Lori Cook v. Harrison Medical Center

Ninth Circuit

Lori Cook v. Harrison Medical Center

706 F. App'x 368

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedDecember 13, 2017

Docket15-35613

StatusUnpublished

This text of 706 F. App'x 368 (Lori Cook v. Harrison Medical Center) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Lori Cook v. Harrison Medical Center, 706 F. App'x 368 (9th Cir. 2017).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM *

Harrison Medical Center (Harrison) appeals the district court’s denial of its Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law and the subsequent entry of judgment in favor of Lori Cook (Cook). We have jurisdiction’ under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. Harrison argues that Cook never had a viable cause of action under the False Claims Act (FCA) because a false claim was never submitted to Medicare. As we have explained, in contrast to a FCA violation claim, the plaintiff in a FCA retaliation claim need only “show that he or she suspected that the defendant submitted a false claim—not that the defendant actually submitted one.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted).

2. Harrison also contends that Cook’s suspicions lacked an objectively reasonable basis. Cook has pointed to evidence that the jury could have relied on in finding objective reasonableness, and Harrison’s attempts to controvert the evidence fail because we “are not permitted to weigh the evidence again, or to substitute our own judgment for the jury’s.” Saavedra v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 93 F.3d 547, 555 (9th Cir. 1996).

3. Finally, Harrison challenges whether Cook had a good faith belief that Harrison was “possibly” committing fraud. U.S. ex rel. Campie v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 862 F.3d 890, 908 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Moore v. Cal. Inst. of Tech. Jet Propulsion Lab., 275 F.3d 838, 845 (9th Cir. 2002)). Reviewing the record as a whole, we are satisfied that Cook’s testimony was adequate to sustain the jury’s conclusion that she did. First Nat’l Mortg. Co. v. Fed. Realty Inv. Tr., 631 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2011).

For these reasons, we are not convinced that the evidence permits “only one reasonable conclusion” that is “contrary to the jury’s verdict.” Pavao v. Pagay, 307 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 2002).

AFFIRMED.

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM *

Harrison Medical Center (Harrison) appeals the district court’s denial of its Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law and the subsequent entry of judgment in favor of Lori Cook (Cook). We have jurisdiction’ under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. Harrison argues that Cook never had a viable cause of action under the False Claims Act (FCA) because a false claim was never submitted to Medicare. As we have explained, in contrast to a FCA violation claim, the plaintiff in a FCA retaliation claim need only “show that he or she suspected that the defendant submitted a false claim—not that the defendant actually submitted one.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted).

2. Harrison also contends that Cook’s suspicions lacked an objectively reasonable basis. Cook has pointed to evidence that the jury could have relied on in finding objective reasonableness, and Harrison’s attempts to controvert the evidence fail because we “are not permitted to weigh the evidence again, or to substitute our own judgment for the jury’s.” Saavedra v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 93 F.3d 547, 555 (9th Cir. 1996).

3. Finally, Harrison challenges whether Cook had a good faith belief that Harrison was “possibly” committing fraud. U.S. ex rel. Campie v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 862 F.3d 890, 908 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Moore v. Cal. Inst. of Tech. Jet Propulsion Lab., 275 F.3d 838, 845 (9th Cir. 2002)). Reviewing the record as a whole, we are satisfied that Cook’s testimony was adequate to sustain the jury’s conclusion that she did. First Nat’l Mortg. Co. v. Fed. Realty Inv. Tr., 631 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2011).

For these reasons, we are not convinced that the evidence permits “only one reasonable conclusion” that is “contrary to the jury’s verdict.” Pavao v. Pagay, 307 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 2002).

AFFIRMED.

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

Kimberly S. Saavedra the Estate of Masakazu Yamaguchi Makiko Yamaguchi Chisato Yamaguchi, Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants v. Korean Air Lines Company, Ltd. Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee. Kimberly S. Saavedra, as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Makoto Okai, Deceased, and as Personal Representative of Toru Okai and Hitoko Okai, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee v. Korean Air Lines Company, Ltd., Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant

93 F.3d 547 (Ninth Circuit, 1996)

Michael P. Moore v. California Institute of Technology Jet Propulsion Laboratory

275 F.3d 838 (Ninth Circuit, 2002)

Harolyn Pavao, as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Jon Webster Pavao v. John Pagay County of Hawaii

307 F.3d 915 (Ninth Circuit, 2002)

Mendiondo v. Centinela Hospital Medical Center

521 F.3d 1097 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)

United States Ex Rel. Campie v. Gilead Sciences, Inc.

862 F.3d 890 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)

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706 F. App'x 368, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lori-cook-v-harrison-medical-center-ca9-2017.

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