Lori Chavez-DeRemer v. Levering Regional Health Care Center, L.LC.

District Court, E.D. Missouri·Decided September 19, 2025·No. 4:21-cv-00182·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

LORI CHAVEZ-DEREMER, ) Secretary of the United States ) Department of Labor, ) ) Plaintiff, ) No. 4:21-CV-182 HEA ) v. ) ) LEVERING REGIONAL HEALTH ) CARE CENTER, L.L.C., et al., ) ) Defendants. )

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This matter is before the Court on Defendants Levering Regional Health Care Center, L.L.C. (“Levering”) and Reliant Care Management Company, L.L.C.’s (“Reliant Care”) (collectively “Defendants”) Motion to Reconsider Order Vacating Judgment and Denying Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 113). Plaintiff Lori Chavez-Deremer, Secretary of the United States Department of Labor, opposes Defendants’ motion. For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motion to reconsider is denied. I. Background Plaintiff brings suit against Defendants for violating the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.(“FLSA”). The Amended Complaint (hereinafter “Complaint”) alleges Defendants violated the FLSA, because they automatically deducted 30 minutes for meal breaks from employees’ pay when Defendants knew or should have known the employees regularly worked through their meal breaks.

According to the Complaint, Defendants have and are failing to pay certain of their employees for overtime work. (ECF No. 23 at 4). Plaintiff seeks unpaid overtime compensation for the period from February 13, 2018 going forward. In addition,

Plaintiff seeks to enjoin Defendants from withholding payment of unpaid compensation. Following discovery in this case, Defendants filed a joint motion for summary judgment. Defendants argued that they were entitled to summary judgment because

there was no evidence they had violated the FLSA. In the alternative, Defendants argued that in the event Plaintiff could establish an FLSA violation, the applicable statute of limitations should be two years, because there was no evidence Defendants

willfully violated the FLSA. Reliant Care filed a separate motion for summary judgment and argued it was not a joint employer. On October 23, 2023, the Court granted Defendants’ joint motion for summary and entered summary judgment in Defendants’ favor. The Court found

that the undisputed evidence showed that there was a lawful policy in place whereby employees could report and be paid for missed meal breaks and, therefore, Defendants had not violated the FLSA. The Court further found that Plaintiff failed

to provide adequate evidence that employees worked more than 40 hours a week. The Court denied as moot Defendants’ alternative argument regarding the applicable statute of limitations and Reliant Care’s separate motion for summary judgment.

The Court entered Judgment in Defendants’ favor, and Plaintiff appealed the Court’s decision. On March 26, 2025, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the

entry of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. Micone v. Levering Reg’l Health Care Ctr., L.LC., 132 F.4th 1074 (8th Cir. 2025). The Eighth Circuit found there was evidence in the record that Defendants “knew or should have known that it was not paying its employees for time spent working

during the automatically deducted lunch breaks.” Id. at 1080 n.3. On remand, Defendants asked that the Court revisit unresolved issues from their joint motion for summary judgment and Reliant Care’s separate motion for

summary judgment. In an Opinion, Memorandum, and Order dated August 25, 2025, the Court vacated the Judgment dated October 13, 2025. And after careful review of the record, the Court found Defendants’ and Reliant Care’s arguments were without merit and denied both motions for summary judgment as to all issues.

This case is set for trial on October 6, 2025. In the motion at bar, Defendants argue that the Court erroneously vacated the October 13, 2025 Judgment in full. They contend that Plaintiff’s allegations can be

divided into two periods of time – February 13, 2018, to February 12, 2020 (the “Audit Period”), and February 13, 2020, through Present (the “Post Audit Period”). Defendants argue that the Eighth Circuit’s reversal applied to the Audit Period only,

and that they remain entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to the Post Audit Period. II. Legal Standard

Defendants move for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Motions for reconsideration of non-final orders “can be construed as motions under Rule 60(b).” Williams v. York, 891 F.3d 701, 706 (8th Cir. 2018). See also Anderson v. Raymond Corp., 340 F.3d 520, 525 (8th Cir. 2003) (“motions

for reconsideration are nothing more than Rule 60(b) motions when directed at non- final orders.”) (cleaned up). Rule 60(b) allows for relief based on the following six specific grounds: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly

discovered evidence that with reasonable diligence could not have been discovered in time for a Rule 59(b) motion; (3) fraud, misrepresentation or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or

vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; and (6) any other reason that justifies relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)-(6). Relief under Rule 60(b) is limited. A district court should grant a Rule 60(b) motion only upon an adequate showing of

exceptional circumstances. Schwieger v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. of NE, 207 F.3d 480, 487 (8th Cir. 2000). A Rule 60(b) motion is not for the purpose of rearguing, more fully, the merits of a claim. Broadway v. Norris, 193 F.3d 987, 990 (8th Cir. 1999).

III. Discussion Defendants fail to identify the grounds upon which they are seeking relief under Rule 60(b). On this basis alone, the motion is denied. But the Court also finds

Defendants’ arguments are without merit. In support of their contention that the Eighth Circuit’s reversal is limited to the Audit Period only, Defendants point to language in the opinion where the Eighth Circuit discusses evidence from the Audit Period. For example, Defendants point to

the following language: A reasonable jury could find that the absence of any time sheets submitted during the two-year audit period, contrasted with the over 800 time sheets submitted in a four-month period two years later, is evidence that Levering failed to effectively communicate its policy— which did not change—to employees during the audit period.

(ECF No. 93, 7). Defendants also quote the following language from the Eighth Circuit’s opinion: Therefore, because a reasonable jury could find Levering knew or should have known that none of its employees ever submitted a Temporary Time Sheet to get reimbursed during the audit period despite working through lunch, a reasonable jury could find Levering knew or should have known that it was not paying its employees for time spent working during the automatically deducted lunch breaks.

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Lori Chavez-DeRemer v. Levering Regional Health Care Center, L.LC., (E.D. Mo. 2025).

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