Lorenzo Anderson v. Department of the Army

Merit Systems Protection Board·Decided July 15, 2024·No. AT-0752-19-0667-I-1·Unpublished

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

LORENZO L. ANDERSON, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, AT-0752-19-0667-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DATE: July 15, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Lorenzo L. Anderson , Blythewood, South Carolina, pro se.

Debra Sherman Tedeschi , Esquire, and Steven J. Phillips , Esquire, Fort Jackson, South Carolina, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Member*

*Member Kerner did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed his appeal of his later-rescinded removal action after finding that he failed to establish his affirmative defense of reprisal for prior equal employment opportunity (EEO) activity. On petition for review, the appellant argues that the 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

administrative judge made several incorrect factual determinations regarding her analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the underlying charges, and that she erred in finding that he failed to establish his affirmative defense of reprisal for prior EEO activity. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). The administrative judge determined below that the agency fully rescinded the underlying removal action. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 36 at 1-2, Tab 40, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 5. The appellant does not challenge that conclusion. PFR File, Tab 1. The Board will only dismiss an appeal as moot if the appellant received all of the relief that he could have received if the matter had been adjudicated and he had prevailed. See Green v. Department of the Air Force, 114 M.S.P.R. 340, ¶ 7 (2010). When, as here, an appellant has outstanding, viable claims of compensatory damages before the Board, an agency’s complete rescission of the action appealed does not afford him all of the relief available before the Board, so the mere rescission does not render the appeal moot. See Currier v. U.S. Postal Service, 72 M.S.P.R. 191, 197 (1996). Because EEO 3

reprisal claims, such as the appellant’s, raise possible entitlement to compensatory damages, see Hess v. U.S. Postal Service, 124 M.S.P.R. 40, ¶¶ 9, 18-19 (2016); see also 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201(d), 1201.202(c) (both providing for an award of compensatory damages to a prevailing party who is found to have been intentionally discriminated against on grounds covered under Title VII), the administrative judge correctly adjudicated this case on the limited issue of whether the appellant established his EEO reprisal affirmative defense, IAF, Tabs 22, 27-28. After considering testimony from the proposing official that she was unaware of the appellant’s prior EEO complaints and from the deciding official that, although he was aware of the appellant’s prior EEO complaints, they played no role in his decision to remove the appellant, the administrative judge found that the appellant failed to prove by preponderant evidence that the agency was motivated by retaliatory animus based on his prior EEO activity. ID at 10-11. We have reviewed the record, and we agree with her finding that the appellant failed to establish his EEO reprisal claim. 2 The appellant argues on review, among other things, that the administrative judge erred in denying certain unspecified witnesses who would have testified regarding the merits of the underlying, ultimately rescinded, removal action and regarding the proposing official’s knowledge of the appellant’s prior EEO complaints. PFR File, Tab 1 at 8, 11-15. However, when the administrative judge made her rulings on witnesses in the order and summary of the prehearing conference, she provided both parties with an opportunity to object to those rulings. IAF, Tab 36 at 2-3. The appellant does not appear to have objected to the rulings either before or during the hearing. The Board has held that an

2 Here, because we affirm the administrative judge’s opinion that the appellant failed to show that any prohibited consideration was a motivating factor in the agency’s action, we need not resolve the issue of whether he proved that retaliation was a “but-for” cause of the agency’s decision. See Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 20-22, 29-33. 4

appellant’s failure to timely object to the administrative judge’s rulings on witnesses precludes him from doing so on petition for review. See Tarpley v. U.S. Postal Service, 37 M.S.P.R. 579, 581 (1998). Thus, we do not consider this claim further.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 3 You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum. Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you should contact that forum for more information.

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Lorenzo Anderson v. Department of the Army, (Miss. 2024).

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