Lovelady v. Otis Bantum Correctional Facility

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 29, 2025
Docket1:24-cv-09646
StatusUnknown

This text of Lovelady v. Otis Bantum Correctional Facility (Lovelady v. Otis Bantum Correctional Facility) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lovelady v. Otis Bantum Correctional Facility, (S.D.N.Y. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JUAN LOVELADY, Plaintiff, -against- 24-CV-9646 (LTS) OTIS BANTUM CORRECTIONAL ORDER TO AMEND CENTER; THE CITY OF NEW YORK; MAYOR ERIC ADAMS; COMMISSIONER LYNELL MAGINLEY-LIDDIE, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff Juan Lovelady, who currently is detained at the Otis Bantum Correctional Center (“OBCC”), brings this action, pro se, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights during his detention at the OBCC. By order dated January 28, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In

reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff initially filed this action with 62 other OBCC detainees. By order dated December 12, 2024, the Court directed the Clerk of Court (1) to sever the claims brought by each individual plaintiff whose name appeared in the complaint and (2) to open a new civil action for each individual plaintiff. The complaint contains several sets of allegations. Each set of allegations is handwritten by a different individual. The facts do not describe Plaintiff’s individual experience at OBCC or how any particular defendant violated his rights. Rather, the facts are written from the

perspective of all the individuals who signed the complaint. These facts concern several different incidents occurring at OBCC involving the alleged denial of medical care, general complaints about the conditions at OBCC, and specific allegations regarding alleged retaliation for complaints lodged about these conditions. The complaint does not specify, however, that Plaintiff suffered the denial of medical care or lodged complaints about his conditions. Named as Defendants are the City of New York, the OBCC, Mayor Eric Adams, and Commissioner Lynelle Maginley-Liddie. Individual correction officers are mentioned throughout the complaint but are not named as defendants. DISCUSSION A. Otis Bantum Correctional Center Plaintiff’s claims against OBCC must be dismissed because it is not an entity that can be

sued under the New York City Charter. This defendant is a jail operated by the New York City Department of Correction (“DOC”), and DOC is an agency of the City of New York that cannot be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F. Supp. 2d 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”). The Court therefore dismisses OBCC as a defendant in this action for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Plaintiff names as a defendant the City of New York, and any claims he intended to bring against OBCC may be asserted against the City of New York.2 B. Mayor Eric Adams and Commissioner Lynelle Maginley-Liddie

Official Capacity Claims Plaintiff names as defendants Mayor Adams Commissioner Maginley-Liddie. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to assert these claims against these defendants in their official capacity, the Court construes these claims as claims against the City of New York, a named defendant in this action. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (“As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity [of which the officer is an agent].”). The Court dismisses the official capacity claims against these defendants. The claims against them will proceed against the City of New York. Personal Capacity Claims To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing the defendants’

direct and personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Spavone v. N.Y.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Kentucky v. Graham
473 U.S. 159 (Supreme Court, 1985)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Emerson v. City of New York
740 F. Supp. 2d 385 (S.D. New York, 2010)
Cuoco v. Moritsugu
222 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Jenkins v. City of New York
478 F.3d 76 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Jones v. Town of East Haven
691 F.3d 72 (First Circuit, 2012)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Lovelady v. Otis Bantum Correctional Facility, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lovelady-v-otis-bantum-correctional-facility-nysd-2025.