Lucas J. Matlock

CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Connecticut
DecidedDecember 13, 2022
Docket22-20073
StatusUnknown

This text of Lucas J. Matlock (Lucas J. Matlock) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lucas J. Matlock, (Conn. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT HARTFORD DIVISION ____________________________________ IN RE: ) CASE NO. 22-20073 (JJT) ) LUCAS J. MATLOCK, ) DEBTOR. ) CHAPTER 7 ____________________________________) MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEBTOR’S MOTION TO REDEEM Before the Court is the Debtor’s Motion to Redeem dated August 2, 2022 (ECF No. 38) a 2022 Ford F350 Crew Cab XLT (“Subject Vehicle”) from Ally Bank (“Lender”) for the payment of $46,487.00.1 This matter was tried by the Court on December 12, 2022 upon the parties’ arguments, the Lender’s Motion in Limine (ECF No. 59) and testimony each from the Debtor and the Lender’s expert vehicle appraiser, James Acabbo. The Debtor introduced into evidence merely one full exhibit (Debtor’s Exhibit 1), an undated, unsigned proposed reaffirmation agreement (the “Reaffirmation Agreement”) allegedly generated by the Lender for the Debtor on or about March 13, 2022. It proposed, in effect, a full reaffirmation of the secured debt ($94,538.20) by the Debtor, and also stated, in a separate paragraph, that the value of the Subject Vehicle collateral was $46,487.00. See Debtor’s Exhibit 1, Part I, Items B and E, respectively. There was no evidence presented that the Reaffirmation Agreement was dated, signed by the Lender, definitively offered or otherwise not subject to further negotiation or consideration by either party. In his alleged reliance on this statement of $46,487.00 collateral value, the Debtor claims to have accepted the Lender’s “offer” to redeem at that price. No evidence was otherwise adduced by the Debtor that there was any such independent offer, that it was accepted on or about the time the Reaffirmation 1 The Debtor obtained a discharge on May 18, 2022 (ECF No. 25) and this case closed on June 2, 2022 (ECF No. 28)only to be reopened on June 17, 2022 to hear this Motion (ECF No. 36). Agreement was generated or that it would be the payout collateral value associated with any proposed redemption, an entirely different bankruptcy process. In considering the probative value of Debtor’s Exhibit 1 and his related testimony, the Court does not find the testimony of the Debtor characterizing the current collateral value at $46,487.00 to be weighty, accurate or reliable

evidence of the redemption value of the Subject Vehicle. Importantly for these proceedings, the parties have agreed upon the record, based upon the plain language of 11 U.S.C. §§ 722 and 506 that the replacement value of the Subject Vehicle at the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition is the relevant valuation metric. ECF No. 64. In contrast to the Debtor’s meager proof of purported collateral value, the Lender has adduced the details of the purchase transaction, including the vehicle’s attributes and options and for a purchase price of $94,268.62, most which was to be financed by the Debtor. See ECF No. 43-2. This transaction closed on February 7, 2022 –– a mere two days later, the Debtor filed his bankruptcy petition. In that filing for relief, the Debtor’s sworn statements contained in his Schedule A/B and again in his Schedules C and D (collectively, the “Bankruptcy Schedules”) each attest, under penalty of perjury, that the value of the Subject Vehicle is $71,125.00.2 He has

even done so in the Affidavit (ECF No. 38, the “Redemption Affidavit”)) filed in connection with his Motion to Redeem, stating unequivocally, “. . . the [Subject Vehicle] . . . had a fair market range of $58,655 to $71,429 . . . .” Notwithstanding these prior sworn affirmations to this Court and to his creditors, at trial the Debtor disingenuously and unabashedly testified that he had no other basis to value the Subject Vehicle at anything other than the $46,487.00 “valuation” contained in the unsigned Reaffirmation Agreement which he rejected.

2 The Court has taken judicial notice as such upon the record of the hearing. In contradistinction to the Debtor’s direct case, the Lender adduced at trial an expert report (Lender’s Exhibit 1) and live expert vehicle appraisal opinion testimony concluding that the Subject Vehicle’s replacement value was $98,245.33 as of the date of the appraisal (and, possibly, slightly more on the date of the bankruptcy petition). The expert’s testimony was based upon his

in person physical inspection of the vehicle’s condition (ECF No. 57), the contract purchase price, the Subject Vehicle’s attributes and options and market supply and demand during the relevant period along with an analysis of supporting comparable retail sales. Although Debtor’s counsel cross-examined the Lender’s expert, that examination failed to dilute the credibility, weight, substance and reliability of that opinion. The Court notes that the Debtor’s position is severely undermined by his own judicial admissions contained in his referenced Bankruptcy Schedules and supporting Redemption Affidavit. His flawed, shifting and insubstantial personal opinion of replacement value is founded exclusively on a value (ostensibly mistaken or not definitive) that the Lender provided in the proposed Reaffirmation Agreement.

The Court finds that the Debtor’s testimony is self-serving and sly gamesmanship endeavoring to achieve a windfall bargain by redeeming the Subject Vehicle for a value of $46,487.00, when he indisputably purchased it for $94,268.62 two days before the filing of his bankruptcy petition. He would have this Court believe, without substantiation, that this high demand premium vehicle had remarkably depreciated over fifty (50) percent in less than two days in a vehicle market characterized by scarce supply, high demand and delays in production and delivery of comparable vehicles. While, in this context, the Court makes no findings as to the Lender’s allegations regarding the Debtor’s intent to defraud creditors at the time of the transaction, it does note that the Debtor has done his best to avoid payments, making but one monthly payment on the Subject Vehicle over the course of his ownership. He has also been involved in at least three (3) post-petition accidents that have damaged the vehicle.3 The Debtor has unapologetically endeavored to use those accidents to diminish the Subject Vehicle’s value, notwithstanding his counsel’s unequivocal

acknowledgement that the collateral value inquiry here must be answered as of the date of the petition. That offer of proof (Proposed Debtor Exhibits 2 and 3), excluded from the trial, has no bearing on this valuation. Similarly, an alleged “offer” for the vehicle by CarMax, to establish a current value (Proposed Debtor Exhibit 4) was excluded by the Court for lack of foundation, relevance and failure to establish it as a learned treatise or industry guide that might avoid the hearsay rules. The record is clear that the Debtor barely met his burden of presenting this Motion to Redeem –– it is also clear that he utterly failed to meet his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence (see In Re Herrera, 454 B.R. 559, 561 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y 2011) (noting that the party seeking redemption bears the burden of proving the appropriate redemption value by a

preponderance of the evidence) in determining a valuation of the Subject Vehicle. Neither party disputed that the Debtor bore the burden of proving the appropriate redemption value. The record is also bereft of probative evidence that the vehicle was used for “personal, family, or household use,” another essential element of the Debtor’s burden of proof under 11 U.S.C. § 722.

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Bluebook (online)
Lucas J. Matlock, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lucas-j-matlock-ctb-2022.