Louviere v. Carewell Hospitality, LLC

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Louisiana
DecidedDecember 2, 2019
Docket2:18-cv-06419
StatusUnknown

This text of Louviere v. Carewell Hospitality, LLC (Louviere v. Carewell Hospitality, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Louviere v. Carewell Hospitality, LLC, (E.D. La. 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA BRETT LOUVIERE CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO: 18-6419 CAREWELL HOSPITALITY, LLC SECTION: "S" (4) ORDER AND REASONS IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by defendant Carewell Hospitality, LLC ("Carewell") (Rec. Doc. 21) is GRANTED, and this matter is DISMISSED.

BACKGROUND Plaintiff was employed by Carewell beginning on or about November 1, 2000. Carewell is the owner of property which includes a motel formerly known as Red Carpet Inn, and an RV Park known as Mardi Gras RV Park. In 2007, plaintiff notified his employer and former owner of Carewell, Chintu “Mike” Patel, that plaintiff was HIV positive. Plaintiff alleges that Patel discriminated against him by not allowing him to miss work for doctors’ appointments and that Patel terminated him on February 17, 2016 believing plaintiff had abandoned his job. On or about July 27, 2016, plaintiff filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission ("EEOC") claiming discrimination by defendant due to his HIV status. On October 11, 2016, plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC alleging defendant’s conduct violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et. seq. ("ADA"). Defendant responded to the EEOC claim asserting, among other things, that defendant was not covered under the ADA because it employed only six individuals at all relevant times. On October 23, 2017, the EEOC mailed a Notice of Rights letter to plaintiff at the address on his charge of discrimination, informing him that his case was closed because they were unable to determine whether a violation of law occurred, and stating that plaintiff had 90 days within which to file suit. However, this letter was returned to the EEOC on November 7, 2017 as undeliverable, apparently due to plaintiff having moved without notifying the EEOC. On November 7, 2017, the EEOC attempted to call plaintiff, but his phone was not in service. Chintu Patel passed away in September of 2018 and his widow, Pinku Patel, is currently the sole owner of Carewell. On July 2, 2018, plaintiff filed the instant suit alleging that Carewell

violated the ADA and the Louisiana Employment Discrimination law, La.R.S. 23:301 et seq. ("LEDL"). Carewell has now moved for summary judgment, arguing that this matter should be dismissed because it has less than 15 employees, and thus is not a covered employer under the ADA. Defendant further argues that the ADA claim is time-barred because it was filed 92 days after plaintiff’s presumed receipt of the Notice of Rights letter, and plaintiff's LEDL claim is prescribed because it was not brought within one year, or at the latest 18 months, of plaintiff’s alleged termination.1

Plaintiff opposes, arguing that material fact issues exist as to whether Carewell is actually an integrated enterprise comprised of several superficially distinct entities, namely Carewell 1 LEDL claims are subject to a one-year prescriptive period; however, that period may be suspended up to a maximum of six months during the pendency of an EECO investigation. La. R.S. 23:303(D). 2 Hospitality, LLC, Hospitality International, and Mardi Gras Motor Home Park, Inc. (d/b/a Mardi Grass RV Park), which may have the requisite number of employees. Plaintiff alternatively argues that he should be given time to conduct additional discovery on the issue of the number of employees of Carewell. Plaintiff also contends that his suit was filed within 90 days of receipt of the Notice of Rights letter, and, while he acknowledges his LEDL claims are brought beyond the prescriptive period, he contends that the claim should go forward anyway to avoid inconsistent results due to different state and federal prescriptive periods. DISCUSSION Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the “court shall grant

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Granting a motion for summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits filed in support of the motion demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). The court must find “[a] factual dispute ... [to be] ‘genuine’ if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party ... [and a] fact ... [to be] ‘material’ if it might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing substantive law.” Beck v. Somerset Techs., Inc., 882 F.2d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. 242 (1986)). If the moving party meets the initial burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence of the existence of a genuine issue 3 for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). The non-movant cannot satisfy the summary judgment burden with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). If the opposing party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party does not have to submit evidentiary documents properly to support its motion, but need only point out the absence of evidence supporting the essential elements of the opposing party’s case. Saunders v. Michelin Tire Corp., 942 F.2d 299, 301 (5th Cir. 1991). DISCUSSION The ADA prohibits discriminatory conduct by a “covered entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).

A “covered entity” is an employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee.” An “employer” is “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of the 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year…..” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A). Thus, employers with fewer than fifteen employees are specifically excluded from ADA coverage. See Flynn v. Distinctive Home Care, Inc., 812 F.3d 422, 426 (5th Cir. 2016). The employee- numerosity requirement is a substantive element of a plaintiff’s claim for relief under the ADA. See Minard v. ITC Deltacom Commc’ns, Inc., 447 F.3d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 2006).2

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Related

Little v. Liquid Air Corp.
37 F.3d 1069 (Fifth Circuit, 1994)
Minard v. ITC Deltacom Communications, Inc.
447 F.3d 352 (Fifth Circuit, 2006)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Munoz v. H & M WHOLESALE, INC.
926 F. Supp. 596 (S.D. Texas, 1996)
Rochelle Flynn v. Distinctive Home Care, Inc.
812 F.3d 422 (Fifth Circuit, 2016)
Trevino v. Celanese Corp.
701 F.2d 397 (Fifth Circuit, 1983)

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Louviere v. Carewell Hospitality, LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/louviere-v-carewell-hospitality-llc-laed-2019.