UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______
LUCIA MORALES BENAVENTE,
Petitioner, Case No. 1:25-cv-1737
v. Honorable Robert J. Jonker
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents. ____________________________/
OPINION Petitioner initiated this action on November 24, 2025, by filing a counseled petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) Petitioner is a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan. Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of her current detention and asks the Court to, inter alia, assume jurisdiction over this action, declare that Respondents’ actions to detain Petitioner violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Immigration and Nationality Act, issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Petitioner’s release on recognizance or under parole or, alternatively, a bond hearing, declare that Petitioner’s detention is unlawful, and award attorneys’ fees and costs for this action. (Id., PageID.21.) For the following reasons, the Court will grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Discussion I. Factual Background Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.12–13.) She entered the United States on or about September 9, 2024, and applied for admission using the CBP One mobile application. (I-213, ECF No. 10-1, PageID.56.) Petitioner was charged with inadmissibility pursuant to § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) for being “an
immigrant who, at the time of application for admission, is not in possession of [valid immigration and travel documents].” (Id.) She was then paroled into the United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (I-94, ECF No. 11-1, PageID.76) (indicating that Petitioners’ “Class of Admission” is “DT”)1 for two years (I-213, ECF No. 10-1, PageID.57). On October 9, 2025, Petitioner filed a Form I-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding Removal. (Payment Receipt, ECF No. 11-2, PageID.78.) Petitioner’s application for asylum remains pending. (Reply., ECF No. 11, PageID.65.) Prior to Petitioner’s present detention, she resided in Chicago, Illinois with her son. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.13.) On September 27, 2025, ICE agents encountered and arrested Petitioner in Chicago, Illinois. (Id.) Petitioner was issued an NTA, charging her with inadmissibility pursuant to
§ 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the INA. (NTA, ECF No. 10-2, PageID.62.)
1 See United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Guidance Website, https://www.uscis. gov/save/current-user-agencies/guidance/faqs-on-the-effect-of-changes-to-parole-and-temporary- protected-status-tps-for-save-agencies (under “Non-Categorical Parole” heading, select “What does ‘Non-Categorical Parole’ mean?”) (“Aliens who are outside of the United States may request to be paroled into the United States based on urgent humanitarian reasons or a significant public benefit. These aliens are not paroled into the United States under a categorical parole program or process. Often, the Class of Admission (COA) for these aliens is ‘DT’ though other parole related COAs may have been used.”). II. Habeas Corpus Legal Standard The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration- related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025). III. Merits Discussion A. Statutory and Regulatory Basis for Petitioner’s Parole and Recent Detention Here, Petitioner entered the United States with inspection and was subsequently paroled into the United States for two years under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). (I-94, ECF No. 11-1, PageID.76; I-213, ECF No. 10-1, PageID.57). Petitioner also filed a Form I-589 Application for Asylum and Withholding Removal, which remains pending. (Payment Receipt, ECF No. 11-2, PageID.78; Reply., ECF No. 11, PageID.65.) The INA “establishes the framework governing noncitizens’ entry into and removal from
the United States, with regulations promulgated by the enforcing agencies providing further governance.” Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1132 (D. Or. 2025). “Noncitizens who arrive at a port of entry without a visa or other entry document, like Petitioner, are deemed ‘inadmissible’ under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)” due to their lack of entry documents. Id. at 1132 & n.7 (noting that “[d]epending on the circumstances, other categories of inadmissibility may also apply, but § 1182(a)(7) applies for noncitizens without proper documentation”). Once a noncitizen is deemed inadmissible, “the immigration officer must order the noncitizen’s removal unless the noncitizen indicates an intention to apply for asylum or fear of prosecution.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)). The government may place the noncitizen into expedited removal proceedings, see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), or the government may place the noncitizen into regular removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). See Y-Z-L-H, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1132–33 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)). Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). However, “applicants for admission may be temporarily released on parole [into the United States] ‘for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit,’” as set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288 (2018) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). The decision to grant parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) is determined “on a case-by-case basis.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Then, “when the purpose of the parole has been served,” § 1182(d)(5)(A) provides that “the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case
shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). To terminate the previously granted parole, the agency must comply with the applicable regulatory and statutory requirements. As set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i), which governs the “[t]ermination of parole,” In cases not covered by paragraph (e)(1) of this section,[2] upon accomplishment of the purpose for which parole was authorized or when in the opinion of one of the officials listed in paragraph (a) of this section, neither humanitarian reasons nor public benefit warrants the continued presence of the alien in the United States,
2 Paragraph (e)(1) provides for the automatic termination of parole without written notice where the noncitizen has either departed from the United States or at the expiration of time for which the parole was authorized. The parties have not suggested that either circumstance applies here. parole shall be terminated upon written notice to the alien and he or she shall be restored to the status that he or she had at the time of parole. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i). That is, “[u]nder the governing regulation, [§ 1182(d)(5)(A)] parole may be terminated only if the purpose of parole is accomplished, or humanitarian reasons and the public benefit no longer warrant parole.” Loaiza Arias v. LaRose, No. 3:25-cv-02595-BTM-MMP, 2025 WL 3295385, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)). As explained below, the Court concludes that Respondents have failed to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions to terminate Petitioner’s parole. Cf. Coal. for Humane Immigrant Rts. v. Noem, No. 25- cv-872 (JMC), 2025 WL 2192986, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2025) (holding that the government failed to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions and that paroled noncitizens cannot be subject to expedited removal proceedings); Salgado Bustos v. Raycraft, No. 25-13202, 2025 WL
3022294, at *5–7 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025) (same); E.V. v. Raycraft, No. 4:25-cv-2069, 2025 WL 2938594, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 16, 2025) (same). First, based on the information before the Court, it does not appear that the purpose of Petitioner’s parole has been accomplished. Petitioner fled from Mexico, seeking asylum in the United States, and Petitioner and applied for admission using the CBP One mobile application. (I- 213, ECF No. 10-1, PageID.56.). At that time, Petitioner was granted parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), which provides for parole into the United States “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); (see I-94, ECF No. 11-1, PageID.76; I- 213, ECF No. 10-1, PageID.57). Petitioner filed a Form I-589 Application for Asylum and
Withholding Removal, which remains pending. (Payment Receipt, ECF No. 11-2, PageID.78; Reply., ECF No. 11, PageID.65.) Thus, when Petitioner was recently arrested and detained, Petitioner was still seeking asylum. (See id.) Moreover, there is nothing before the Court to suggest that the humanitarian reason or public benefit that justified Petitioner’s parole no longer applies. Indeed, Respondents make no argument about whether the requirements for termination of parole in § 1182(d)(5)(A) and its regulations have been satisfied. Further, district courts that have addressed the termination of § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole “have found that just as a grant of parole requires an individualized review, revocation of parole requires a case-by-case assessment to comply with the statute,” and the Court finds the reasoning in these
non-binding cases to be persuasive. Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, 794 F. Supp. 3d 128, 146 (W.D.N.Y. 2025) (citations omitted) (addressing this issue, and granting the petitioner’s motion for preliminary injunction and ordering that the petitioner be released); see, e.g., Y-Z-L-H, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1137–47 (addressing this issue, and granting the petitioner’s habeas petition and ordering that the petitioner be released from custody); Loaiza Arias, 2025 WL 3295385, at *2–4 (same); Noori v. LaRose, No. 25-cv-1824-GPC-MSB, 2025 WL 2800149, at *10–13 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2025) (same); Munoz Materano v. Arteta, No. 25 CIV. 6137 (ER), --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2630826, at *14–17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2025) (same); Gabriel B.M. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-4298 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 3443584, at *6–7 (D. Minn. Dec. 1, 2025) (addressing this issue, and
granting the petitioner’s request for a preliminary injunction and ordering the petitioner’s release from custody); Orellana v. Francis, No. 25-cv-04212 (OEM), 2025 WL 2822640, at *2–3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2025) (addressing the issue in the context of a motion for reconsideration filed by the respondents, and affirming the court’s grant of habeas relief to the petitioner and the court’s order to release the petitioner). But see Doe v. Noem, 152 F.4th 272, 278–79, 285 (1st Cir. 2025) (reversing district court’s grant of preliminary relief and vacating district court’s stay of the termination notice for previously granted parole because “Plaintiffs ha[d] not demonstrated a strong likelihood of success in showing that under the statute, the Secretary must terminate these grants of parole under the [parole] program[s] on an individual basis”).3 Here, there is no indication in the record before the Court that any such case-by-case determination regarding the revocation
3 Doe v. Noem, 152 F.4th 272 (1st Cir. 2025), is distinguishable from the present case. As the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota recently explained in Gabriel B.M. v. Bondi, a case that is similar to the present action: First, unlike here, the government in Doe did make a determination that the purpose of the plaintiffs’ parole had been accomplished. The plaintiffs, non-citizens who entered into the United States through the Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela (“CHNV”) parole program, lost parole status when the government, via a lengthy and thorough notice published in the Federal Register, decided to terminate the CHNV program altogether, determining that the program no longer served its implementing purpose. In contrast, for Petitioner’s revocation, there is no evidence to suggest that such a determination or other finding was made at all, and the evidence in the record strongly suggests it wasn’t. Second, the Doe court did not address the regulatory requirements established by 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i), which implement the parole statute and illuminate the procedural requirements for termination of parole. . . . Part 212.5(e)(2)(i) not only restates the revocation authority enumerated in § 1182(d)(5)(A), but also clarifies the (admittedly minimal) procedures the Respondents must follow when invoking the parole statute’s revocation authority. The Respondents’ failure to follow the governing regulation is equally unlawful. . . . Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Doe court’s interpretation of § 1182(d)(5)(A) reads the bulk of the revocation clause out of the statute. That interpretation rests entirely on the fact that the revocation clause does not include the same “case-by-case” language. But such a myopic focus on that omission elides a significant portion of the text of the revocation clause. The revocation clause in the parole statute gives the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority to revoke parole “when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Secretary . . ., have been served.” If Respondents were not required to make such a determination to effect termination of parole, then there would be no reason for this language to have been included in the statute. This contradicts “one of the most basic interpretive canons, that a statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.” Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (cleaned up). Instead, because the parole statute (and its implementing regulation) require such a preconditional determination to be made, the Court enforces it here. Gabriel B.M. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-4298 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 3443584, at *7 (D. Minn. Dec. 1, 2025). Doe v. Noem is distinguishable from the present action for these same reasons. of Petitioner’s parole was made. Indeed, Respondents have not provided the Court with any facts that would even suggest that Petitioner’s parole was terminated before her recent arrest. In summary, as explained above, based on the information that is presently before the Court, there is no indication that Respondents followed the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements to revoke or terminate Petitioner’s parole. If Respondents did not follow those
requirements, then they did not have the authority to arrest and detain Petitioner, “unless there [wa]s some other valid reason to arrest him.” Mata Velasquez, 794 F. Supp. 3d at 145; cf. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., No. 21-3369, 2022 WL 17369438, at *6 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 2022) (discussing that “an agency’s action that fails to observe the procedures required by its own regulations should be set aside” (citation omitted)); Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 545 (6th Cir. 2004) (“It is an elemental principle of administrative law that agencies are bound to follow their own regulations[,] . . . [and] ‘[a]n agency’s failure to follow its own regulations tends to cause unjust discrimination and deny adequate notice and consequently may result in a violation of an individual’s constitutional right to due process.’” (additional internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Sameena, Inc. v. U.S. Air Force, 147 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1998))). Respondents do not claim that they had any reason to arrest and detain Petitioner other than her status as a noncitizen. Indeed, Respondents argue that any noncitizen, regardless of whether they are already present and residing in the United States, is “an alien seeking admission” subject to mandatory detention under § 1225. This Court and other courts throughout the country have rejected this argument. Cf., e.g., Salgado Mendoza v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1252, 2025 WL 3077589, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 4, 2025); Ruiz Mejia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1227, 2025 WL 3041827, at *5–6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); De Jesus Ramirez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1261, 2025 WL 3039266, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Escobar-Ruiz v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1232, 2025 WL 3039255, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Marin Garcia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1271, 2025 WL 3017200, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Cervantes Rodriguez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1196, 2025 WL 3022212, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Puerto-Hernandez v. Lynch, No. 1:25-cv- 1097, 2025 WL 3012033, at *9 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 2025); Rodriguez Carmona v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1131, 2025 WL 2992222, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 2025).
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that Respondents failed to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements to revoke or terminate Petitioner’s § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole.4 B. Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations Petitioner argues that her detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. (See Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.20.) Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments arguing that Petitioner is entitled to no further process at this time because she is entitled to only those procedures provided by Congress under § 1225(b). (Resp., ECF No. 10, PageID.51.) “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the very liberty that [the Due Process Clause] protects.”
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citation omitted). The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause extends to all persons, regardless of status. See A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 145 S. Ct.
4 The Court has recently reached the same conclusion in other habeas corpus actions filed by immigration detainees who had received § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole. See Tezara Munoz v. Lynch, No. 1:25-cv-1632, 2025 WL 3687338 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 19, 2025); Gil Pirona v. Noem, No. 1:25- cv-1571, 2025 WL 3687339 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 19, 2025); Infante Rodriguez v. Raycraft, No. 1:25- cv-1560, 2025 WL 3673583 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 18, 2025); Quintero-Martinez v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1507, 2025 WL 3649515 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 17, 2025); Puerta Marin v. Lynch, No. 1:25-cv-1444, 2025 WL 3533028 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 10, 2025); Parra Ocanto v. Lynch, No. 1:25-cv-1447, 2025 WL 3522113 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 9, 2025); Arevalo v. Lynch, No. 1:25-cv- 1365, 2025 WL 3522106 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 9, 2025); Rodriguez Martinez v. Raycraft, No. 1:25- cv-1504, 2025 WL 3511093 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 8, 2025); Godoy Zelaya v. Lynch, No. 1:25-cv- 1355, 2025 WL 3496472 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 5, 2025). 1364, 1367 (2025). Thus, noncitizens, such as Petitioner, are entitled to its protections. See id.; see also Chavez-Acosta v. Garland, No. 22-3045, 2023 WL 246837, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 18. 2023). The Sixth Circuit held that the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), regarding the adequacy of process, applies in the context of immigration detention. See, e.g., United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio, 983 F.3d 848, 852–56 (6th Cir. 2020) (“If this court
has previously addressed the due-process claim, then we are bound by precedent; if the claim is an issue of first impression, then we generally apply the three-factor test the Supreme Court set out in Mathews v. Eldridge.”). Under Mathews, the Court must consider the following three factors: “(1) the private interest that will be affected by official action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest; and (3) the government’s interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures entail.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). The first Mathews factor clearly weighs in favor of Petitioner. Here, Petitioner entered the United States and applied for admission using the CBP One mobile application. Respondents then
granted Petitioner parole into the United States, determining that Petitioner was not a flight risk or danger. Respondents have now detained Petitioner, and there is no dispute that Petitioner has a significant private interest in avoiding detention, as one of the “most elemental of liberty interests” is to be free from detention. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (citation omitted). The Court may also consider Petitioner’s conditions of confinement, i.e., “whether a detainee is held in conditions indistinguishable from criminal incarceration.” See Günaydin v. Trump, 784 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1187 (D. Minn. 2025) (citing Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 28 (1st Cir. 2021); Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020)). There can be no doubt that she is “experiencing [many of] the deprivations of incarceration, including loss of contact with friends and family, loss of income earning, . . . lack of privacy, and, most fundamentally, the lack of freedom of movement.” See Günaydin, 784 F. Supp. 3d at 1187. The second Mathews factor also weighs in Petitioner’s favor. Clearly, there is a high risk of erroneously depriving Petitioner of her freedom if Petitioner does not receive an individualized determination regarding the revocation of her parole. “To mitigate the risk of erroneous
deprivation, due process would require, ‘at [a] minimum, the opportunity for [Petitioner] to submit evidence relevant to whether [the government] should revoke [his parole] before [it] make[s] a revocation decision.’” Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, 794 F. Supp. 3d 128, 153 (W.D.N.Y. 2025) (citation omitted). Finally, under the third Mathews factor, the Court recognizes that the Government “does, indeed, have a legitimate interest in ensuring noncitizens’ appearance at removal proceedings and preventing harms to the community.” See Sampiao v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11981-JEK, 2025 WL 2607924, at *12 (D. Mass. Sep. 9, 2025) (citation omitted). However, Respondents have not shown that they have a significant interest in Petitioner’s continued detention. Notably, continuing to
enforce Petitioner’s detention would likely impose more costs upon the Government, as it would be required to continue funding and overseeing Petitioner’s detention. See id. In sum, the Court’s balancing of the Mathews factors weighs in Petitioner’s favor. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights.5
5 Because the Court will grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition for the reasons set forth herein, the Court does not, and need not, address other claims raised in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition. IV. Proper Respondents Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent in this action, and they seek the dismissal of all of the other named Respondents. (Resp., ECF No. 10, PageID.53.) “The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the
person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.” Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494–95 (1973). Thus, [r]ead literally, the language of § 2241(a) requires nothing more than that the court issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the custodian. So long as the custodian can be reached by service of process, the court can issue a writ “within its jurisdiction” requiring that the prisoner be brought before the court for a hearing on his claim, or requiring that he be released outright from custody, even if the prisoner himself is confined outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction. Id. at 495. The Sixth Circuit has concluded “that a detained alien generally must designate his immediate custodian—the [Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the predecessor to the present immigration-related agencies,] District Director for the district where he is being detained—as the respondent to his habeas corpus petition.” Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 322 (6th Cir. 2003). Here, Petitioner has named the Director of the Detroit Field Office of ICE, the United States Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General of the United States as Respondents. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1, 13–14.) In Roman v. Ashcroft, the Sixth Circuit stated that although it “conclude[d] that the immediate custodian rule generally applies to alien habeas corpus petitioners, . . . [there is] the possibility of exceptions to this rule.” Roman, 340 F.3d at 322. The Roman court explained: Some courts are also willing to make an exception to the immediate custodian rule in other extraordinary circumstances. For example, courts have noted the INS’s ability, as a practical matter, to deny aliens any meaningful opportunity to seek habeas corpus relief simply by transferring aliens to another district any time they filed a habeas corpus petition. Chavez–Rivas[ v. Olsen], 194 F. Supp. 2d [368,] 374 [(D.N.J. 2002)]. Aliens remaining in detention for extended periods are often transferred several times during their detention. See Lee v. Ashcroft, 216 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[T]he location of custody, and the identity of the day- to-day custodian, frequently change when detainees are transferred among INS facilities, all of which are under the control of the Attorney General.”); . . . . In light of these transfers, one court reasoned that an alien may properly name a respondent other than his immediate custodian because a petition naming a higher level official, such as the Attorney General, could be adjudicated without interruption in the event of a transfer. Arias–Agramonte[ v. Comm’r], [No. 00 CIV. 2412 (RWS),] 2000 WL 1617999, at *8 [(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2000)] (explaining that a petition naming only one’s immediate custodian would be dismissed when the alien was transferred to another local district). Id. at 325–26. Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded, “an exception might be appropriate if the INS were to exercise its transfer power in a clear effort to evade an alien’s habeas petitions.” Id. at 326. In light of the foregoing, to ensure that Respondents maintain authority to enforce this Court’s grant of habeas relief in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western District of Michigan, the Court will not dismiss Secretary Noem as a Respondent to these proceedings. The Court will, however, dismiss the Attorney General of the United States as a Respondent. Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment granting Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The Court will order Respondents to release Petitioner from custody, subject to any conditions that existed under Petitioner’s § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole. Additionally, the Court will enjoin Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner absent a material change in circumstances unless the requirements of due process have been satisfied. The Court will also order Respondents to file a status report within three days of the issuance of the Court’s opinion and judgment to certify compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment. Further, the Court will dismiss the Attorney General of the United States as a Respondent.
Dated: December 30, 2025 /s/ Robert J. Jonker Robert J. Jonker United States District Judge