Lowrey v. Castillo

Opinion

The slip opinion is the first version of an opinion released by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals. Once an opinion is selected for publication by the Court, it is assigned a vendor-neutral citation by the Clerk of the Court for compliance with Rule 23-112 NMRA, authenticated and formally published. The slip opinion may contain deviations from the formal authenticated opinion.

1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 2 Opinion Number: _____________ 3 Filing Date: January 29, 2024 4 No. A-1-CA-40083 5 JARROD LOWREY, 6 Plaintiff-Appellant, 7 v.

8 SINFY CASTILLO and JAVIER 9 ARGUETA,

10 Defendants-Appellees.

11 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 12 Nancy J. Franchini, District Court Judge

13 Jarrod Lowrey 14 Rio Rancho, NM

15 Pro Se Appellant

16 Jackson Loman Stanford Downey & Stevens-Block, P.C. 17 Eric Loman 18 Albuquerque, NM

19 for Appellees 1 OPINION 2 WRAY, Judge. 3 {1} Plaintiff Jarrod Lowrey appeals pro se the district court’s dismissal of the 4 complaint brought against Defendants Sinfy Castillo, a probation officer, and Javier 5 Argueta, Defendant Castillo’s supervisor (collectively, Defendants), both employed 6 by the Bernalillo County Metropolitan Court (the Metro court). The complaint 7 asserted unspecified causes of action relating to Defendants’ alleged misconduct in 8 the supervision of a participant in a domestic violence early intervention program 9 (EIP Participant), which is a Metro court treatment program. Defendants moved to 10 dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint based on Rule 1-012(B)(6) NMRA. The district court 11 granted the motion and determined in part that Defendants were protected by quasi- 12 judicial immunity. We conclude that the alleged misconduct arose from Defendants’ 13 activities that were performed as an arm of the Metro court and their services 14 supervising the Metro court treatment program participants were integral to the 15 judicial process; quasi-judicial immunity permits Defendants to perform that judicial 16 function without fear of civil liability and sufficient procedural safeguards protect 17 against potential misconduct; and Defendants acted within the scope of their quasi- 18 judicial function. We therefore affirm.

1 BACKGROUND 2 {2} Plaintiff’s complaint asserts the following. EIP Participant had been arrested 3 for twice violating a domestic violence restraining order and agreed to participate in 4 a preprosecution diversionary domestic violence early intervention program (the 5 EIP) run by the Metro court. As part of the EIP, EIP Participant entered into two EIP 6 agreements (EIP Agreements), which contemplated supervision by a probation 7 officer and imposed a series of conditions. The conditions required EIP Participant 8 to (1) report to the probation officer weekly or “as often as the probation officer may 9 require”; (2) notify the probation officer of any change in address, employment, or 10 school status; (3) inform the probation officer of any missed counseling sessions or 11 treatment and explain any absences; (4) submit to drug and alcohol testing upon the 12 probation officer’s request; and (5) be truthful with the probation officer, the EIP 13 judge, and any counselor. Defendant Castillo was the probation officer who 14 supervised EIP Participant’s compliance with the EIP Agreements and the Metro 15 court’s conditions of release, and Defendant Argueta was Defendant Castillo’s 16 supervisor. 17 {3} Plaintiff’s primary allegation is that Defendants’ failure to supervise EIP 18 Participant put Plaintiff, his minor son, other children, and the community at risk. 19 EIP Participant was living with Plaintiff’s ex-wife and her children, including 20 Plaintiff’s son. Concerned that EIP Participant was using drugs in the home while

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1 living with the children, Plaintiff investigated EIP Participant and discovered that he 2 was subject to the EIP Agreements and Defendants’ supervision. Plaintiff initially 3 contacted Defendants to report violations of the EIP Agreements, which included 4 the failure to notify the probation officer of a change of address, drug use, and 5 contact with an assault victim. Specifically, Plaintiff reached out to Defendant 6 Castillo “to see if she could assist . . . in removing [EIP Participant] from [Plaintiff’s] 7 son’s house.” Defendant Castillo stated that “there was nothing she could do to get 8 [EIP Participant] away from [Plaintiff’s] son” but did instruct EIP Participant to 9 submit to a drug test, filed an EIP probation violation report, and participated in the 10 EIP probation violation hearing. 11 {4} Plaintiff subsequently reported to Defendants additional violations by EIP 12 Participant, which included arrests, failure to appear in court, failure to obtain or 13 continue employment, perjury, and failure to submit to drug tests. Defendants 14 requested that Plaintiff prepare an affidavit detailing the information, and Plaintiff 15 complied. Thereafter, Defendants filed additional EIP probation violation reports 16 and affidavits, participated in the hearings, recommended that the Metro court 17 impose community service as sanctions, and required EIP Participant to submit to 18 additional drug tests. The Metro court ordered EIP Participant to perform community 19 service. Nevertheless, Plaintiff had an additional meeting with Defendants to

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1 articulate his continued frustration with their supervision and his view that 2 Defendants had misrepresented and minimized his reports to the Metro court judge. 3 {5} In Plaintiff’s words, Defendants “dismissed” Plaintiff’s concerns. Thereafter, 4 Plaintiff filed a civil complaint against Defendants in district court and alleged that 5 Defendant Castillo failed to (1) check more frequently on EIP Participant’s “living 6 situation” and criminal records; (2) require more frequent drug testing; and (3) report 7 accurately to the Metro court the information that Plaintiff had provided about EIP 8 Participant’s potential probation violations. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants created 9 a dangerous situation for the community, himself, his son, and other children by 10 enabling EIP Participant’s “drug problems to persist” and “completely fail[ing] to 11 rehabilitate” him. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and argued, in 12 relevant part, that Defendants were an arm of the court and entitled to absolute 13 immunity from civil suit. The district court granted Defendants’ motion and 14 dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff appeals. 15 DISCUSSION 16 {6} Plaintiff first argues that the district court did not properly apply the 17 “functional approach” to determine whether Defendants were entitled to quasi- 18 judicial immunity and as a result, improperly dismissed the complaint, which leaves 19 no redress for the constitutional harm that Defendants’ alleged misconduct has 20 caused to Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s son, other children, and the community. Plaintiff’s

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1 second argument—that immunity results in the lack of redress of harm—challenges 2 the long-standing policy-based decision by our courts to afford immunity to some 3 actors under some circumstances. See Collins ex rel. Collins v. Tabet, 1991-NMSC- 4 013, ¶¶ 18-19, 26, 111 N.M. 391, 806 P.2d 40 (collecting immunity cases and 5 applying immunity principles to guardians ad litem), abrogated on other grounds by 6 State v. Mares, ___-NMSC-___, ¶ 32, ___ P.3d ___ (S-1-SC-38948, Dec. 22, 2023). 7 Specifically, our Supreme Court has afforded absolute immunity to individuals 8 acting “within the scope of the appointment” as “an arm of the court.” Kimbrell v. 9 Kimbrell, 2014-NMSC-027, ¶ 8, 331 P.3d 915 (internal quotation marks and citation 10 omitted); see id. ¶ 11 (stating the rule set forth in Collins). As a result, we do not 11 reevaluate the legitimacy of the immunity doctrines but instead review the district 12 court’s application of immunity law to the present case. See Kimbrell, 2014-NMSC- 13 027, ¶¶ 11-17 (adopting a framework for the applicability of immunity under the 14 circumstances). We “review questions of immunity de novo.” Hunnicutt v. Sewell, 15 2009-NMCA-121, ¶ 8, 147 N.M. 272, 219 P.3d 529. Where, as here, the question is 16 whether the district court erred by granting a Rule 1-012(B)(6) motion to dismiss, 17 we take “the well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint as true and test the legal 18 sufficiency of the claims.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 19 {7} Quasi-judicial immunity refers to the extension to quasi-judicial officers of 20 the well-settled law that a judge acting within their jurisdiction is entitled to absolute

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1 immunity. Collins, 1991-NMSC-013, ¶¶ 17, 24. Absolute judicial immunity is 2 afforded in order to protect judges “from harassment, intimidation, or other 3 interference with their ability to engage in impartial decision-making.” Id. ¶ 18. It 4 preserves the “autonomy and integrity of the judiciary” and is extended to quasi- 5 judicial offers “so that persons who are integral to the judicial process are able to 6 perform their functions without the intimidating effect of potential lawsuits.” Id. ¶ 24 7 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Hunnicutt, 2009-NMCA-121, ¶ 9. 8 Because we conclude that quasi-judicial immunity applies to a probation officer 9 supervising participation in the Metro court EIP and Defendants did not act “clearly 10 and completely outside the scope” of their appointment as an arm of the court, we 11 agree with the district court that Defendants are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. 12 Cf. Kimbrell, 2014-NMSC-027, ¶¶ 2, 22 (concluding that quasi-judicial immunity 13 applies to certain guardians ad litem and considering whether the alleged misconduct 14 was “clearly and completely outside the scope” of their appointment).

15 I. Quasi-Judicial Immunity Applies to a Probation Officer Supervising 16 Participation in the Metro Court EIP

17 {8} Quasi-judicial immunity is applicable if (1) the individual is acting as an arm 18 of the court and the acts are integral to the judicial process; (2) the threat of civil 19 liability could impair the independence of the individual and thereby the ability of 20 the court to perform its judicial duties; and (3) procedural safeguards exist to “protect 21 against misconduct.” Id. ¶¶ 12-13. We first evaluate whether Defendants acted as an

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1 arm of the court in their capacity as probation officers monitoring Metro court EIP 2 participants and whether those acts were integral to the judicial process. We then 3 turn to consider together the threat of civil liability and the existence of other 4 procedural safeguards.

5 A. A Probation Officer Supervising a Participant in the Metro Court EIP 6 Serves as an Arm of the Court and Performs a Function That Is Integral 7 to the Judicial Process

8 {9} Quasi-judicial immunity protects individuals who act “as an actual 9 functionary or arm of the court, not only in status or denomination but in reality” 10 and are an “integral part[] of the judicial process.” Collins, 1991-NMSC-013, ¶¶ 16, 11 19 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). When the extent to which an 12 individual acts as an arm of the court is not clear, we apply the “functional 13 approach,” or analysis, to decide whether the acts, as alleged in the complaint, were 14 judicial functions. See id. ¶ 42 (stating that “a limited factual inquiry is necessary to 15 determine the nature of [the individual]’s appointment”); Kimbrell, 2014-NMSC- 16 027, ¶ 17 (noting the necessity of the functional approach in Collins but declining to 17 apply that analysis because under the governing rule in Kimbrell, it was “very clear 18 that the guardian ad litem [wa]s an arm of the court”). Plaintiff argues, Defendants 19 do not dispute, and we agree that the functional approach applies to determine 20 whether Defendants are immune. We therefore apply the functional analysis to

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1 determine whether Defendants acted as an arm of the court and then consider 2 whether those functions are integral to the judicial process. 3 {10} To apply the functional analysis, we examine the Defendants’ role in the 4 process that gave rise to Plaintiff’s allegations. See Hunnicutt, 2009-NMCA-121, 5 ¶¶ 9-13. Plaintiff challenges Defendants’ conduct in relation to the Metro court 6 treatment program. The Metro court accepted EIP Participant into the program 7 subject to conditions that were set forth in the EIP Agreements and reiterated in part 8 in the acceptance letter signed by the Metro court EIP judge. The EIP Agreements, 9 on the Metro court letterhead, required EIP Participant’s performance of the required 10 conditions to be supervised by a probation officer, including reporting to the 11 probation officer; notifying the probation officer of changes in EIP Participant’s 12 address, employment, school status, or missed counseling sessions; submitting to 13 drug and alcohol tests at the probation officer’s request; and being truthful with the 14 probation officer and the Metro court EIP judge. The EIP Agreements incorporated 15 EIP Participant’s court-imposed conditions of release into the EIP Agreements’ 16 conditions, and Defendant Castillo, as a probation officer, was trusted with 17 monitoring EIP Participant’s compliance with those conditions. EIP Participant 18 agreed that violation of the EIP Agreements could “result in sanctions, including a 19 warrant being issued . . ., jail time being imposed, and/or termination from the 20 program.” As Plaintiff concedes, Defendants’ actions were “clearly defined” by the

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1 conditions in the EIP Agreements. As a result, Defendants’ role was to perform 2 judicial functions—to implement the Metro court treatment program. See id. ¶ 10 3 (concluding where a court has a responsibility to perform the function, that function 4 is “judicial and not administrative”). 5 {11} We further conclude that Defendants’ judicial functions were integral to the 6 judicial process. Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ function of supervising EIP 7 Participant was purely administrative because Defendants performed “general 8 routine investigative acts” that are not integral to the judicial process. Because 9 Plaintiff characterizes these functions as “operational in nature” and “subservient to 10 departmental directives,” Plaintiff argues that immunity should not be extended to 11 Defendants. After accepting EIP Participant, however, the Metro court was reliant 12 on Defendants’ supervisory actions to evaluate EIP Participant’s compliance with 13 the conditions and continued participation in the Metro court EIP. To that end, 14 Defendants presented reports to the Metro court based on EIP Participant’s alleged 15 violations of the conditions and recommended that the Metro court impose sixteen 16 hours of community service. Defendants supervised EIP Participant’s compliance 17 with the conditions of the EIP Agreements, and thereby played an integral role in 18 the Metro court’s performance of its function to evaluate whether EIP Participant 19 should continue to participate in the Metro court EIP.

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1 B. The Threat of Litigation Could Impair the Performance of the Judicial 2 Function and Existing Procedures Safeguard Against Probation Officer 3 Misconduct While Supervising Participation in the Metro Court EIP

4 {12} We turn next to the impact of the threat of civil liability and the existing 5 procedural safeguards to protect against misconduct. Kimbrell, 2014-NMSC-027, 6 ¶¶ 12-13. In Kimbrell, our Supreme Court recognized that the threat of “liability 7 could impair [a] guardian ad litem’s ability to independently investigate and report 8 the facts to the court, thereby obstructing the pathway to ascertaining the truth and 9 impairing the judge’s ability to perform [their] judicial duties.” Id. As we have 10 described, the EIP Agreements similarly designated a probation officer to investigate 11 and report to the Metro court the facts related to EIP Participant’s compliance with 12 the EIP conditions. Independent objective discharge of this function by probation 13 officers is essential to provide the court with the information necessary to implement 14 the Metro court EIP. If a probation officer is concerned about civil liability—from 15 either a program participant or a member of the community—the probation officer’s 16 ability to act independently and the court’s ability to perform its duties could be 17 impaired. Cf. Collins, 1991-NMSC-013, ¶ 26 (explaining that “[t]he objectivity of a 18 guardian’s investigation and recommendation might be compromised by the threat 19 of liability; and . . . this could impair the judge’s own ability to perform [their] 20 judicial duties in approving the settlement”). We therefore conclude that the threat

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1 of civil liability would impair the Metro court’s ability to perform its judicial duties 2 in relation to the EIP. Cf. Kimbrell, 2014-NMSC-027, ¶¶ 12-13. 3 {13} Procedural safeguards further exist to protect against the misconduct alleged, 4 which makes “the threat of civil litigation unnecessary.” Id. To evaluate the 5 availability of procedural safeguards to prevent misconduct by a probation officer 6 performing their duties in this context, we first observe that misconduct can involve 7 either inaccurately reporting information to the detriment of the participant or failing 8 to investigate and report accurate information to the detriment of third parties. 9 Plaintiff alleges only the latter type of misconduct and argues that Defendants’ failed 10 to report or investigate violations, which in turn placed Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s son, 11 other children, and the community in danger. In the context of inaction that allegedly 12 places third parties at risk, adequate procedural safeguards exist because other law 13 enforcement agencies, including the police and child protective services, are charged 14 with keeping the community safe. See NMSA 1978, § 29-1-1 (1979) (describing the 15 duty of peace officers to investigate all criminal violations brought to their attention 16 or of which they are aware, and to initiate a criminal prosecution “if the 17 circumstances are such as to indicate to a reasonably prudent person that such action 18 should be taken”); NMSA 1978, § 32A-4-3 (2021) (stating the duty of “[e]very 19 person,” including law enforcement officers, to report child abuse and child neglect, 20 as well as the responsibility of local law enforcement agencies to investigate such

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1 abuse or neglect); NMSA 1978, § 32A-4-4(A) (2019, amended 2023) (requiring 2 child protective services to investigate reports alleging neglect or abuse). 3 {14} For these reasons, when claims of civil liability are premised on allegations 4 that probation officers failed to report or investigate violations by a participant in the 5 Metro court’s EIP program, we conclude that the threat of civil liability could impair 6 the judge’s ability to perform judicial duties and that procedural safeguards exist to 7 otherwise protect against the type of misconduct alleged in the present case. Taking 8 this conclusion together with our holding that probation officers who supervise 9 participants in the Metro court EIP program function as an arm of the court and that 10 function is integral to the judicial process, we hold that quasi-judicial immunity 11 generally applies in this context.

12 II. Defendants Did Not Act Outside the Scope of the Probation Officer’s 13 Function in Supervising EIP Participant

14 {15} Even when quasi-judicial immunity applies, however, an individual may not 15 be entitled to its protection if the alleged misconduct was “clearly and completely 16 outside the scope” of the individual’s function as an arm of the court. Kimbrell, 17 2014-NMSC-027, ¶¶ 1-2. Plaintiff maintains that Defendants could not be immune 18 for actions taken in bad faith—for example, misrepresenting Plaintiff’s reports about 19 EIP Participant’s behavior—because such acts are not within the judicial function. 20 Importantly, however, Plaintiff concedes that Defendants’ actions were within the 21 scope of the duties assigned to them by the Metro court, complaining only about how

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1 Defendants performed those duties. But allegations about the improper performance 2 of duties have no bearing on the scope of duties inquiry. See Hunnicutt, 2009- 3 NMCA-121, ¶ 13 (declining to “examine the allegations of improper or illegal 4 conduct”). As a result, Plaintiff has not persuaded us that Defendants’ actions were 5 “clearly and completely outside the scope of” a probation officer’s judicial function 6 of supervising EIP Participant. 7 CONCLUSION 8 {16} For these reasons, we hold that Defendants are entitled to quasi-judicial 9 immunity, and we affirm the district court. 10 {17} IT IS SO ORDERED.

11 ______________________________ 12 KATHERINE A. WRAY, Judge

13 WE CONCUR:

14 __________________________ 15 ZACHARY A. IVES, Judge

16 __________________________ 17 JANE B. YOHALEM, Judge