Lowery v. Morton

36 S.E.2d 661, 200 Ga. 227, 1946 Ga. LEXIS 364
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedJanuary 10, 1946
Docket15329.
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 36 S.E.2d 661 (Lowery v. Morton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lowery v. Morton, 36 S.E.2d 661, 200 Ga. 227, 1946 Ga. LEXIS 364 (Ga. 1946).

Opinion

Wyatt, Justice.

The Code, § 110-101, provides: “The ver-' diet shall cover the issues made by the pleadings, and shall be for the plaintiff or defendant.”

This court has held many times that it is not error for a trial judge not to receive an improper or imperfect verdict, and to cause the jury to retire and put their verdict in proper form. See Van Leonard v. Eagle & Phœnix Manufacturing Co., 60 Ga. 544; Blalock v, Waldrup, 84 Ga. 145 (10 S. E. 622, 20 Am. St. R. 350); Vance v. Roberts, 86 Ga. 457 (5), 463 (12 S. E. 653); Baker v. Thompson, 89 Ga. 486 (5) (15 S. E. 644); Jordan v. Downs, 118 Ga. 544 (2) (45 S. E. 439); Lee v. Humphries, 124 Ga. 539 (2) (52 S. E. 1007); Seaboard Air-Line Railway v. Howe, 139 Ga. 429 (2) (77 S. E. 387). In Smith v. Pilcher, 130 Ga. 350, 355 (60 S. E. 1000), Mr. Justice Holden, speaking for the court and discussing the question now under consideration, said: “When ever a verdict is ambiguous and uncertain in its meaning or does not cover a substantial issue made by the pleadings in the case upon which proof is offered, it is proper to have the jury retire again for the purpose of rendering another verdict, under proper instructions from the court. It is better to do this than to receive the verdict, which would probably have to be set aside on a motion for a new trial, resulting in the expense and trouble of another trial.” In Jordan v. Downs, supra, Chief Justice Simmons, speaking for the court, said: “We think that it is not only the right but the duty of the trial judge, when a verdict as returned is ambiguous or indefinite, to call the attention of the jury to the faults of the verdict, ask them what they mean by the verdict or answers returned, and, upon ascertaining what is meant, to direct them to return to their room and correct the verdict so as to make it speak their meaning. A judge has supervision of. the whole case, and is not merely a figurehead to sit by and see injustice done or to allow the reception of an ambiguous and indefinite verdict which is likely to give rise to more litigation or to result in another long and weary trial.”

We think the language above quoted applicable to the instant case. The jury had one question, and one only, submitted to them- — title to the property in controversy. The verdict first returned undertook to decide and determine questions which had *230 not been submitted to tbe jury, to wit, liability for taxes on tbe property for a period of thirteen years, and the adjudication of monetary claims as between the parties. "We are not called upon in this case to determine whether or not the first verdict returned was a valid verdict. When it is determined that the verdict was ambiguous, uncertain, or did not cover the issues in the case, that is as far as the inquiry need go, for the reason that when this is made to appear, it is not error for the trial judge to require the jury to return to their room, under proper instructions, and make their verdict certain. Especially is this true when it appears, as it does here, that the complaining party made no objection at the time the judge declined to accept the verdict and sent the jury back to their room for further deliberation.

We conclude that there was no error in the action of the trial judge.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Kitchin v. Reidelberger
714 S.E.2d 361 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 2011)
Bailey v. Annistown Road Baptist Church, Inc.
689 S.E.2d 62 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 2009)
Neiman-Marcus v. Gammage
382 S.E.2d 208 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1989)
Georgia American Insurance v. Mills
369 S.E.2d 768 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1988)
White v. Archer Daniels Midland Co.
350 S.E.2d 788 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1986)
Colley v. Dillon
280 S.E.2d 425 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1981)
Smith v. Smith
266 S.E.2d 496 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1980)
Ballard v. Turner
249 S.E.2d 637 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1978)
Roswell Road-Perimeter Highway Liquor Store, Inc. v. Schurke
222 S.E.2d 847 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1975)
University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp.
504 F.2d 518 (Fifth Circuit, 1974)
Kamor v. Fireman's Fund Insurance
211 S.E.2d 179 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1974)
Wilder v. Wilder
189 S.E.2d 695 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1972)
Denham v. Shellman Grain Elevator, Inc.
181 S.E.2d 894 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1971)
Thompson v. Ingram
177 S.E.2d 61 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1970)
Piedmont Cotton Mills, Inc. v. General Warehouse No. Two, Inc.
149 S.E.2d 72 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1966)
Parrish Bakeries of Georgia, Inc. v. Wiseman Baking Co.
122 S.E.2d 260 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1961)
Fried v. Fried
69 S.E.2d 862 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1952)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
36 S.E.2d 661, 200 Ga. 227, 1946 Ga. LEXIS 364, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lowery-v-morton-ga-1946.