Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. United States

148 Ct. Cl. 671, 5 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 530, 1960 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 39, 1960 WL 66580
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJanuary 20, 1960
DocketNo. 65-59
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 148 Ct. Cl. 671 (Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. United States, 148 Ct. Cl. 671, 5 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 530, 1960 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 39, 1960 WL 66580 (cc 1960).

Opinion

Littleton, Judge (Bet.),

delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and engaged in the business of selling electric energy and gas at rates established or approved by the Public Service Commission of Kentucky or by the Federal Power Commission, sues for a refund of excess profits taxes and interest thereon paid for the years 1951, 1952 and 1953. The aggregate amount involved is $88,017.28.

The issue is whether in computing its excess profits tax credits under section 448 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 64 Stat. 1137, 26 U.S.C. (1952 ed.), § 448, plaintiff was entitled to include in its earned surplus account for each year all credits attributable to current profits (less debits attributable to distributions out of such profits), in accordance with the method by which its corporate books of account are maintained. Defendant maintains that under Treasury Regulations 130, section 40.448-2, as amended by T.D. 5983, 1953-1 Cum. Bull. 352, plaintiff is entitled to include only its earned surplus account at the beginning of each year, as recorded in its books of account, without reference to the average earned surplus account for the taxable year. Plaintiff admits that the regulation so provides, but argues that the regulation is inconsistent with section 448 [673]*673of the 1939 Code. We agree with plaintiff that the regulation goes beyond the statute.

Section 448 provides for an excess profits tax credit to a regulated public utility furnishing electric energy or gas in an amount which includes the utility’s other tax liabilities plus 6% of the sum of average borrowed capital and “adjusted invested capital” for the taxable year. The statute goes on to provide that for a public utility, such as plaintiff, whose books of account are kept in accordance with systems of accounts prescribed by an appropriate regulatory body1

the adjusted invested capital for [any taxable] year shall be the sum of the average outstanding common and preferred capital stock accounts and the capital surplus and earned surplus accounts for such taxable year as recorded on such corf orate hooks of account. [Emphasis supplied.]

Plaintiff’s earned surplus accounts for the taxable years in question, “as recorded on [its] corporate books of account,” included current earnings, which became earned surplus at the end of the year. It thus appears that the inclusion of these current earnings in plaintiff’s earned surplus accounts for the purpose of determining its excess profits tax credit is expressly permitted, and indeed required by the statute. The provision permitting regulated public utilities to compute adjusted invested capital according to methods used in their books of account was added by the Senate Finance Committee to the original House draft of the Excess Profits Tax Bill •of 1950 (H.R. 9827,81st Cong., 2d Sess.). The Finance Committee explained its action as follows:

Another major change from the House bill is that providing that most of the utilities may compute their equity capital and retained earnings in the manner provided by their regulating bodies rather than by the means provided for ordinary corporations using the invested capital base. Your Committee believes that it is desirable to allow corporations to compute their rate of return [674]*674in this manner since this is the basis on which their rate of return is computed for regulatory purposes by other governmental bodies and also because these corporations are more familiar with this type of computation.2

We think the legislative history supports the clear meaning of the language of the statute that plaintiff’s current earnings may be included in its earned surplus accounts for excess profits tax credit purposes since they are so included in its corporate books of account for regulatory purposes by other governmental bodies. Congress intended to provide a special excess profits tax credit treatment for regulated public utilities. We must interpret and apply the statute to give effect to the expressed intent of Congress.

Defendant further urges that the failure of the statute to repeat the word “average”, used before “outstanding common and preferred capital stock accounts,” before the words “capital surplus” or “earned surplus” indicates that the statute required the calculation of earned surplus as of the beginning of the taxable year. It is our opinion that this is not a correct inference. The omission of the word “average” merely left the statute neutral on the question, which the statute then provided should be determined by reference to the method used in the corporate books of account. Where such method did not include current earnings, the statute may not in all instances permit their inclusion; but where, as here, such method did include them, the statute requires their inclusion.3

Defendant’s principal reliance is on Treasury Regulations 130, § 40.448-2, supra, paragraph (e) (2) (i), which provides in part:

The determination of the adjusted invested capital for any taxable year shall be made without regard to the profits or loss for such taxable year computed in accordance with such [prescribed] system of accounts [675]*675and without regard to distribution out of the profits for such taxable year so computed.

The terms of this regulation naturally support the action of defendant in this case, but on the facts and circumstances in the case we must hold the regulation to be invalid since it is inconsistent with the statute which it purports to interpret. On its face, the regulation provides for a determination of adjusted invested capital “without regard to the profits or loss computed in accordance with such system of accounts,” while the statute prescribes computation “as recorded on such corporate books of account.” The regulation is thus not an explanation or clarification of the statute; it is an amendment thereof and, as such, was beyond the power of the Department of the Treasury to make. We must therefore refrain from giving effect to the regulation. Helvering v. Credit Alliance Co., 316 U.S. 107, 113; Helvering v. Reynolds, 313 U.S. 428; Russell Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 146 C. Cls. 833; Philadelphia Electric Co. v. United States, 127 C. Cls. 297, 302.

Finally, defendant attempts to argue against the wisdom of the statutory provision, as we have interpreted it. Suffice it to say that this argument is misdirected; the wisdom of taxing policies is for Congress, not this court, to determine. Nor, as a matter of fact, is it within the province of the Treasury Department to alter by regulation those Congressional provisions which it believes or finds unwise. Amendment of statutes is the business of Congress.

Section 448 permits, for the purpose of calculating plaintiff’s excess profits tax credit, the inclusion of current earnings in plaintiff’s earned surplus account, as recorded in its books of account. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to recover the amounts paid as a result of the Commissioner’s erroneous exclusion of current earnings, together with interest as provided by law on the overpayments.

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148 Ct. Cl. 671, 5 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 530, 1960 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 39, 1960 WL 66580, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/louisville-gas-electric-co-v-united-states-cc-1960.