Loya v. Garrett

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: January 2, 2025
• Docket: 3:22-cv-00309
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 OSCAR BENJAMIN LOYA, Case No. 3:22-cv-00309-MMD-CLB

7 Petitioner, ORDER v. 8 TIM GARRETT, et al., 9 Respondents. 10 11 I. SUMMARY 12 Petitioner Oscar Benjamin Loya filed a counseled First Amended Petition. (ECF 13 No. 34 (“Petition”).) Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the Petition (“Motion to 14 Dismiss” (ECF No. 49)) alleging all grounds in the Petition, except Ground 1(D), are 15 untimely and do not relate back to the original petition, and that grounds 1(A)-1(D) are not 16 cognizable. Respondents also filed a motion for leave to file exhibits under seal. (ECF 17 No. 45 (“Motion to Seal”).) Loya filed a motion to strike the Motion to Dismiss, or 18 alternatively, a motion for a more definite statement (ECF No. 51 (“Motion to Strike)) and 19 requested an extension of time to respond to the Motion to Dismiss.1 20 II. DISCUSSION 21 A. Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike 22 In their Motion to Dismiss, Respondents argue this Court must dismiss Grounds 23 1(A)-1(C) and 1(E)-1(G) of the Petition because they “do not share a common core of 24 operative facts with the original petition such that they relate back to the original petition” 25 and because “the facts differ in time or type from the facts alleged in the timely petition.” 26 (ECF No. 49 at 6-7.) Respondents include in their motion legal standards for the Anti- 27 Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act statute of limitations and relation back. (Id. at 1 4-7.) Respondents listed the grounds raised in the Petition but listed none of the grounds 2 raised in the original petition. (Id. at 3-4.) 3 Loya argues the Motion to Dismiss is not specifically pleaded, does not provide fair 4 notice, and fails to comply with the notice pleading standard of the Federal Rules of Civil 5 Procedure. (ECF No. 51 at 2-7.) He asserts the Motion to Dismiss fails to articulate, 6 beyond conclusory statements, how Loya’s claims do not relate back to the original 7 timely petition. (Id.) 8 Habeas Rule 5(b) states, “[t]he answer must address the allegations in the petition. 9 It must also state whether any claim in the petition is barred by a failure to exhaust state 10 remedies, a procedural bar, non-retroactivity, or a statute of limitations.” Although this rule 11 does not mention the specificity of response required in a motion to dismiss, until recently 12 it was a longstanding practice in this district for Respondents to identify in such motions 13 the grounds they claimed did not relate back and to explain why. Although Respondents 14 listed the grounds they claim do not relate back, and generally argue those grounds “do 15 not share a common core of operative facts with the original petition such that they relate 16 back to the original petition” and “the facts differ in time or type from the facts alleged in 17 the timely petition,” such allegations are conclusory and the Motion to Dismiss does not 18 otherwise specify any reasons why the claims do not relate back to the original petition. 19 Respondents’ reliance on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Ross v. Williams, to argue 20 they have no obligation to further specify the reasons why they claim the grounds in the 21 petition do not relate back because the burden to prove relation back falls on the habeas 22 petitioner, is misguided. 950 F .3d 1160, 1172 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc). The Circuit in 23 Ross held factual allegations contained in an amended petition related back to facts set 24 forth in documents (in that case, a state court order) attached to an original timely filed 25 pro se petition. Id. at 1164-1166. The state’s pleading burden was not an issue that was 26 ruled upon in Ross. See, e.g., United States v. Kirilyuk, 29 F.4th 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 27 2022) (acknowledging the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly stated that “[q]uestions which 28 merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are 1 not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents” (quoting 2 United States v. Ped, 943 F.3d 427, 434 (9th Cir. 2019))). 3 Here, Respondents’ timeliness challenge in the Motion to Dismiss evades the 4 spirit, if not the letter, of the specificity requirement in Habeas Rule 5(b). And it frustrates 5 the judicial process by ensuring that the heart of the relation-back issues is not reached 6 until Respondents’ reply brief, depriving Loya of the fair opportunity to address it, and 7 leaving the Court with an incomplete analysis. To avoid this scenario and ensure fairness 8 in this process, the Court grants the Motion to Strike and for a more definite statement, 9 strikes the untimeliness argument in the Motion to Dismiss, and denies the remainder of 10 that motion without prejudice to Respondents’ ability to reassert it in a renewed motion. 11 The Court will allow Respondents to either answer the Petition or file a renewed motion 12 to dismiss in which they specifically explain their untimeliness argument and any relation- 13 back arguments on a claim-by-claim basis.2 14 B. Motion to Seal 15 Respondents seek leave to file under seal Exhibits 8, 32, and 33, in support of the 16 Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 45.) Exhibits 8, 32, and 33 consist of Presentence 17 Investigation Reports (“PIR”) and related attachments. (ECF Nos. 46-1; 46-2; 46-3.) Loya 18 did not file an opposition and the time to do so has expired. 19 To overcome the strong presumption in favor of public access, the party seeking 20 sealing must make a particularized showing as to why the exhibit should be sealed and 21 provide compelling reasons, supported by specific factual findings, for his request. See 22 Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006); Pintos v. Pac. 23 Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010). In general, compelling reasons for 24 sealing exist when court records might become a vehicle for improper purposes, such as 25 “to gratify private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release

26 2Loya seeks an extension of time to file his opposition to Respondents’ Motion to 27 Dismiss until the Court issues a ruling on his motion to strike. The Court finds the request is made in good faith and not solely for the purpose of delay, and therefore, good cause 28 exists to grant the motion. If the respondents file a renewed motion to dismiss as provided 1 || trade secrets.” Demaree v. Pederson, 887 F.3d 870, 884 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting 2 || Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179). Under Nevada law, the PIR is “confidential and must not 3 || be made a part of any public record.” NRS § 176.156(5). 4 Having reviewed and considered the matter under Kamakana and its progeny, and 5 || because Loya does not object, the Court finds that a compelling need to protect the 6 || privacy of the individuals referred to in the PIRs and related attachments outweighs the 7 || public interest in open access to the court records. The Court will grant Respondents’ 8 || motion (ECF No. 45) and consider Exhibits 8, 32, and 33 (ECF Nos. 46-1; 46-2; and 46- 9 || 3) properly filed under seal. 10 lll. © CONCLUSION 11 It is therefore ordered that Petitioner Oscar Benjamin Loya’s motion to strike or 12 || alternatively for a more definite statement (ECF No. 51) is granted. The Clerk of Court is 13 || directed to strike Respondents’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 49). 14 It is further ordered that Respondents will have 30 days after the entry of this order 15 || to file either a renewed motion to dismiss or an answer. The briefing schedule in the 16 || August 25, 2022, order (ECF No. 8) otherwise remains in effect. 17 It is further ordered that Respondents’ motion to seal Exhibits 8, 32, and 33 (ECF 18 || No. 45) is granted. The documents filed as ECF Nos. 46-1; 46-2; and 46-3 are considered 19 || properly filed under seal and will remain under seal. 20 DATED THIS 2"¢ Day of January 2025.

22 MIRANDAM.DU 53 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 24 25 26 27 28