Loveridge v. United States

CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
DecidedAugust 13, 2018
Docket16-912
StatusPublished

This text of Loveridge v. United States (Loveridge v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Federal Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Loveridge v. United States, (uscfc 2018).

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims No. 16-912L and No.16-1565L and No. 18-375 Consolidated (Filed: August 13, 2018)

) PERRY LOVERIDGE, et al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) Rails-to Trails; Fifth Amendment ) Takings; Oregon Law, Easement; Fee THE UNITED STATES, ) Simple ) Defendant. ) ) ********************* ) ) ALBRIGHT, et al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) ) THE UNITED STATES, ) ) Defendant. ) )

Steven M. Wald, St. Louis, MO, for Loveridge plainitffs. Michael J. Smith, St. Louis, MO and Thomas S. Stewart and Elizabeth G. McCulley, Kansas City, MO, of counsel.

Mark F. Hearne, II, Clayton, MO, for Albright plaintiffs. Maghan S. Largent, Lindsay S.C. Brinton, and Stephen S. Davis, Clayton, MO and Abram J. Pafford, Washington, D.C., of counsel.

Barbara M.R. Marvin, Environment and Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., with whom was Jeffrey H. Wood, Acting Assistant Attorney General, for defendant. Ragu-Jara Gregg, Washington, D.C., of counsel.

OPINION

FIRESTONE, Senior Judge

I. Introduction

Pending before the court are cross-motions for partial summary judgment filed

pursuant to Rule 56 of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”)

by the plaintiffs in Loveridge v. United States (“Loveridge plaintiffs”), the plaintiffs in

Albright v. United States (“Albright plaintiffs”), and the United States (“the

government”).1

The Loveridge plaintiffs and the Albright plaintiffs claim in their motions that the

government affected a taking of their reversionary interests in land within a dormant rail

corridor when the government approved the conversion of an approximately eighty-one

mile long portion of a dormant railroad line between Tillamook County and Washington

County, Oregon to create a recreational trail pursuant to the National Trail System Act

Amendments of 1983, 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (“Trails Act”). The plaintiffs contend in their

motions that the deeds from their predecessors-in-interest granted only easements to the

railroad which terminated when the railroad became dormant. If the deeds granted

easements, plaintiffs argue that after the rail line became dormant the property within the

corridor reverted back to plaintiffs and that conversion of the rail corridor gave rise to a

taking of their reversionary interests in the rail corridor.

1 Loveridge v. United States and Albright v. United States both involve the same rail corridor in Oregon and overlapping deeds but the cases involve different plaintiffs and there is different counsel in each case. For these reasons, the cases have not been consolidated. Nonetheless, because the cases concern the same segment of railroad line and involve many of the same deeds the court is issuing a single opinion. 2

The government argues that the deeds at issue should be read to have conveyed the

property within the rail corridor to the railroads in fee simple absolute. If the railroads

received a fee interest in the corridor, the plaintiffs have no revisionary interest subject to

a taking. In the alternative, the government contends that any easements granted to the

railroad were broad enough to encompass trail use. In this opinion the court will only

address whether the deeds in dispute conveyed an easement, as plaintiffs contend, or a

fee, as the government contends.

II. The Rails to Trails Act

The statutory and legal backdrop to Rails-to-Trails cases was recently summarized

by the Federal Circuit in Chicago Coating Co., LLC v. United States, 892 F.3d 1164,

1165-68 (Fed. Cir. 2018). As the Federal Circuit explains, under the Trails Act, the

United States Surface Transportation Board (“STB”) has issued regulations regarding the

abandonment and discontinuance of service over railroad lines. See 49 C.F.R. §§

1152.1–1152.60. A railroad, to abandon or discontinue service over a rail line, must file

an application for abandonment or discontinuance with the STB under 49 U.S.C. § 10903

or a notice of exemption under 49 U.S.C. § 10502 and 49 C.F.R. § 1152.50. Under either

procedure, the STB will not approve the abandonment of the railroad line under either

procedure if a “qualified trail provider” (“a state, political subdivision, or qualified

private organization”) submits to the STB a request to use the rail corridor for interim

trail use and railbanking under 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (“section 1247(d)”). See 49 U.S.C. §

1152.29. If the qualified trail provider submits a statement of willingness to assume

financial and legal responsibility to the STB and the railroad carrier, the STB will, in

situations involving an operating railroad, issue a Certificate of Interim Trail Use or

Abandonment (“CITU”), which preserves the STB’s jurisdiction over the railroad

corridor while the parties negotiate an interim trail use agreement. 49 U.S.C. §

1152.29(c). In situations involving the exemption procedure, the STB will issue a Notice

of Interim Trail Use (“NITU”), which also preserves the STB’s jurisdiction over the

railroad corridor, allows the railroad to discontinue its operations, permits the railroad to

remove equipment and railroad track, and provides the railroad and the qualified trail

provider 180 days to negotiate an interim trail use agreement. 49 U.S.C. § 1152.29(d).

During this time, the railroad will also negotiate an agreement for the transfer of the rail

corridor to the trail operator. If an agreement is reached, the CITU or NITU

automatically authorizes the interim trail use. If the STB takes no further action, the trail

sponsor may then assume management of the former railroad corridor, subject only to the

right of a railroad to reassert control of the property for the restoration of rail service. If,

on the other hand, an agreement is not reached, the railroad will be allowed to abandon

the railroad line, at which time the STB’s jurisdiction over the railroad corridor

terminates. Section 1247(d) provides that interim trail use “shall not be treated, for

purposes of any law or rule of law, as an abandonment of the use of such rights-of-way

for railroad purposes.” 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). Thus, the property remains within the

national rail system and available for reactivation of rail service for the duration of the

interim trail use. Chicago Coating, at 1167. The Federal Circuit has explained that

section 1247(d) of the Trails Act “prevents the operation of state laws that would

otherwise come into effect upon abandonment—property laws that would ‘result in

extinguishment of easements for railroad purposes and reversion of rights of way to

abutting landowners.’” Caldwell v.

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