Lorenzo Anderson v. Department of the Army

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedFebruary 21, 2025
DocketAT-0752-21-0159-X-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Lorenzo Anderson v. Department of the Army (Lorenzo Anderson v. Department of the Army) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lorenzo Anderson v. Department of the Army, (Miss. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

LORENZO ANDERSON, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, AT-0752-21-0159-X-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DATE: February 21, 2025 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Christopher Hugh Bonk , Esquire, Silver Spring, Maryland, for the appellant.

Steven J. Phillips and Jerrod Fussnecker , Esquire, Fort Jackson, South Carolina, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

The administrative judge issued a compliance initial decision finding the agency in noncompliance with the decision in the underlying appeal and granting the appellant’s petition for enforcement. Anderson v. Department of the Army,

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-21-0159-C-1, Compliance File, Tab 27, Compliance Initial Decision (CID). For the reasons discussed below, we now find the agency in compliance and DISMISS the appellant’s petition for enforcement.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE OF COMPLIANCE On April 18, 2024, the administrative judge issued a compliance initial decision finding the agency noncompliant with the Board’s final order in the underlying matter, which had reversed the appellant’s removal. CID at 1; see Anderson v. Department of the Army, MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-21-0159-I-2, Appeal File, Tab 23, Initial Decision. Specifically, the administrative judge found the agency noncompliant with its obligations to take the following actions: “(1) restore the appellant to his previous position of Supervisory Human Resources Specialist (Military), GS-0201-11 (PD# DU210310); (2) expunge all references to the canceled removal from the appellant’s personnel records; (3) correct and/or issue appropriate performance ratings for [Fiscal Year (FY)] 2020 through FY 2023; and (4) pay the appropriate performance awards based on those ratings.” CID at 9. As neither party filed any submission with the Clerk of the Board within the time limit set forth in 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114, the administrative judge’s findings of noncompliance have become final, and the appellant’s petition for enforcement has been referred to the Board for a final decision on compliance pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 1201.183(c). 2 See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.183(b).

2 As noted in the compliance initial decision, the Board’s regulations provide that, on a finding of noncompliance, the party found to be in noncompliance must do the following: (i) to the extent that the party decides to take the actions required by the initial decision, the party must submit to the Clerk of the Board, within the time limit for filing a petition for review under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e), a statement that the party has taken the actions identified in the initial decision, along with evidence establishing that the party has taken those actions; and/or (ii) to the extent that the party decides not to take all of the actions required by the initial decision, the party must file a petition for review under the provisions of 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.114-1201.115. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.183(a)(6). 3

On May 29, 2024, the Clerk of the Board issued an Acknowledgement Order informing the parties of the continued processing of this matter and setting forth deadlines for additional compliance submissions. Anderson v. Department of the Army, MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-21-0159-X-1, Compliance Referral File (CRF), Tab 1. Thereafter, the parties filed numerous substantive submissions addressing the compliance issues identified by the administrative judge. CRF, Tabs 2-5, 8, 10-11, 14. As explained below, we find that the agency has satisfied its burden to demonstrate that it has fulfilled its compliance obligations.

ANALYSIS When, as here, the Board finds a personnel action unwarranted, the aim is to place the appellant, as nearly as possible, in the situation he would have been in had the wrongful personnel action not occurred. Vaughan v. Department of Agriculture, 116 M.S.P.R. 319, ¶ 5 (2011); King v. Department of the Navy, 100 M.S.P.R. 116, ¶ 12 (2005), aff’d per curiam, 167 F. App’x 191 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The agency bears the burden to prove compliance with the Board’s order by a preponderance of the evidence. 3 Vaughan, 116 M.S.P.R. 319, ¶ 5; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.183(d). An agency’s assertions of compliance must include a clear explanation of its compliance actions supported by documentary evidence. Vaughan, 116 M.S.P.R. 319, ¶ 5. The appellant may rebut the agency’s evidence of compliance by making specific, nonconclusory, and supported assertions of continued noncompliance. Id.

Restoration to Position of Supervisory Human Resources Specialist (Military) The administrative judge found that the agency had failed to properly restore the appellant to his position because it had placed him in a new, nonsupervisory position with different duties from those he held in the supervisory position from which he was removed. CID at 3-4. The administrative judge held that the agency 3 A preponderance of the evidence is the degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable person, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q). 4

had failed to demonstrate that it had a “strong, overriding or compelling reason” for this reassignment, CID at 4, and ordered the agency to restore him to the specific position he formerly occupied, CID at 9. In his pleadings before the full Board, the appellant acknowledged that the agency has now returned him to his former position of record, CRF, Tab 3 at 4, but asserted that the agency has failed to provide him required training on various Human Resources (HR) and other systems; that his supervisor, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Hultgren, performs his “core duties,” including training other individuals on the HR and other systems in lieu of the appellant performing such training; and that other individuals attend HR meetings that he should attend as a supervisory HR specialist. Id. at 4-6. In response, the agency submitted affidavits from LTC Hultgren attesting that the appellant has access to the required trainings but has failed to do them despite multiple reminders; that she properly attends certain meetings as the appellant’s supervisor and attends other meetings if they are of interest or utility to her; and that the appellant has been added to the required meetings and distribution lists.

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Related

King v. Department of the Navy
167 F. App'x 191 (Federal Circuit, 2006)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)

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Lorenzo Anderson v. Department of the Army, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lorenzo-anderson-v-department-of-the-army-mspb-2025.