Lori Joseph Bldrs., Inc. v. Torres

Opinion

Lori Joseph Bldrs., Inc. v Torres

2026 NY Slip Op 05300

September 16, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Lori Joseph Builders, Inc., etc., respondent,

v

Ana E. Torres, appellant, et al., defendants.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on September 16, 2026

2024-12575, (Index No. 53832/22)

Angela G. Iannacci, J.P.

William G. Ford

Carl J. Landicino

Susan Quirk, JJ.

Knox Law Group, P.C., New York, NY (Daniel Knox of counsel), for appellant.

Marvin Kemp & Cole, PLLC, Rhinebeck, NY (Sean M. Kemp of counsel), for respondent.

[*1]

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract, the defendant Ana E. Torres appeals from an amended judgment of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Thomas R. Davis, J.), entered January 28, 2025. The amended judgment, insofar as appealed from, after a nonjury trial, (1) is in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant Ana E. Torres in the principal sum of $79,174.89, and (2) dismissed that defendant's counterclaim alleging willful exaggeration of a mechanic's lien pursuant to Lien Law § 39-a.

ORDERED that on the Court's own motion, the notice of appeal from a judgment of the same court entered November 15, 2024, is deemed to be a premature notice of appeal from the amendment judgment (see CPLR 5520[c]); and it is further,

ORDERED that the amended judgment is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant Ana E. Torres in the principal sum of $79,174.89, and substituting therefor a provision dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant Ana E. Torres; as so modified, the amended judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs to the defendant Ana E. Torres, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Dutchess County, for a hearing to determine whether sanctions should be imposed upon the plaintiff pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1.

In 2020, the defendant Ana E. Torres (hereinafter the defendant) and her husband, Lineras "Lenny" Torres (hereinafter Lenny and together with the defendant, the Torreses), asked Gary Joseph, owner of the plaintiff and long-time friend of the defendant's family, to review their plans to build a custom home in Fishkill. Joseph agreed to work as a construction management contractor for the Torreses and began working on the property in late summer or early fall of 2020. Joseph and the Torreses executed two contracts on December 3, 2020: one for site work valued at $90,000 (hereinafter the site work contract) and one for a construction management fee of $105,000, which was subsequently reduced to $75,000 (hereinafter the management fee contract). Both contracts provided that "Lenny Torres agrees to pay" the stated value of the contract. Prior and subsequent to the signing of the site work contract and the management fee contract, the Torreses made multiple payments to the plaintiff.

In December 2021, Joseph, on behalf of the plaintiff, filed a mechanic's lien, claiming that from December 3, 2020, until August 27, 2021, the plaintiff had performed labor and provided materials valued at $90,000, of which $90,000 remained unpaid.

At some point prior to the commencement of this action, Lenny died.

In December 2022, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant, among others, asserting causes of action to recover damages for breach of contract or to recover in quantum meruit and to foreclose the mechanic's lien. The defendant denied the allegations and asserted, inter alia, a counterclaim alleging willful exaggeration of a mechanic's lien pursuant to Lien Law § 39-a.

After a nonjury trial, the Supreme Court, among other things, dismissed the defendant's counterclaim alleging willful exaggeration of a mechanic's lien pursuant to Lien Law § 39-a and entered an amended judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the principal sum of $79,174.89, the full amount of damages that the plaintiff requested at trial, on the breach of contract causes of action. The defendant appeals.

In reviewing a determination made after a nonjury trial, this Court's authority is as broad as that of the trial court and includes the power to render the judgment it finds warranted by the facts, taking into account in a close case that the trial judge had the advantage of seeing the witnesses (see Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v Town of Bedford, 60 NY2d 492, 499; Home Constr. Corp. v Beaury, 149 AD3d 699, 701).

"'[T]o recover damages for breach of contract, a plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of a contract, the plaintiff's performance pursuant to the contract, the defendant's breach of its contractual obligations, and damages resulting from the breach'" (McAllister v Wayside Out-Reach Dev., Inc., 241 AD3d 539, 540, quoting Shulamith Sch. for Girls, Inc. v Shulamith Sch. for Girls of Brooklyn, 230 AD3d 822, 823-824). "A written agreement that is complete, clear, and unambiguous on its face must be enforced to give effect to the meaning of its terms and the reasonable expectations of the parties, and the court should determine the intent of the parties from within the four corners of the contract without looking to extrinsic evidence to create ambiguities" (Vivir of L I, Inc. v Ehrenkranz, 127 AD3d 962, 963).

Here, the plain language of the contracts unambiguously attributed the responsibility for payment to Lenny, providing first that "Lenny Torres agrees to pay" and then later "[p]ayment will be made as outlined above." Despite being a signatory to the contracts, the defendant is not obligated to pay the plaintiff under the terms of the contracts. As such, the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant breached any obligations under the contracts (see e.g. Matter of Legion of Christ, Inc. v Town of Mount Pleasant, 151 AD3d 858, 860; Long Is. Jr. Soccer League v Back of the Net, Ltd., 85 AD3d 737, 738). Accordingly, the Supreme Court improperly awarded damages for breach of contract.

Further, the terms of the contracts are too indefinite and uncertain to be enforceable (see UETA Latinamerica, Inc. v Zafir, 129 AD3d 704, 705). "The doctrine of definiteness, well established in contract law, 'means that a court cannot enforce a contract unless it is able to determine what in fact the parties have agreed to'" (id., quoting Matter of 166 Mamaroneck Ave. Corp. v 151 E. Post Rd. Corp., 78 NY2d 88, 91). Accordingly, the site work contract and the management fee contract are unenforceable.

Where there is not an enforceable contract, a plaintiff may recover in equity under quantum meruit (see Home Constr. Corp. v Beaury, 149 AD3d at 702; Kieran v Sinetos, 145 AD3d 987, 988). "'The elements of a cause of action sounding in quantum meruit are: (1) the performance of services in good faith, (2) the acceptance of services by the person to whom they are rendered, (3) the expectation of compensation therefor, and (4) the reasonable value of the services rendered'" (DiSario v Rynston, 138 AD3d 672, 674, quoting Johnson v Robertson, 131 AD3d 670, 672). "'In construction contract cases, the customary method of calculating damages on a quantum meruit basis . . . is actual job costs plus an allowance for overhead and profits minus amounts paid'" (id. at 674-[*2]675, quoting TY Elec. Corp. v DelMonte, 101 AD3d 1626, 1626).

Here, the plaintiff cannot recover in quantum meruit because it failed to present any evidence of the reasonable value of the services rendered. Accordingly, this theory cannot support the Supreme Court's award of $79,174.89 to the plaintiff (see id. at 675; cf. Johnson v Robertson, 131 AD3d at 672-673).

"When a court determines that a mechanic's lien is void due to willful exaggeration, the person filing such notice of lien is liable in damages to the owner or contractor" (Degraw Constr. Group, Inc. v McGowan Bldrs., Inc., 178 AD3d 770, 771; see Lien Law § 39-a). "However, '[t]he Legislature intended the remedy in Lien Law § 39-a to be available only where the lien was valid in all other respects and was declared void by reason of willful exaggeration after a trial of the foreclosure action'" (Degraw Constr. Group, Inc. v McGowan Bldrs., Inc., 178 AD3d at 771, quoting Guzman v Estate of Fluker, 226 AD2d 676, 678; see Atlas Refrigeration-Air Conditioning, Inc. v Lo Pinto, 33 AD3d 639, 640).

Here, the Supreme Court determined, as the defendant had argued, that the mechanic's lien was invalid because it was untimely. Therefore, under these circumstances, damages under Lien Law § 39-a for willful exaggeration of the mechanic's lien are unavailable to the defendant (see Degraw Constr. Group, Inc. v McGowan Bldrs., Inc., 178 AD3d at 771; Saratoga Assoc. Landscape Architects, Architects, Engrs. & Planners, P.C. v Lauter Dev. Group, 77 AD3d 1219, 1223).

However, under the circumstances here, where the plaintiff's allegations that it had received no payment were flatly contradicted by the plaintiff's own evidence, an award of sanctions for frivolous conduct may be appropriate (see Matter of McCrory v Village of Mamaroneck Bd. of Trustees, 230 AD3d 786, 791-792; Kaygreen Realty Co., LLC v IG Second Generation Partners, L.P., 78 AD3d 1008, 1010).

The defendant's remaining contentions either are not properly before this Court or need not be reached in light of our determination.

IANNACCI, J.P., FORD, LANDICINO and QUIRK, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court