Love v. State
This text of 75 So. 189 (Love v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Alabama Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
We note that the statute has been materially changed since the decision in Underwood v. State, 25 Ala. 70, and the utterances in that case are of little or no assistance in determining the questions presented in this case. Code 1852, § 3108.
The indictment here charges that the defendant and others, “whipped or-beat John Davis upon an accusation that he had insulted his daughter, Dell Carroll, née Dell Davis, by writing her a note,” stating the contents of the alleged insulting note, to force said Davis to confess himself guilty of writing said insulting note, etc.
The state’s witness Davis, on his examination in chief, gave testimony tending to show that the defendant and others whipped and abused him, and at the time charged him with writing the alleged note, and when he denied writing the note they whipped him again. On cross-examination he testified without objection that he wrote a note and gave it to his daughter, but denied that he wrote the alleged insulting note.
The defendant, as a part of his defense, offered to show -that Davis wrote the alleged insulting note, and the rejection of this evidence presents the vital question presented on this appeal.
As we have shown, the intent attending the assault and battery, like an assault with intent to murder, is one of the elements that distinguishes the statutory offense from an ordinary assault and battery. That intent must be found by the jury, and may be inferred from the facts and circumstances attending the assault “and the presence or absence of excusing or palliating facts or circumstances.” Brown v. State, 142 Ala. 287, 38 South. 268; Jackson v. State, 94 Ala. 89, 10 South. 509; Meredith v. State, 60 Ala. 441; Wigmore’s Evidence, § 300.
Under section 3108 of the Code of 1852, if the abuse was' inflicted as a punishment for an alleged offense, the offense denounced by the statute was complete. Not so with ‘the present statute; the/assault and battery must be inflicted- with the intent to make the person abused confess his guilt of an offense, or make a disclosure, or consent to leave the neighborhood, county, or state.
If, therefore, the abuse was inflicted on the state’s witness-to avenge the-alleged insult, and not to make him confess, or make a disclosure, or consent to leave the neighborhood, county, or state, while the defendant would be guilty of an aggravated: assault and battery, he would not be. guilty of the statutory offense denounced -as -lynching by section 7388, Code 1907. - - !
While the excluded evidenoa is offered on a theory inconsistent with the defendant’s alibi, it is not inconsistent with the theory of the state, and has some tendency to rebut the state’s testimony tending to prove one of the essential elements of the statutory offense.
Reversed and remanded.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
75 So. 189, 16 Ala. App. 44, 1917 Ala. App. LEXIS 114, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/love-v-state-alactapp-1917.