Lozynsky v. Hairston

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Lozynsky v. Hairston

308 S.E.2d 605, 168 Ga. App. 276, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2749

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedSeptember 14, 1983

Docket66549

StatusPublished

Cited by6 cases

This text of 308 S.E.2d 605 (Lozynsky v. Hairston) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Lozynsky v. Hairston, 308 S.E.2d 605, 168 Ga. App. 276, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2749 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).

Pincite

Opinions

Banke, Judge.

The plaintiff brought this action seeking damages for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle collision. This is an interlocutory appeal from the grant of the plaintiffs motion for new trial following a jury verdict for the defendant.

The order appealed from was predicated upon the affidavit of one juror to the effect that he had visited the scene of the collision during an overnight recess and made measurements of the scene which he felt were more accurate than those provided during the trial. The juror further disclosed that he had shared this information with other jurors. During the hearing on the motion for new trial, the trial court also heard evidence that another juror had shared with fellow jurors his opinions and knowledge concerning the length of a Volkswagen and the width of a state highway. Held:

“It is the uncontrovertible law of this state that statements of jurors or of third parties indicating that certain of the jurors may have acted on private knowledge or on matters not in evidence will not be received subsequent to trial to impeach or impugn a verdict nor does a superior court have the legal power to hear or receive such statements.” Samples v. Greene, 138 Ga. App. 823, 825 (227 SE2d 456) (1976). “As a matter of public policy, a juror cannot be heard to impeach his verdict, either by way of disclosing the incompetency or misconduct of his fellow-jurors, or by showing his own misconduct or disqualification from any cause.” Swift v. S. S. Kresge Co., 159 Ga. App. 571 (1) (284 SE2d 74) (1981). See also OCGA § 9-10-9 (former Code Ann. § 110-109); Firestone Tire &c. Co. v. Pinyan, 155 Ga. App. 343 (1) (270 SE2d 883) (1980); Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Nash, 150 Ga. App. 68 (3) (256 SE2d 619) (1979). The only exception to the firm application of this rule that we have discovered is that set out in Watkins v. State, 237 Ga. 678 (229 SE2d 465) (1976), which was [277]*277clearly based on protections provided a criminal defendant by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Such exception is not applicable in this case.

Decided September 14, 1983 Rehearing denied October 4, 1983. Michael J. Gorby, Jerry A. Lumley, for appellant. George P. Graves, for appellee.

Judgment reversed.

Deen, P. J., concurs in the judgment only. Carley, J., concurs specially.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Banke, Judge.

The plaintiff brought this action seeking damages for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle collision. This is an interlocutory appeal from the grant of the plaintiffs motion for new trial following a jury verdict for the defendant.

The order appealed from was predicated upon the affidavit of one juror to the effect that he had visited the scene of the collision during an overnight recess and made measurements of the scene which he felt were more accurate than those provided during the trial. The juror further disclosed that he had shared this information with other jurors. During the hearing on the motion for new trial, the trial court also heard evidence that another juror had shared with fellow jurors his opinions and knowledge concerning the length of a Volkswagen and the width of a state highway. Held:

“It is the uncontrovertible law of this state that statements of jurors or of third parties indicating that certain of the jurors may have acted on private knowledge or on matters not in evidence will not be received subsequent to trial to impeach or impugn a verdict nor does a superior court have the legal power to hear or receive such statements.” Samples v. Greene, 138 Ga. App. 823, 825 (227 SE2d 456) (1976). “As a matter of public policy, a juror cannot be heard to impeach his verdict, either by way of disclosing the incompetency or misconduct of his fellow-jurors, or by showing his own misconduct or disqualification from any cause.” Swift v. S. S. Kresge Co., 159 Ga. App. 571 (1) (284 SE2d 74) (1981). See also OCGA § 9-10-9 (former Code Ann. § 110-109); Firestone Tire &c. Co. v. Pinyan, 155 Ga. App. 343 (1) (270 SE2d 883) (1980); Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Nash, 150 Ga. App. 68 (3) (256 SE2d 619) (1979). The only exception to the firm application of this rule that we have discovered is that set out in Watkins v. State, 237 Ga. 678 (229 SE2d 465) (1976), which was [277]*277clearly based on protections provided a criminal defendant by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Such exception is not applicable in this case.

Decided September 14, 1983 Rehearing denied October 4, 1983. Michael J. Gorby, Jerry A. Lumley, for appellant. George P. Graves, for appellee.

Judgment reversed.

Deen, P. J., concurs in the judgment only. Carley, J., concurs specially.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

308 S.E.2d 605, 168 Ga. App. 276, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2749, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lozynsky-v-hairston-gactapp-1983.

Opinions

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack