Lovelady v. Otis Bantum Correctional Facility

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided December 12, 2024·No. 1:24-cv-09646·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK BRANDON L. GRIFFITH, et al., Plaintiffs, 24-CV-8318 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO SEVER AND OPEN NEW CIVIL ACTIONS OTIS BANTUM CORRECTIONAL CENTER, et al., Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Brandon L. Griffith (“Griffith”), who currently is detained at the Otis Bantum Correctional Facility (“OBCC”), filed this pro se complaint alleging that OBCC correctional staff are violating his and 62 other OBCC detainees’ constitutional rights. The complaint lists the names of 62 other OBCC detainees, all of whom also signed the complaint. Griffith identifies himself as the “lead plaintiff.” Only Griffith submitted a request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees, and a prisoner authorization. For the reasons set forth below, the Court directs the Clerk of Court to (1) sever the claims, under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, brought by each plaintiff whose name appears in the complaint; and (2) open a new civil action for each plaintiff other than Griffith, who will now be the sole plaintiff in this case. DISCUSSION Under Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, multiple plaintiffs may join in one action if (1) they assert any right to relief arising out of the same occurrence or series of occurrences, and (2) if any question of law or fact in common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action. See, e.g., Kalie v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12-CV-9192 (PAE), 2013 WL 4044951, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2013) (courts “look to the logical relationship between the claims and determine ‘whether the essential facts of the various claims are so logically connected that considerations of judicial economy and fairness dictate that all the issues be resolved in one lawsuit’” (quoting United States v. Aquavella, 615 F.2d 12, 22 (2d Cir. 1979))). Under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts have the authority to sever

claims, even without a finding that joinder of such claims was improper. Generally, if joinder “will not foster the objectives of the rule, but will result in prejudice, expense or delay,” Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 1652 (3d ed.) (citations omitted), a court may sever a claim, see Wyndham Assoc. v. Bintliff, 398 F.2d 614, 618 (2d Cir. 1968) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 “authorizes the severance of any claim, even without a finding of improper joinder, where there are sufficient other reasons for ordering a severance”); Ghaly v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 228 F. Supp. 2d 283, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that “district courts have broad discretion to decide whether joinder is appropriate, even when the requirements of Rule 20(a) have been met”) (citation omitted). In determining whether to order severance of claims, courts consider the requirements of Rule 20 and additional factors, “including (1) whether severance will serve judicial economy;

(2) whether prejudice to the parties would be caused by severance; and (3) whether the claims involve different witnesses and evidence.” Kehr v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 596 F. Supp. 2d 821, 826 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (considering motion to sever under Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 and 21); see also Laureano v. Goord, No. 06-CV-7845 (SHS) (RLE), 2007 WL 2826649, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2007) (noting that when considering severance, “courts should be guided by ‘considerations of convenience, avoidance of prejudice to the parties, and efficiency’” (quoting Hecht v. City of New York, 217 F.R.D. 148, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)). The Court finds that, in the interests of judicial economy, the claims brought by plaintiffs should be severed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 because the practical realities of managing this pro se multi-prisoner litigation militate against adjudicating the plaintiffs’ claims in one action. First, as pro se litigants, plaintiffs may appear only on their own behalf; none may appear

as an attorney for the others. See United States v. Flaherty, 540 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[A]n individual who is not licensed as an attorney ‘may not appear on another person’s behalf in the other’s cause’”) (citations omitted); Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 558 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[B]ecause pro se means to appear for one’s self, a person may not appear on another person’s behalf in the other’s cause”). Although Griffith describes himself as the “lead plaintiff,” he cannot represent the interests of the 62 other plaintiffs. Second, Rule 11(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every pleading, written motion, or other paper be signed by every party personally who is unrepresented. During this action, each plaintiff will be required to sign any motion or notice filed. But because of the transitory nature of a pretrial detention facility such as Rikers Island, where one or more of the

plaintiffs could be released or transferred at any time, at least some of the plaintiffs likely will be unable to sign future documents. Finally, because of security concerns related to correspondence and face-to-face communications between detained individuals, plaintiffs will have at best only a very limited opportunity to discuss case strategy, share discovery, or even provide each other with copies of the motions and notices that they file with the court. These circumstances will result in piecemeal submissions, delays, and missed deadlines. See Perkins v. City of New York, No. 14-CV-3779 (WHP), 2014 WL 5369428, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2014) (finding that multi-prisoner case should be severed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 into individual actions based on unwieldy complaint, security considerations, and plaintiffs’ likely inability to jointly litigate the case because they were housed in different facilities or given limited opportunities to associate). For these reasons, the Court concludes that allowing this case to proceed as a multi- plaintiff case would not be fair to the plaintiffs and would not achieve judicial economy.

Allowing each plaintiff to proceed separately will facilitate the fair and efficient disposition of the litigation. The Court therefore severs this action into individual cases. Brandon Griffith will proceed as the sole plaintiff in this action. The other 62 plaintiffs, listed below, will each be assigned a new case number. A copy of the complaint (ECF No. 1) and this order will be docketed in each new case.

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Lovelady v. Otis Bantum Correctional Facility, (S.D.N.Y. 2024).

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