Lott Et Ux. v. Peoples Nat. Gas Co.

188 A. 582, 324 Pa. 517, 1936 Pa. LEXIS 553
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedOctober 8, 1936
DocketAppeals, 173, 175, 176, 177 and 178
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 188 A. 582 (Lott Et Ux. v. Peoples Nat. Gas Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lott Et Ux. v. Peoples Nat. Gas Co., 188 A. 582, 324 Pa. 517, 1936 Pa. LEXIS 553 (Pa. 1936).

Opinion

Opinion by

Me. Justice Steen,

On February 4, 1934, an explosion of gas wrecked a house at the southeast corner of Inverness and Woodmont Streets, Pittsburgh, of which plaintiffs Clarence E. Lott and his wife Eleanor B. Lott were the owners and occupants, and injured them and plaintiff Dorothy Lott, their minor daughter. Suits brought by plaintiffs to recover for property damage and personal injuries resulted in verdicts against defendant aggregating, as reduced by the court below, $48,323.22. Defendant appeals from the overruling of its motions for judgments n. o. v. and for new trials.

The house was constructed in the years 1928-29, at which time the gas service line was laid from Inverness Street in to the property. It was a steel pipe one and a half inches in diameter, and consisted of three pieces, one 14 feet and two each 21 feet long, joined together by the ends being screwed into “sleeves” or couplings. It *520 was attached rigidly at the house end and lay in a perfectly straight line, except that the section nearest the street was bent in a reverse downward and outward to conform to the slope of the terrace upon which the house was built. After the line was laid it was inspected in the open trench and tested for leaks by the contractor in the presence of representatives of defendant and was found to be in proper condition. The trench was filled up a day or two thereafter, except at the extreme street end where a few days later the service pipe was connected by defendant’s employees with the company’s four-inch main located under and along the Inverness Street sidewalk. The lawn under which the pipe lay was not excavated again from the time of its original installation until after the explosion. Meanwhile there were some suspicious manifestations of escaping gas; during the two summers prior to the explosion plaintiffs had trouble keeping the grass growing in the neighborhood of the underlying pipe; in the winter of 1932-33 there was a smell of gas in the house; this was reported to defendant which made an examination, followed by investigations by plaintiffs themselves, but no definite escape of gas was detected. When, after the explosion, a trench was dug in order to ascertain the cause of the catastrophe, and the pipe was exposed to view, there was seen to be a large hole or fracture at the house end of the section nearest the street, that is to say, at a distance of 21 feet from the main and just where the thread of that section entered the coupling. Apparently both parties to the litigation agree that the gas must have escaped at that point and permeated the soil, but when unable to reach the atmosphere because of the frozen surface of the ground it forced its way into the basement of plaintiffs’ house where it became ignited and the explosion followed.

Plaintiffs’ theory of the cause of the accident, and the basis upon which they predicated their right of recovery, was that in connecting the service line with the gas main *521 defendant did the work recklessly and negligently in that it forced and distorted the pipe at the street end laterally toward the south, that is, in a direction away from Woodmont Street, thereby causing a sharp bending of the pipe at the first coupling, the outside of the bend projecting northerly, which in turn culminated in a fracture at the point of extreme angulation; the break may have occurred either at the time the work was done or later as a result of the weakening of the pipe due to the bending. In support of this theory plaintiffs offered considerable testimony to show that the exposed pipe, as it lay in the trench, exhibited such an angulation, and that, when a torch was moved along it a flame two or three feet high shot out from the side of the pipe at that point. Moreover — and according to plaintiffs of greatest significance, — when, in order to cut out a section three feet on either side of the fracture, the pipe was first sawed through, the part attached to the main violently sprang or lashed some nine or ten inches to and against the northerly side of the trench, showing thereby, as claimed by plaintiffs, that the cutting had released a strong lateral tension which had been the cause of the bending and breaking of the pipe. Plaintiffs argue, and produced expert testimony to establish, that this lashing is explicable in no way other than that the pipe had been forced into connection with the main in such a position, at such an angle, and in such a way, as to distort and ultimately break it.

Witnesses on behalf of defendant testified, in opposition to these contentions, that the service pipe had not in fact been forced into- the main in any strained or improper manner, but that the connection was made by a series of couplings put together so as to form a swinging joint and thus allow sufficient play to prevent tension and undue rigidity, and that it would have been impossible to wrench and move the pipe, covered as it then was by several feet of earth, with sufficient force to bend and break it at a point 21 feet away. Defendant contended *522 that the bending and breaking of the pipe were probably caused by the soil under the pipe being wet, due to the presence of an adjoining water line, or being soft and consisting only of filled in ground, and that this had allowed a subsidence of the pipe by the action of the pressure of the overlying ground. Admittedly this would not explain a lateral angulation, but defendant asserted that the principal bending was in a vertical and not a horizontal direction, and that the break was underneath and not on the side of the pipe and therefore not due to any lateral distortion.

It is obvious that the principal issue of fact between the parties was thus narrowed to whether the bend and break were on the northerly side or on the bottom of the pipe. It has already been stated that plaintiff produced several witnesses to establish its contention on this question, thus, according to ordinary rules, presenting a case for the determination of the jury. Defendant claims, however, that binding instructions should have been given in its favor because of the following facts: When the 6-foot piece of the pipe was cut out the workmen used a hacksaw which made well-defined serrations or scorings on the two ends of the detached section. These workmen, called as plaintiffs’ witnesses, testified that in using the saw they had worked it up and down in a vertical direction. Placing the section so as to bring the scorings into a perpendicular position, the angulation and break would, defendant claims, be toward the bottom rather than the side. Defendant therefore argues that these scorings, taken in connection with the testimony of plaintiffs’ witnesses as to the position in which the cutting was effected, amount to incontrovertible physical facts which override plaintiffs’ oral testimony as to the position in which the pipe lay, and the court should have decided the fact accordingly and not have allowed the jury to find to the contrary. Defendant relies upon the well-established principle that “A court will not accept as true that which is shown to be untrue *523 by incontrovertible physical facts, hut instead will take judicial notice of the results arising from such facts”: Snyder v. Penn Liberty Refining Co., 302 Pa. 320, 322.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Stack v. Wapner
368 A.2d 292 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1976)
C. R. Grove v. Dun & Bradstreet
438 F.2d 433 (Third Circuit, 1971)
Grove v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.
438 F.2d 433 (Third Circuit, 1971)
Phillips v. Delaware Power & Light Company
216 A.2d 281 (Supreme Court of Delaware, 1966)
Murphy v. J. L. Saunders, Inc.
121 S.E.2d 375 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1961)
Cohen v. Penn Fruit Co.
159 A.2d 558 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1960)
First Methodist Episcopal Church v. Bangor Gas Co.
7 Pa. D. & C.2d 730 (Northampton County Court of Common Pleas, 1956)
Van Buren v. Eberhard
104 A.2d 98 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1954)
Lorenz v. Caste Development Co.
81 A.2d 887 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1951)
Foley v. the Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co.
68 A.2d 517 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1949)
Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co.
166 F.2d 908 (Third Circuit, 1948)
Schell v. Miller North Broad Storage Co.
42 A.2d 180 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1944)
Jones v. Monroe Electric Co.
39 A.2d 569 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1944)
Dunmire v. Fitzgerald
37 A.2d 596 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1944)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
188 A. 582, 324 Pa. 517, 1936 Pa. LEXIS 553, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lott-et-ux-v-peoples-nat-gas-co-pa-1936.