Lucas A. Sanchez-Del Valle v. Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Division of Licensing

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: September 4, 2024
• Docket: 3D2023-2064
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed September 4, 2024. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D23-2064 Lower Tribunal Nos. CD202307061; D3216160 ________________

Lucas A. Sanchez-Del Valle, Appellant,

vs.

Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Division of Licensing, Appellee.

An Appeal from the State of Florida, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Division of Licensing.

Coffey Burlington, P.L., and Jared W. Whaley, for appellant.

Tobey Schultz, Senior Attorney (Tallahassee), for appellee.

Before EMAS, LINDSEY and MILLER, JJ.

EMAS, J. Lucas Sanchez-Del Valle appeals a final order of the Department of

Agriculture and Consumer Services, Division of Licensing (the Department),

which revoked his Security Officer’s License pursuant to Section

493.6118(2)(e), Florida Statutes (2023), following his plea to the felony crime

of fleeing and eluding an officer and the misdemeanor crime of resisting an

officer without violence, for which he received a withhold of adjudication and

was placed on probation.

Upon our hybrid review, see G.R. v. Agency for Persons. with

Disabilities, 315 So. 3d 107, 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (“We review an

agency's conclusions of law de novo and we review the record to determine

whether competent substantial evidence supports the agency's decision.”),

and affording no deference to agency interpretation of statutes or rules, see

id., we affirm the order of revocation of appellant’s security officer’s license,

finding the Department did not err in its consideration of the mitigating

circumstances presented by Sanchez-Del Valle as it related to the rebuttable

presumption of guilt arising from the plea. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400

U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (recognizing an Alford plea as “a plea containing a

protestation of innocence when . . . a defendant intelligently concludes that

his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the record before the judge

contains strong evidence of actual guilt.”) (emphasis added); Fla. R. Crim. P.

2 3.172(e) (requiring that, prior to accepting a plea of nolo contendere, the

judge “must determine that the defendant either: (1) acknowledges his or her

guilt; or (2) acknowledges that he or she feels the plea to be in his or her

best interest, while maintaining his or her innocence.”) (emphasis added);

T.J. v. State, 215 So. 3d 71, 73 n.6 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (observing: “People

accused of crimes or delinquent acts often enter a plea of nolo contendere

instead of a guilty plea. Also known as an Alford plea, a plea of nolo

contendere allows an accused, in effect, to plead guilty while continuing to

maintain his or her innocence.”) (emphasis added) (citing Alford, 400 U.S.

25 and Brown v. State, 943 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)); The Florida

Bar, re Fla. Rules of Crim. Proc., 343 So. 2d 1247, 1255 (1977) (Committee

Note observing that amendment to rule 3.172 “[i]ncorporates Fed. R. Crim.

P. 11(c), and allows for pleas of convenience as provided in North Carolina

v. Alford.”)

Affirmed.