 | shall close this case. 3 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 6 May 8, 2025 7 aes 8 jell bib GL 9 OTIS ni HT, 0 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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