Love v. People

32 L.R.A. 139, 43 N.E. 710, 160 Ill. 501, 1896 Ill. LEXIS 1535
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 28, 1896
StatusPublished
Cited by42 cases

This text of 32 L.R.A. 139 (Love v. People) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Love v. People, 32 L.R.A. 139, 43 N.E. 710, 160 Ill. 501, 1896 Ill. LEXIS 1535 (Ill. 1896).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Phillips

delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff in error was convicted of burglary under an indictment charging Mulligan O’Brien, Weeden Love, William Shoof, A1 Robinson and Aaron Perkins with burglariously breaking and entering the office building of Arthur L. Hoag on the 20th day of January, 1895. On the morning of the day on which the trial of this plaintiff in error was commenced, the State’s attorney nol pros’d as to the defendant William Shoof. On motion of Aaron Perkins he was granted a separate trial 'and the . cause was continued as to him. Plaintiff in error and O’Brien were tried and the latter found not guilty. The punishment of Love was fixed at imprisonment in the penitentiary for the term of one year. Robinson was not arrested.

William Shoof was called as witness for the State, and his competency as a witness was denied .by the defendant. The evidence of an accomplice is, in general, admissible against a prisoner on trial. (Gray v. People, 26 Ill. 344; Earll v. People, 73 id. 329; Friedberg v. People, 102 id. 160.) The State’s attorney had a right to nolle the indictment as to one of the persons indicted and call him as a witness for the State. He is a competent witness, and his credibility is to be determined by the jury. The error assigned on this question cannot be sustained, and for the same reason the error assigned for permitting the wife of William Shoof to testify is not well taken.

The indictment contained three counts, in each of which the offense of burglary is charged, and in each count the indictment then proceeds to charge the defendants with then and there being in said office building, and “did steal, take and carry away,” etc. Such an in-

dictment charges both burglary and larceny, and these offenses may be found in the same count. (1 Hale’s Pleas of the Crown, 556; 1 Russell on Crimes, 827; 2 Arch-bold’s Crim. PI. & Pr. 329-331.) Where a defendant is found guilty generally, and a punishment imposed which is by law authorized to be inflicted for either offense charged in such a count, the verdict must be sustained. (Crowley v. Commonwealth, 11 Metc. 575; Cook v. State, 4 Zabr. 846; Manly v. State, 7 Ind. 148; Froleck v. State, 11 id. 213; State v. Hooker, 17 Vt. 658.) The effect of this general verdict is, logically, the jury found the defendant guilty of burglary. They did not find the value of the property stolen, wdiich would not have been necessary in a conviction for burglary but which was necessary in a conviction for larceny. The verdict finding the defendant, Love, guilty generally, and fixing his punishment, was, therefore, a conviction for burglary, and not obnoxious to the error assigned that it failed to specify the offense for which he was convicted. (Lyons v. People, 68 Ill. 271.) Had the conviction been for larceny it would then have been necessary to find the value of the property stolen, and had the court been asked to instruct the jury that they were warranted in finding the defendant guilty of larceny if the evidence authorized it, it would doubtless have done so. Ruth v. People, 99 Ill. 185.

Without undertaking a consideration of the instructions to which exceptions are taken, we will enter into a discussion of the facts of this case, which we deem the question of paramount importance and on which the decision must depend. In the latter part of 1894 and early part of 1895 much complaint had been made in the city of Momence of existing lawlessness. Robberies and burglaries had occurred until complaints reached the members of the city council, whereupon a consultation of certain members was held, which resulted in the employment of a detective agency in the city of Chicago, from which a detective was sent to investigate, report, and seek to arrest the offenders. Within two weeks prior to the commission of this act, that detective, who went by the name of Robinson, visited the city of Momence. He seemed to be well supplied with money, which he used lavishly and ignobly. The uncontradicted evidence shows he made the acquaintance of this plaintiff in error, who was impecunious, and with .bad habits as to the use of intoxicating liquors and haunting saloons and billiard rooms. Through this acquaintance with Love, he, at his own request, was introduced to O’Brien, Perkins and Shoof by Love. These were all young men without much money, and similar in their habits to this plaintiff in error, frequenting the same resorts. After becoming thus acquainted, this detective, by the liberal and extravagant use of money in treating to whisky, beer and cigars, caused these young men to follow after him, seek his association, answer his requests and comply with his wishes. Plausible, self-contained and strong, he was calculated to work on their weaker natures. Well-dressed and affable, he pleased them, and an apparent liberality with money,■—even giving one, or two dollars at a time to these young men on different occasions,-—made him an object of admiration, and he easily led and influenced them. He endeavored to excite a desire for crime by intimating his means were thus acquired. He suggested and proposed they should engage in the commission of burglaries, robberies, etc., and sought to induce them to engage with him in such acts. Day after day and night after night his efforts were not directed to the arrest of criminals, but his mental powers and robust health, with the use of money, were directed towards an effort to make criminals of these young men. With plenty to drink and smoke and eat at his expense, he sought to undermine and dazzle their mental and moral strength and lead them into the commission of crime. Ambitious, doubtless, to succeed in his chosen pursuit, with him the conviction of those theretofore guilty was less an object than that he might fasten on some one the commission of a crime. If he could make the criminal and induce the commission of the crime and cause the arrest of the actor, or throw around him a web of circumstances that would lead to conviction, it would redound to the glory of his chief and cause his advancement. With him the end justified the means, and the reputation of the agency to which he belonged and his own advancement were apparently his object. Such means and agents are more dangerous to the welfare of society than are the crimes they were intended to detect and the criminals they were to arrest. Robinson, having for several days been in close association with Love, proposed he should accompany him to Exline, and whilst there he called on Hoag, whose office was subsequently alleged to have been burglarized. Prom the testimony it is apparent that Hoag knew his office was to be entered and safe opened, and he acted in concert with the detective, and complied with his request in leaving money in the safe with the expectation of the office being burglarized and safe opened, etc. He not only expected it to be done, but he made the safe ready. He marked his money for the purpose of having it taken by a burglarious entry. In brief, he left money in the safe to be stolen, with knowledge from the detective that he, the detective, had “some fellows he was trying to catch,' and he might probably want to come there to catch them. * * * I expected the money to be stolen, and for that reason marked it. * * * I locked the safe. * i:' * I thought the detective would open it in some way. * * * I left the money believing the office was to be burglarized.

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Bluebook (online)
32 L.R.A. 139, 43 N.E. 710, 160 Ill. 501, 1896 Ill. LEXIS 1535, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/love-v-people-ill-1896.