Lownsbury v. Securities & Exchange Commission
Opinions
This case arises upon the motion of the Securities and Exchange Commission to dismiss the petition of certain stockholders of The Commonwealth & Southern Corporation for review of present orders1 of the Commission, respondents, and to dismiss a motion, also made by the same petitioners, for a stay of all proceedings, pending review by this Court. The controversy centers upon interpretation of two sections of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 19352 in relation to court review of the corporation’s reorganization plan.
The primary question involved is whether this Court is the proper forum to test the Commission’s orders pursuant to section 24(a)3 of the Act, as petitioners allege, or [218] whether the District Court is the proper forum pursuant to section 11(e),4 as the Commission alleges.
The orders of the Commission are expressly stated not to be deemed operative to authorize any of the transactions contemplated by the piar, until a District Court has entered an order enforcing the plan. The orders also condition the effectiveness of the plan upon its approval by vote of the corporation’s shareholders, prior to submission to a District Court. The orders are then, argues the Commission, interlocutory and general review provisions, in a statute, as to agency orders do not apply to those which are merely interlocutory. Federal Power Commission v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 1937, 304 U.S. 375, 58 S.Ct. 963, 82 L.Ed. 1408.
The conditional nature of the Commission’s order is apparently a method of so framing its mandate as to avoid the seeming inconsistency involved in sections 11(e) and 24(a) of the statute. If effective, an orderly review following Commission action is provided for through District Court, Circuit Court of Appeals, and possibly Supreme Court, in proceedings in which all parties in interest may be participants. The very question before us as to effectiveness of the device was before the Second Circuit in a case, which while showing some difference on facts, presented no difference in legal question which we can see. Okin v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2 Cir., 1944, 145 F.2d 206, remanded as to a point not relevant to our question 1945, 325 U.S. 840, 65 S.Ct. 1569.
The Second Circuit took squarely the position the Commission contends for here. In support of its conclusion, the Court stressed the significance of the express provision for general review in 11(b) and its omission in 11(e) ; “the practicalities of the situation”; and “the legislative history of the Act, evincing a Congressional intent that the relationship of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the district court provided for in § 11 should be ‘exactly’ the same as that of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the district court in railroad reorganization under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 205.” [145 F.2d 208.]
We think this decision is completely in point and that it discusses the problem thoroughly, reaching a result which we believe to be correct. No object would be [219] served in repeating what has been so adequately discussed in that opinion.
The petition for review of the orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission is dismissed and the motion for stay of proceedings denied.
Footnotes
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151 F.2d 217 (Lownsbury v. Securities & Exchange Commission) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.