Lovedeep A. v. Orestes Cruz, Field Office Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and Tonya Andrews, Warden, Golden State Annex ICE Processing Center

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: March 26, 2026
• Docket: 1:26-cv-01070
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 LOVEDEEP A.,1 No. 1:26-cv-01070-JLT-FJS (HC) 10 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT PETITION AND DIRECT 11 v. RESPONDENTS TO PROVIDE PETITIONER WITH A BOND HEARING 12 ORESTES CRUZ, Field Office Director, [Doc. 1] 13 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and TONYA ANDREWS, [10-DAY OBJECTION DEADLINE] 14 Warden, Golden State Annex ICE Processing Center, 15 Respondents. 16

17 18 Petitioner Lovedeep A. is a citizen of India pursuing a petition for writ of habeas corpus 19 under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He filed the instant petition on February 6, 2026. (Doc. 1.) He is 20 challenging his current detention and claims he is entitled to a bond hearing. Respondents filed a 21 response to the petition on March 7, 2026. (Doc. 7.) On March 23, 2026, Petitioner filed a 22 traverse. (Doc. 10.) 23 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 24 Petitioner is a native and citizen of India who entered the United States without inspection 25 1 As recommended by the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial 26 Conference of the United States, the Court omits petitioner’s full name, using only his first name and last initial, to protect sensitive personal information. See Memorandum re: Privacy Concern Regarding Social 27 Security and Immigration Opinions, Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, Judicial Conference of the United States (May 1, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/18-cv-l- 28 suggestion_cacm_0.pdf. 1 in November 2021. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 2.) He was determined to be inadmissible and served with a 2 notice and order of expedited removal (“Form I-860”) placing him in expedited removal 3 proceedings pursuant to Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 235(b)(1)(A)(iii). (Doc. 1 at 4 ¶ 14; 7-1 at 3; 7-2.) Petitioner expressed a fear of persecution if returned to India. Arora v. U.S. 5 Dept. Homeland Security, 2025 WL 3641586, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2026).2 Normally, when 6 an alien expresses a fear of persecution, an asylum officer conducts a credible fear interview 7 (“CFI”) and makes a determination. In this case, it appears that no such CFI was conducted, and 8 no order of expedited removal was issued. 9 On December 2, 2021, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) released 10 Petitioner, without a CFI having been conducted. (Doc. 1 at 2.) The parties disagree on the 11 specific statute under which Petitioner was released. Petitioner alleges he was released pursuant 12 to § 1226(a), because the Form I-220A Order of Release on Recognizance (“OREC”) explicitly 13 states that Petitioner was released “[i]n accordance with section 236 of the Immigration and 14 Nationality Act and the applicable provisions of Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations.” 15 (Doc. 1-2 at 2.) Respondents contend the OREC was issued in error, because the only statutory 16 mechanism for release available was release on parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). 17 (Doc. 7 at 2.) 18 In January 2022, Petitioner filed an asylum application. Arora, 2025 WL 3641586, at * 1. 19 In September 2022, Petitioner obtained work authorization. Id. Over the next few years, Petitioner 20 worked as a cashier and attended all required immigration check-in meetings. Id. 21 In June 2025, Respondents dismissed Petitioner’s asylum application on the basis that he 22 was subject to expedited removal based on the Form I-860 issued in November 2021 when he 23 first entered the country. Id. About one and one-half months later, apparently realizing a CFI had 24 never been conducted, Respondents scheduled Petitioner for a CFI. Id. The CFI was thereafter 25 2 Prior to the instant case, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the Northern District of California seeking to 26 enjoin Respondents from conducting a credible fear interview (“CFI”), removing petitioner pursuant to any order of expedited removal, taking any adverse action against Petitioner for failure to appear for a CFI, 27 detaining him solely pursuant to an expedited removal order, and declining to adjudicate his asylum application on the merits. The court denied Petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order after 28 concluding it lacked jurisdiction over the claims. Arora, 2025 WL 3641586, at *1-2. 1 continued to October 15. Id. 2 On August 20, 2025, Petitioner commenced the lawsuit in the Northern District of 3 California. Id. After the lawsuit was initiated, on October 17, 2025, Petitioner appeared for a 4 routine ICE check-in and was detained. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 3.) 5 On January 2, 2026, a CFI was conducted at which an asylum officer determined 6 Petitioner had a credible fear of persecution. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 3.) ICE then vacated the expedited 7 removal order and placed Petitioner in removal proceedings under INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. §1229a. 8 (Id.) 9 I. JURISDICTION 10 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every 11 individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) 12 (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). A district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus when the 13 Petitioner “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 14 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “[D]istrict courts retain jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider 15 habeas challenges to immigration detention that are sufficiently independent of the merits of [a] 16 removal order.” Lopez-Marroquin v. Barr, 955 F.3d 759, 759 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Singh v. 17 Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1211–12 (9th Cir. 2011)). 18 III. DISCUSSION 19 Civil immigration detention is typically justified only when a noncitizen presents a risk of 20 flight or danger to the community. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001); Padilla v. 21 ICE, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023). Petitioner contends that Respondents have 22 wrongly subjected him to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). (Doc. 1 at 8-9.) 23 He contends that he is subject to § 1226(a) and therefore entitled to a bond hearing. (Doc. 1 at 8- 24 10.) 25 Respondents contend that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b). 26 Respondents argue that Petitioner was still subject to § 1225(b) when detained, because a CFI had 27 not been conducted and the process was not completed until 2025, when Petitioner was re- 28 detained. Respondents claim the paperwork reflecting Petitioner’s release under § 1226(a) was in 1 error, and that the Government was not authorized to release Petitioner under § 1226(a). (Doc. 7 2 at 5.) Rather, Respondents argue Petitioner was subject to § 1225 for the entire time Petitioner has 3 been present in the United States, because he never ceased to be an “applicant for admission.” 4 (Doc. 7 at 5-6.) Respondents contend that “Petitioner’s unchanged status as an ‘applicant for 5 admission’ is the sole reason he remains subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 6 1225(b),” and “that decision is not reviewable on habeas.” (Doc. 7 at 5-6.) 7 A. Statutory Background 8 A non-citizen who is present in the United States but has not been admitted is considered 9 an applicant for admission. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(a)(1). Such applicant is subject to expedited 10 removal if the applicant (1) is inadmissible because he or she lacks a valid entry document; (2) 11 has not “been physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period 12 immediately prior to the date of the determination of inadmissibility”; and (3) is among those 13 whom the Secretary of Homeland Security has designated for expedited removal. 8 U.S.C. 14 §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii)(I)–(II). Once “an immigration officer determines” that a designated 15 applicant “is inadmissible,” “the officer [must] order the alien removed from the United States 16 without further hearing or review.” 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). Here, Petitioner was 17 determined inadmissible and placed in expedited removal proceedings. 18 If an applicant “indicates either an intention to apply for asylum” or “a fear of 19 persecution,” the immigration officer “shall refer the alien for an interview by an asylum officer.” 20 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). The point of this screening interview is to determine whether 21 the applicant has a “credible fear of persecution.” § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v). If the asylum officer finds 22 an applicant's asserted fear to be credible, the applicant will receive “full consideration” of his 23 asylum claim in a standard removal hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(f); see 8 U.S.C. 24 § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). If the asylum officer finds that the applicant does not have a credible fear, a 25 supervisor will review the asylum officer's determination. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(e)(8). If the 26 supervisor agrees with it, the applicant may appeal to an immigration judge, who can take further 27 evidence and “shall make a de novo determination.” 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1003.42(c), (d)(1); see 8 28 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III). In this case, Petitioner was not provided a CFI interview prior to 1 his release. It was only after the Government later discovered that no such hearing had been 2 provided that it resumed the process. 3 Regardless of whether the applicant receives full or expedited review, he or she is not 4 entitled to immediate release. Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 111 5 (2020). They “shall be detained pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and, 6 if found not to have such a fear, until removed.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV)). 7 Likewise, applicants who are found to have a credible fear may also be detained pending further 8 consideration of their asylum applications. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii)). In either 9 case, the applicant must be detained until the conclusion of those proceedings. Jennings v. 10 Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 297 (2018). But an applicant “may be temporarily released on parole 11 ‘for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.’” Id. at 288 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 12 1182(d)(5)(A) and citing 8 C.F.R §§ 212.5(b), 235.3 (2017)). Said parole request is considered 13 by designated ICE Enforcement Removal Operations (“ERO”) officers. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(a). 14 “Such parole, however, ‘shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien.’” Jennings, 583 U.S. 15 at 288 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). 16 In this case, Petitioner was not detained pending a final determination of credible fear. 17 Rather, he was released. Respondents are correct that release could only be accomplished under 18 § 1182(d)(5)(A) in this case, because a final determination of credible fear had not yet been made. 19 Nevertheless, Petitioner was in fact released, “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant 20 public benefit.” Id. “Release [therefore] reflects a determination by the government that the 21 noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.” Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 22 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff'd sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v. Sessions, 905 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 23 2018). 24 B. Petitioner Possesses a Protected Liberty Interest 25 A protected liberty interest may arise from a conditional release from physical restraint. 26 Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143, 147–49 (1997). Even when a statute allows the government to 27 arrest and detain an individual, a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause may 28 entitle the individual to procedural protections not found in the statute. See id. (Due Process 1 requires hearing before revocation of pre-parole); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) 2 (same, in probation context); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (same, in parole 3 context). To determine whether a specific conditional release rises to the level of a protected 4 liberty interest, “[c]ourts have resolved the issue by comparing the specific conditional release in 5 the case before them with the liberty interest in parole as characterized by Morrissey.” Gonzalez- 6 Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864, 887 (1st Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation 7 omitted). 8 In Morrissey, the Supreme Court explained that parole “enables [the parolee] to do a wide 9 range of things open to persons” who have never been in custody or convicted of any crime, 10 including to live at home, work, and “be with family and friends and to form the other enduring 11 attachments of normal life.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. “Though the [government] properly 12 subjects [the parolee] to many restrictions not applicable to other citizens,” such as monitoring 13 and seeking authorization to work and travel, his “condition is very different from that of 14 confinement in a prison.” Id. “The parolee has relied on at least an implicit promise that parole 15 will be revoked only if he fails to live up to the parole conditions.” Id. The revocation of parole 16 undoubtedly “inflicts a grievous loss on the parolee.” Id. (quotations omitted). Therefore, a 17 parolee possesses a protected interest in his “continued liberty.” Id. at 481–84. 18 Petitioner's humanitarian parole was similar. For several years, it allowed him to establish 19 ties in the community, work pursuant to a valid work authorization, and pursue relief in his 20 removal proceedings. These actions were made possible by petitioner's freedom, which is “the 21 most elemental of liberty interests[.]” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004). 22 Respondents argue that they nonetheless had authority to re-detain petitioner under § 1225(b). In 23 Ramirez Tesara v. Wamsley, the District Court for the Western District of Washington rejected a 24 similar argument: the court found that the government's “argument does not explain why 25 [immigration authorities] found Petitioner to be eligible for parole [when they released him a year 26 earlier], but not the following year even after he had established deep ties to the community ... 27 and timely filed an asylum application.” Ramirez Tesara v. Wamsley, No. 2:25-CV-01723-MJP- 28 TLF, 2025 WL 2637663, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 12, 2025). While immigration officials may 1 have had discretion over the initial decision to detain or release petitioner, their decision to 2 release an individual from custody created “an implicit promise” upon which an individual may 3 rely: that his liberty “will be revoked only if [he] fails to live up to the ... conditions [of release].” 4 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. As other courts have found in similar circumstances, “even when ICE 5 has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending removal proceedings, after that 6 individual is released from custody she has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of 7 custody.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025). “[T]he government's 8 discretion to incarcerate non-citizens is always constrained by the requirements of due process.” 9 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2017). 10 The Court finds that Petitioner has a protected liberty interest in his release under 11 § 1182(d)(5)(A). See Guillermo M. R. v. Kaiser, 791 F. Supp. 3d 1021, 1029 (N.D. Cal. 2025) 12 (recognizing that “the liberty interest that arises upon release [from immigration detention] is 13 inherent in the Due Process Clause”); Ortega v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-05259-JST, 2025 WL 14 1771438, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2025) (collecting cases finding that noncitizens who have 15 been released have a strong liberty interest). The Court must therefore determine what process is 16 due before the government may terminate his liberty. 17 C. Matthews Factors 18 Due process “is a flexible concept that varies with the particular situation.” Zinermon v. 19 Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990). The procedural protections required here may be evaluated 20 using the Mathews v. Eldridge factors:

21 First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable 22 value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 23 burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 24 Id. (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)); see Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 25 F.3d 976, 993 (9th Cir. 2017) (applying Mathews factors in immigration detention context). 26 Turning to the first factor, Petitioner has a significant private interest in remaining free 27 from detention. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other 28 forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” 1 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Petitioner had been out of custody for several years 2 in reliance on the government's previous representations that he was being released pending his 3 removal proceedings. His detention denies him that freedom. 4 Second, “the risk of an erroneous deprivation [of liberty] is high” when, as here, “[the 5 petitioner] has not received any bond or custody redetermination hearing.” A.E. v. Andrews, No. 6 1:25-cv-00107-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 1424382, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025). Civil immigration 7 detention, which is “nonpunitive in purpose and effect[,]” is justified when a noncitizen presents a 8 risk of flight or danger to the community. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; Padilla, 704 F. Supp. 9 3d at 1172. As there were no procedural safeguards to determine if Petitioner's re-detention was 10 justified, “the probable value of additional procedural safeguards, i.e., a bond hearing, is high.” 11 A.E., 2025 WL 1424382, at *5. 12 Third, although the government has a strong interest in enforcing the immigration laws, 13 the government's interest in detaining petitioner without a hearing is “low.” Ortega v. Bonnar, 14 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Doe v. Becerra, No. 2:25-cv-00647-DJC-DMC, 2025 15 WL 691664, at *6 (E.D. Cal. March 3, 2025). In immigration court, custody hearings are routine 16 and impose a “minimal” cost. Doe, 2025 WL 691664, at *6. “If the government wishes to re- 17 arrest [petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps toward doing so; but its interest in 18 doing so without a hearing is low.” Ortega, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 970. 19 On balance, the Mathews factors show that petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing. 20 D. Burden of Proof 21 The Court agrees with the decisions of other courts in this circuit finding that, in this 22 context, the burden is more appropriately placed on the government. See Banda v. McAleenan, 23 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1107 (W.D. Wash. 2019); Abdul-Samed v. Warden of Golden State Annex 24 Det. Facility, No. 1:25-CV-00098-SAB-HC, 2025 WL 2099343, at *8 (E.D. Cal. July 25, 2025); 25 Maliwat v. Scott, No. 2:25-CV-00788-TMC, 2025 WL 2256711, at *10 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 7, 26 2025). 27 E. Pre- vs. Post-Deprivation Hearing 28 The Court concludes that a pre-deprivation hearing is necessary to satisfy due process. 1 “‘[T]he root requirement’ of the Due Process Clause” is “‘that an individual be given an 2 opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant protected interest.’” Cleveland 3 Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 4 371, 379 (1971)); see Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 127 (“Applying [the Mathews] test, the Court 5 usually has held that the Constitution requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives a 6 person of liberty ....”). 7 Courts typically require evidence of urgent concerns or an especially strong government 8 interest to justify a post-deprivation hearing. See Guillermo M. R., 2025 WL 1983677, at *9; 9 United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53, 59–61 (1993) (“We tolerate 10 some exceptions to the general rule requiring predeprivation notice and hearing, but only in 11 extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies 12 postponing the hearing until after the event[,]” such as “executive urgency.” (internal quotations 13 omitted)). Here, it does not appear that there were any exigent circumstances warranting 14 Petitioner’s immediate arrest as a flight risk or danger to the public without any pre-deprivation 15 process. Petitioner states he attended all required check-ins, and in fact, he was detained after 16 duly reporting to the latest check-in. The Court concludes that a pre-deprivation hearing is 17 necessary to satisfy due process. 18 IV. RECOMMENDATION 19 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the petition for writ of habeas 20 corpus be GRANTED, and Respondents be DIRECTED to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing 21 before an Immigration Judge. 22 This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Court Judge 23 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the 24 Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 25 ten (10) days after being served with a copy of this Findings and Recommendation, a party may 26 file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Id. The document should be 27 captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation” and shall not 28 exceed fifteen (15) pages, except by leave of court with good cause shown. The Court will not 1 | consider exhibits attached to the Objections. To the extent a party wishes to refer to any 2 || exhibit(s), the party should reference the exhibit in the record by its CM/ECF document and page 3 || number, when possible, or otherwise reference the exhibit with specificity. Any pages filed in 4 || excess of the fifteen (15) page limitation may be disregarded by the District Judge when 5 || reviewing these Findings and Recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The 6 || parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver 7 || of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014). This 8 || recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of 9 || Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 10 | should not be filed until entry of the District Court's judgment. 1] D IT IS SO ORDERED. Le Zz 13 Dated: _March 26, 2026 __ — AGE FRANK J. SINGER 14 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10