Louis N. Kitten & Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue

319 N.W.2d 421, 1982 Minn. LEXIS 1567
CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota
DecidedMay 21, 1982
DocketNo. 81-638
StatusPublished

This text of 319 N.W.2d 421 (Louis N. Kitten & Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Louis N. Kitten & Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 319 N.W.2d 421, 1982 Minn. LEXIS 1567 (Mich. 1982).

Opinion

PETERSON, Justice.

The sole issue for decision is whether Louis N. Ritten & Company, Inc. is engaged exclusively in interstate commerce, the determination of which dictates whether relator is taxable pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 290.02 (1971), the excise tax on corporations, or Minn.Stat. § 290.03(1) (1971), the income tax on corporations.

Relator filed returns in 1972, 1973 and 1974 under the assumption that it was subject to the state excise tax on corporations, Minn.Stat. § 290.02 (1971), which is based on corporate income. A deduction for interest income from United States government obligations, granted pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 290.08, subd. 8 (1971), is denied to section 290.02 taxpayers by virtue of Minn.Stat. 290.08, subd. 13 (1971). Relator filed timely claims for refund of taxes paid on interest income for the years stated on the ground that it was engaged exclusively in interstate commerce and therefore should have filed returns pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 290.03(1) (1971), the net income tax on corporations. Under the net income tax on corporations, relator’s interest income from United States government obligations would have been deductible and its tax liability would have been reduced by $15,-958.26.

The Commissioner of Revenue disallowed relator’s claim for refund in an order dated October 2, 1979. The disallowance was affirmed by the Minnesota Tax Court after a short evidentiary hearing, and relator now appeals by writ of certiorari.

Relator was incorporated under the laws of this state in the 1920’s as a commodities futures broker. Until the 1960’s, relator’s only office was in Minneapolis; a second office is now maintained in Chicago. During the relevant tax years, relator employed six or seven individuals — brokers, corporate officers and support staff — at the Minneapolis office.

Relator’s futures trading involves the buying and selling of standardized contracts that specify a date and price at which a commodity will be delivered. The trading takes place on the floor of an exchange, a competitive marketplace governed by rules promulgated by Congress and the federal Commodity Futures Trading Commission. A customer can have an order executed on the exchange floor by one of relator’s brokers by first entering into a cash or credit transaction with relator. The credit transactions, or trades “on margin,” involve depositing a downpayment with the broker, who uses the value of the futures contract as collateral for the unpaid balance. The unpaid balance or a portion thereof is subject to call by the broker in the event the commodity on the national market falls below a specified price.

Section 290.03(1)1 imposes a net income tax on a class of taxpayers defined as [423]*423follows: “Domestic and foreign corporations not taxable under section 290.02 which own property within this state or whose business within this state during the taxable year consists exclusively of foreign commerce, interstate commerce, or both[.]” In determining whether relator falls within this class of taxpayers, we are bound by decisions of the United States Supreme Court relating to what constitutes interstate commerce. City of Waseca v. Braun, 206 Minn. 154,165, 288 N.W. 229, 234 (1939). The fact that a business activity involves interstate commerce to a degree sufficient to permit federal regulation does not, however, justify an automatic conclusion that the activity is exclusively interstate. Our inquiry does not end with the fact that commodity futures transactions are in interstate commerce according to federal law.

Relator cites several cases in which a taxpayer has been characterized as engaged exclusively in interstate commerce. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 79 S.Ct. 357, 3 L.Ed.2d 421 (1959), aff’g 250 Minn. 32, 84 N.W.2d 373 (1957); West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 27 Cal.2d 705, 166 P.2d 861, aff’d, 328 U.S. 823, 66 S.Ct. 1378, 90 L.Ed. 1603 (1946); Owens-Illinois Glass Co. v. Commissioner of Taxation, No. 196 (Minn.Bd. Tax App., September 24, 1946). In none of those cases, however, was the characterization of the taxpayer’s business activities as “exclusively interstate” actually placed in issue. More significantly, those business activities were markedly different from the activities of relator.

In each of the cited cases, the only commercial activity by the taxpayer in the taxing state was that of the sales arm of a manufacturing, shipment and sales operation headquartered in another state. Salespersons employed by each taxpayer engaged in commercial activity that had economic significance only as it related to the interstate sale and shipment of a product originating outside of the taxing state.

If relator was engaged exclusively in the business of selling grain and commodities grown outside of Minnesota to customers within Minnesota, then, perhaps, the cited eases would be apposite. However, relator sells a service separate and removed from the interstate shipment of grain. The services of brokers have, in other contexts, been recognized as a distinct and localized commercial activity. In Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 215 Minn. 207, 9 N.W.2d 721 (1943), aff’d, 322 U.S. 202, 64 S.Ct. 967, 88 L.Ed. 1227 (1944), the activities of a customhouse broker were found to be intrastate in character even though his services were entirely devoted to facilitating the movement of goods in foreign commerce.

The broker acts as an independent contractor to perform this personal service for the shipper. He does not come into contact with the commerce itself in any way insofar as its actual movement is concerned. He is at the most an aid or facility to the commerce and but remotely, if at all, affects it.

Id. at 221, 9 N.W.2d at 728.

The commodities futures broker bears a similar relationship to trade in commodities. As a representative of private persons, the broker provides access to the futures exchange, thus facilitating the flow of commodities in commerce without coming into contact with the commerce itself. This service is provided pursuant to a contractual agreement entered into when a customer walks into a broker’s office. The agreement includes a commission charged for the service provided and, if the customer is trading on margin, it also establishes a credit arrangement at an agreed upon interest rate. In view of these localized activities, we cannot characterize relator’s business within this state as consisting exclusively of interstate commerce.

[424]*424The distinction drawn in Union Brokerage between intrastate brokerage services and the commerce it facilitates is not without support. A state license tax on a cotton futures broker was held valid in Ware & Leland v. Mobile County, 209 U.S. 405, 28 S.Ct. 526, 52 L.Ed. 855 (1908). The court noted with respect to those futures transactions.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Ware & Leland v. Mobile County
209 U.S. 405 (Supreme Court, 1908)
Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier
266 U.S. 555 (Supreme Court, 1925)
Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts
268 U.S. 203 (Supreme Court, 1925)
Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen
322 U.S. 202 (Supreme Court, 1944)
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady
430 U.S. 274 (Supreme Court, 1977)
State v. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co.
84 N.W.2d 373 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1957)
Reuben L. Anderson-Cherne, Inc. v. Commissioner of Taxation
226 N.W.2d 611 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1975)
West Publishing Co. v. McColgan
166 P.2d 861 (California Supreme Court, 1946)
City of Waseca v. Braun
288 N.W. 229 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1939)
Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen
9 N.W.2d 721 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1943)
Gaines, Silvey & Nichols, Inc. v. State Board of Tax Appeals
5 A.2d 473 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1939)
West Publishing Co. v. McColgan
328 U.S. 823 (Supreme Court, 1946)
Watson v. Bowles
328 U.S. 824 (Supreme Court, 1946)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
319 N.W.2d 421, 1982 Minn. LEXIS 1567, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/louis-n-kitten-co-v-commissioner-of-revenue-minn-1982.