Lopez v. City of Grand Junction

2018 COA 97

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 12, 2018
• Docket: 16CA1652
• Status: Published

Opinion

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY July 12, 2018

2018COA97

No. 16CA1652 Lopez v. City of Grand Junction — Torts — Negligence; Government — Colorado Governmental Immunity Act — Immunity and Partial Waiver

In this negligence case implicating the Colorado Governmental

Immunity Act, a division of the court of appeals applies the

analytical framework of Springer v. City & Cty. Of Denver, 13 P.3d

794 (Colo. 2000), to conclude that under section 24-10-106(1)(f),

C.R.S. 2017, a city’s immunity may be waived for the operation or

maintenance of a public facility performed by its independent

contractor.

The division here concludes that plaintiffs met their burden to

establish a waiver of immunity as to its negligence claims against

the City of Grand Junction (City) for its independent contractor’s

maintenance work on a traffic light. Accordingly, it reverses the district court’s C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) dismissal of these claims. The

division, however, affirms the district court’s C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1)

dismissal of plaintiff’s negligence claims brought against the City

regarding its maintenance of a sewer line. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2018COA97

Court of Appeals No. 16CA1652 Mesa County District Court No. 13CV30147 Honorable Brian J. Flynn, Judge

Roberto Lopez, Jordan Pierson, and Kolby Gimmeson,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

City of Grand Junction, Colorado,

Defendant-Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division I Opinion by JUDGE LICHTENSTEIN Taubman and Román, JJ., concur

Announced July 12, 2018

Killian Davis, P.C., J. Keith Killian, Damon Davis, Joseph Azbell, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants

Baldwin Morgan & Rider, P.C., Sophia H. Tsai, Kelly L. Kafer, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee ¶1 Underground maintenance of a public traffic light in Grand

Junction breached a natural gas line. Leaking gas from the

ruptured line migrated to a house, resulting in an explosion and

injuries. As a matter of first impression, we must determine

whether section 24-10-106(1)(f), C.R.S. 2017, can be applied to

waive the immunity of the City of Grand Junction (City), even

though the maintenance of the traffic light was performed by an

independent contractor. We conclude that it can.

¶2 Roberto Lopez, Jordan Pierson, and Kolby Gimmeson

(plaintiffs) brought negligence claims against the City for their

resultant personal injuries and property damage. Plaintiffs’

complaint alleges, among other things, that the City breached its

duty of care to safely maintain its utility, electric, and sewer lines.1

¶3 As pertinent here, the complaint alleges that the City

contracted with Apeiron Utility Construction (Apeiron) to upgrade

1 Plaintiffs’ complaint asserted other negligence claims against the City and against other defendants, but those claims are not at issue here. This appeal challenges only their claims against the City for negligence in maintaining its utility and electric lines for the traffic light (including a vicarious liability theory for its independent contractor’s conduct on this project), and for negligence in maintaining its sewer line.

1 utility lines that powered a traffic light and that during this

maintenance project Apeiron ruptured a gas line, and the leaking

gas resulted in the house explosion. The complaint alleges that

Apeiron’s conduct should be imputed to the City.

¶4 The City moved to dismiss these negligence claims for lack of

jurisdiction under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), asserting governmental

immunity under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA).

¶5 In response, plaintiffs argued that the City had waived its

immunity pursuant to section 24-10-106(1)(f). This CGIA provision

waives immunity for injuries resulting from the operation and

maintenance of any public “sanitation [or] electrical facility.” After

the district court held a Trinity hearing on the motion, it granted the

City’s motion to dismiss.

¶6 Applying the analytical framework of Springer v. City & County

of Denver, 13 P.3d 794 (Colo. 2000), we conclude that the waiver of

immunity under section 24-10-106(1)(f) applies even if the

operation or maintenance was performed by a public entity’s

independent contractor.

¶7 Given this conclusion, and based on the facts found by the

district court, we further conclude that the plaintiffs met their

2 burden to establish a waiver of immunity as to the negligence

claims against the City for Apeiron’s maintenance work on the

traffic light. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s C.R.C.P.

12(b)(1) dismissal of these claims for lack of jurisdiction and

remand for further proceedings.

¶8 However, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’

negligence claim against the City as to its operation and

maintenance of its sewer line, as plaintiffs’ evidence did not support

an immunity waiver under section 24-10-106(1)(f).

¶9 Because we are reversing the dismissal of two of the

negligence claims in the complaint, we deny the City’s request for

attorney fees.

I. Additional Factual Background

¶ 10 Following the Trinity hearing, the district court adopted the

City’s nine-page proposed order of dismissal, which includes the

following factual findings.

¶ 11 The City planned to install new electrical lines through an

underground conduit to fix a malfunctioning traffic light. The City

did not have the personnel or equipment to bore under the road to

3 place the conduit, so it hired Apeiron to do this underground

drilling work.

¶ 12 Before selecting the location to bore the hole, and pursuant to

an agreement between the City and Apeiron, Apeiron contacted the

various utility owners to mark their utility lines. One of the utility

owners, Xcel Energy, hired Safe Site to mark its gas lines. Safe Site

marked two gas lines.

¶ 13 Once the utility lines were marked, Apeiron dug potholes to

visualize the located utility lines and then began the directional

drilling work. As it was drilling the pilot bore across the road,

Apeiron’s crew foreman felt the drill strike something. He checked

with a City employee, and they both determined that they were not

aware of any additional utility lines in the area. Apeiron resumed

its work. After drilling the pilot bore, Apeiron pulled a larger drill

head back that also pulled the new conduit back through the hole.

During this process, the drill struck a natural gas line that ran

below the two lines located by Safe Site. After this breach, gas

leaked into the surrounding ground and also into a sewer main

located approximately fifteen to twenty feet away.

4 ¶ 14 There was disputed evidence as to the exact path that the gas

travelled to the house, although it was not disputed that gas

entered the house through its basement, where there was a

nonfunctional toilet and unused shower. One or both of these had

a dry P-trap that allowed the gas into the basement. The gas

ignited and caused an explosion.

¶ 15 The court found that the sewer main was made of a commonly

used porous vitrified clay pipe, not intended to keep gases or

vegetation in or out. At the time of the incident, the pipe was intact

and in good condition, and the sewer main “was functioning at or

near the same efficiency as it had when it was installed.”

II. The CGIA

¶ 16 The CGIA establishes governmental immunity from suit for

public entities and their employees in tort cases, but it also waives

immunity in certain circumstances. See § 24-10-106; Springer, 13

P.3d at 798, 801 n.5; see also Daniel v. City of Colorado Springs,

2014 CO 34, ¶ 13.

¶ 17 This statutory scheme serves the purpose of protecting the

public against unlimited liability and excessive fiscal burdens, while

allowing the common law of negligence to operate against

5 governmental entities except to the extent the statute has barred

suit against them. Walton v. State, 968 P.2d 636, 643 (Colo. 1998);

see Springer, 13 P.3d at 803; see also § 24-10-102, C.R.S. 2017.

¶ 18 Because governmental immunity from suit derogates the

common law of negligence, courts must strictly construe the CGIA

provisions that grant immunity. Springer, 13 P.3d at 798; Walton,

968 P.2d at 642. For the same reason, courts must broadly

construe the statute’s provisions that waive immunity in the

interest of compensating victims injured by the negligence of

government agents. Springer, 13 P.3d at 798; Walton, 968 P.2d at

643.

¶ 19 As pertinent here, a public entity’s immunity from negligence

claims will be waived for injuries “resulting from . . . [t]he operation

and maintenance of any public . . . sanitation [or] electrical facility.”

§ 24-10-106(1)(f).2

¶ 20 “Resulting from” is construed broadly to require only a

“minimal causal connection” between the injuries and the specified

2 At the Trinity hearing and on appeal, the parties do not dispute that the City’s traffic light, conduit, and sewer main are public facilities as contemplated by this waiver provision.

6 conduct. Tidwell ex rel. Tidwell v. City & Cty. of Denver, 83 P.3d 75,

86 (Colo. 2003). Because the required showing is minimal, and

because discovery before a Trinity hearing is limited, the district

court should afford a plaintiff the favorable inferences of his

allegations and need not reach so far as to determine whether the

injuries were “caused by” the specified conduct. Id.

¶ 21 “Operation” means “the act or omission of a public entity or

public employee in the exercise and performance of the powers,

duties, and functions vested in them by law with respect to the

purposes of any public” power or sanitation facility. § 24-10-

103(3)(a), C.R.S. 2017.

¶ 22 This broad definition of “operation” includes the concept of

maintenance. City of Colorado Springs v. Powell, 48 P.3d 561, 565

(Colo. 2002). “Maintenance” is defined as “the act or omission of a

public entity or public employee in keeping a facility in the same

general state of repair or efficiency as initially constructed or in

preserving a facility from decline or failure.” § 24-10-103(2.5).

III. Trinity Hearing and Standard of Review

¶ 23 If governmental immunity is raised before trial, “the issue is

properly addressed pursuant to a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion to

7 dismiss” for lack of jurisdiction. Corsentino v. Cordova, 4 P.3d

1082, 1087 (Colo. 2000).

¶ 24 A trial court may hold a hearing and receive any competent

evidence pertaining to the motion. Trinity Broadcasting of Denver,

Inc. v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916, 924 (Colo. 1993). Injured

plaintiffs bear the burden of proving the court’s subject matter

jurisdiction under the CGIA and that immunity has been waived.

Tidwell, 83 P.3d at 85. Plaintiffs are afforded the reasonable

inferences of their evidence supporting a waiver. Id.

¶ 25 On review, we defer to the district court’s factual findings

unless they are clearly erroneous and unsupported by the record.

City & Cty. of Denver v. Dennis, 2018 CO 37, ¶ 12; see Walton, 968

P.2d at 645. Once questions of historical fact are resolved, the

question whether a governmental entity is entitled to immunity is

one of law, which we review de novo. Dennis, ¶ 12.

IV. Maintenance of the Traffic Light

¶ 26 Plaintiffs contend that the district court erroneously concluded

that Apeiron’s conduct in maintaining the traffic light was not

attributable to the City for purposes of waiving the City’s immunity

8 under section 24-10-106(1)(f). For the reasons that follow, we

agree.

A. The Conduct at Issue

¶ 27 As an initial matter, we must address the “conduct” that

plaintiffs argue is attributable to the City. The district court’s order

characterized the plaintiffs’ argument as “seek[ing] to impute any

act or omission related to locating and marking the gas lines to the

City” ― an act performed by a third party, Safe Site.

¶ 28 But at the Trinity hearing and on appeal, plaintiffs have

consistently argued that the conduct at issue was Apeiron’s act of

striking (and breaching) the natural gas line with a directional drill.

We will therefore review plaintiffs’ attribution argument as it was

argued and with deference to the district court’s findings of fact.

¶ 29 As a logical matter, any attribution of Apeiron’s conduct to the

City will only matter — for purposes of waiver — if the conduct

would have waived the City’s immunity had the City itself

committed this act.

¶ 30 The City’s immunity is waived if plaintiffs can show they had

injuries “resulting from” the specified conduct. § 24-10-106(1)(f);

Tidwell, 83 P.3d at 86. As noted above, the phrase “resulting from”

9 does not require a showing that the injuries were “caused by” the

conduct. Tidwell, 83 P.3d at 86. But there must be at least a

“minimal causal connection” between the injuries and the specified

conduct. Id.

¶ 31 At the Trinity hearing, the district court found that the City’s

project involved drilling a bore hole under the road to install a new

conduit to hold additional electrical lines for its traffic light. During

this project, the drill struck a natural gas line, breaching it. The

court found that “it is undisputed that natural gas from the breach

got into the sewer main and surrounding ground . . . [and] it is not

disputed that the gas entered the home through the basement” and

the house then exploded.

¶ 32 Construing the waiver provision broadly, and affording

plaintiffs the favorable inferences from these undisputed facts, see

id., we conclude the injuries “result[ed] from” the conduct of

striking (and breaching) the natural gas line. Thus, this conduct

10 B. Attribution of the Conduct

¶ 33 Because Apeiron — not the City — committed this act, we

must determine whether its conduct is attributable to the City for

purposes of the CGIA waiver.

¶ 34 The operation and maintenance waiver in section 24-10-

106(1)(f) does not mention any party except the public entity.

Nonetheless, plaintiffs argue that the supreme court, in Springer,

has already construed a different CGIA waiver provision3 to

encompass the conduct of a public entity’s independent contractor

even though that waiver provision only mentions the public entity.

Plaintiffs urge us to similarly construe the operation and

maintenance waiver provision.

¶ 35 In Springer, the supreme court initially looked beyond the

waiver’s language to other text in the CGIA, but did not find

anything that would preclude the attribution of the independent

contractor’s conduct to the public entity. See 13 P.3d at 801.4

3 The provision at issue was section 24-10-106(1)(c), C.R.S. 2017 (dangerous condition of any public building). 4 To the extent the City relies on this other text in the CGIA and

repeats the same arguments that did not prevail in Springer, we reject those arguments.

11 ¶ 36 The court then turned to other means of statutory

construction to discern the legislative intent of the waiver provision

so it could assess whether that intent is consistent with attributing

the independent contractor’s conduct to the public entity.

¶ 37 First, it evaluated the waiver’s underlying rationale to analyze

why the public entity lacks immunity. Id.; see § 2-4-203(1)(a),

C.R.S. 2017. Second, it considered the alternative construction if

the waiver provision were narrowly construed to apply solely to the

acts or omissions of the public entity. Springer, 13 P.3d at 801-02;

see § 2-4-203(1)(e). Third, it evaluated whether an expansive

interpretation of the waiver — to attribute the independent

contractor’s conduct to the public entity — is consistent with the

legislative intent to comport with recognized common law negligence

principles. Springer, 13 P.3d at 802; see § 2-4-203(1)(g).

¶ 38 The Springer court determined that a public entity lacks

immunity because it is responsible for its acts (in creating), as well

as its omissions (in failing to reasonably discover and correct), an

unsafe condition in a public building. Springer, 13 P.3d at 801.

Next, it observed that if the waiver were narrowly construed to

exclude the acts or omissions of the independent contractor, a

12 public entity could simply avoid responsibility by contracting out its

work to others, which would nullify the essential purpose and effect

of the waiver. Id. at 801-02. Finally, it determined that an

expansive reading of the General Assembly’s intent — to hold a

public entity responsible for the acts of its independent contractor

— is consistent with longstanding principles of tort liability. Id. at

802 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 422 (Am. Law Inst.

1965)).

¶ 39 Applying this same analytical framework to the operation and

maintenance waiver of section 24-10-106(1)(f), we are likewise

persuaded that an independent contractor’s conduct is attributable

to a public entity for purposes of waiving immunity.

¶ 40 As in Springer, the underlying rationale for waiving the public

entity’s immunity from suit is that a public entity is in a position to

avoid injury to the public when it engages in a public works project.

See id. at 801. A public entity, while operating or performing

maintenance on a public facility, is liable because it is in a position

to avoid creating (“act”) or failing to prevent (“omission”) a

circumstance resulting in injury. See id.

13 ¶ 41 We are not convinced by the City’s argument that the

legislature intended a different outcome because the dangerous

condition waiver focuses on a “condition,” whereas the operation

and maintenance waiver focuses on “conduct.” Under both waivers,

the governmental entity’s responsibility to avoid injury to the public

stems from its conduct while engaging in a public works project.

See § 24-10-103(1.3) (defining “dangerous condition” to be a

physical condition caused “by the negligent act or omission of the

public entity . . . in constructing or maintaining such facility”)

(emphasis added); see also Springer, 13 P.3d at 799 (“[T]he

dangerous condition must be associated with construction or

maintenance, not solely design.”).

¶ 42 Next, as in Springer, the waiver’s underlying principle would

be nullified if the public entity could escape liability by simply

hiring an independent contractor for the operation and

maintenance of its public facilities. See 13 P.3d at 801-02.

¶ 43 Finally, expansively reading the operation and maintenance

waiver to attribute an independent contractor’s conduct to a public

entity is consistent with common law principles as reflected in the

Restatement (Second) of Torts. See id. at 802 (supporting its

14 interpretation of the CGIA with “longstanding principles of tort

liability”).

¶ 44 Generally, a person hiring an independent contractor to

perform work is not liable for the negligence of the independent

contractor. Huddleston ex rel. Huddleston v. Union Rural Elec.

Ass’n, 841 P.2d 282, 288 (Colo. 1992). However, there are widely

recognized exceptions to this rule. Id.

¶ 45 For example, when a public entity retains possession of its

premises during the independent contractor’s performance of

maintenance on those premises, it essentially assumes the role of a

landowner. Section 422 of the Restatement provides that the

landowner is liable for injuries caused by the negligence of the

independent contractor if the landowner retains possession of the

land while the work is being done or once the landowner resumes

possession of the land upon completion of the work. Restatement

(Second) of Torts § 422, Westlaw (database updated June 2018).

¶ 46 Indeed, the Springer court relied on section 422 to conclude

that attribution of an independent contractor’s work to a public

entity is consistent with the rationale of the dangerous condition

waiver of immunity provisions. 13 P.3d at 802. We perceive the

15 same consistency with the operation and maintenance waiver.

Section 422 is not limited to dangerous conditions, but

contemplates a landowner’s liability for injuries resulting from other

acts or omissions of its independent contractor. See Restatement

(Second) of Torts § 422 cmt. c.

¶ 47 Other widely recognized common law principles of liability

attribute the conduct of the independent contractor to the employer

based on the nature of the activity. Here, plaintiffs assert — and

the City does not dispute — that the maintenance project involved

inherently dangerous activity.

¶ 48 In this vein, we look to the common law principles based on

the nature of the activity. Section 427 of the Restatement provides

that an employer of an independent contractor is liable for injuries

created during work which involves a special danger to others.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 427. Relatedly, section 416

recognizes that an employer of an independent contractor is liable

for injuries created during work which creates a “peculiar risk of

physical harm to others unless special precautions are taken.” Id.

at § 416.

16 ¶ 49 Thus, expansively reading the operation and maintenance

waiver to attribute an independent contractor’s conduct to a public

entity is consistent with these common law principles. Springer, 13

P.3d at 802 (“Where the rationales underlying related legal

provisions are consistent, the application of the provisions should

likewise be consistent.”).

¶ 50 We therefore conclude that a public entity “maintains” a public

facility, for purposes of the immunity waiver in section 24-10-

106(1)(f), even if it hires an independent contractor to perform the

maintenance. Given this conclusion, and based on the district

court’s findings, plaintiffs met their burden to establish a waiver of

immunity as to their negligence claims against the City.

¶ 51 Consequently, we reverse the district court’s order dismissing

plaintiffs’ negligence claims against the City for Apeiron’s

maintenance work on the traffic light.

V. The City’s Maintenance of the Sewer Main

¶ 52 Plaintiffs next assert that the district court erred when it

dismissed their negligence claim against the City as to its operation

17 and maintenance of its sewer main.5 Plaintiffs argue that the

explosion and consequent injuries resulted from the City’s failure to

keep the sewer main in the same general state of repair as when it

was initially constructed. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of

this claim.

A. The “Operation and Maintenance” Waiver

¶ 53 Section 24-10-106(1)(f) waives governmental immunity in

actions for injuries resulting from the operation and maintenance of

a public sanitation facility. § 24-10-106(1)(f); Powell, 48 P.3d at

563.6

¶ 54 Immunity is waived if an injury results from a public entity’s

failure to keep the public facility “in the same general state of being,

repair, or efficiency as initially constructed.” § 24-10-103(2.5)

5 The court did not address plaintiffs’ argument that the operation and maintenance waiver applied to the City’s alleged failure to keep the sewer line in the same state of repair or efficiency. And the court did not rule on plaintiffs’ C.R.C.P. 59 motion, which requested the court to address this issue. Therefore, by operation of law, the court rejected this argument. See C.R.C.P. 59(j) (any post-trial motion that has not been decided within the allowable time period shall be deemed denied). 6 A public “sanitation facility” includes the City’s sewer main. § 24-

10-103(5.5), C.R.S. 2017 (including structures and related apparatus used in the collection or disposition of sewage of a liquid nature in the definition of public sanitation facility).

18 (defining maintenance). This determination focuses on what “the

city did or did not do that is connected with the purpose of the

[facility].” Powell, 48 P.3d at 565.

B. Discussion

¶ 55 Plaintiffs argue that at the time of the explosion, the sewer

main was not in the same general state of repair as when it was

installed. Over time, plant roots had grown into the sewer main,

creating gaps at the joints, which allowed the gas to enter the pipe.

Thus, they assert, the City’s failure to keep the line free of these

invasive roots was a failure to maintain which waived liability under

the CGIA.

¶ 56 The district court found that the sewer main was a vitrified

clay pipe, and that “vitrified clay pipe is porous and not intended to

keep gases or vegetation in or out of the sewer main.”

¶ 57 It found that at the time of the explosion

the sewer main was intact and in good condition. . . . [T]he City had maintained the sewer main, cleaning it approximately every 2.5 years. The main in that area was last cleaned in February 2012, approximately 13 months before this incident. At that time, the main was intact and in good condition.

¶ 58 The court also found that

19 [t]he sewer main was installed in the 1940s, and was made of vitrified clay pipe pursuant to the original design for the sewer main. . . . On March 19, 2013 [the day of the explosion], the sewer main was functioning at or near the same efficiency in 2013 as it had [been] when it was installed.

¶ 59 Testimony at the hearing supported these findings. Steven

Guillory, the utility engineer for the City, acknowledged there was

“some vegetation at some of the joints in the pipe” but agreed the

pipe was in the same general state of repair or efficiency as when it

was initially constructed:

[City Attorney]: In your role as utility engineer can you say whether in March of 2013 the sewer main . . . was in the same general state of repair or efficiency as initially constructed?

[Guillory]: Yes, I would say it was.

¶ 60 Similarly, Larry Brown, the maintenance and collections

supervisor for the City’s wastewater system, testified that he looked

at the video of the sewer main and did not remember “much in the

way” of vegetation in the line. He testified that the line was in good

condition, without any breaks, and that it was “[v]ery clean for a

sewer line.” When the City’s attorney asked him if the sewer main

was in the same general state of repair or efficiency as when it was

20 initially constructed, he testified that it was “fairly close. It looked

pretty good.”

¶ 61 True, there was conflicting testimony from Zachary Jason,

who testified that the sewer was “severely damaged and broken in

several areas [because r]oots were penetrating the clay pipe.” But

the court resolved the evidentiary dispute, finding that the “sewer

main was intact and in good condition” and “was functioning at or

near the same efficiency in 2013 as it had when it was installed.”

¶ 62 Based on this record, we agree with the district court that

plaintiffs did not meet their burden to prove a waiver under section

24-10-106(1)(f).

¶ 63 Plaintiffs nonetheless ask this court to remand for further

findings because the district court only found that the sewer was in

the same general state of efficiency, not the same general state of

repair. We decline to do so.

¶ 64 Although the district court’s order did not expressly use the

words “state of repair,” the court found that the City actively

maintained the sewer line; it was intact, in good condition, and it

functioned as it did when it was installed. See Powell, 48 P.3d at

21 562 (A waiver results from act or omission “connected with the

purpose of the facility.”).

VI. Attorney Fees

¶ 65 The City requests an award of attorney fees pursuant to

section 13-17-201, C.R.S. 2017, which mandates an attorney fee

award when an action is dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction under the CGIA. Crandall v. City of Denver, 238 P.3d

659, 663 (Colo. 2010) (The mandatory language of section

13-17-201 applies to all tort actions, including “CGIA actions

dismissed pursuant to a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion.”). But because

we reverse that part of the judgment dismissing the traffic light

claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, an award of attorney

fees is not appropriate.

VII. Conclusion

¶ 66 We reverse that part of the judgment dismissing the negligence

claims against the City for Apeiron’s maintenance work on the

traffic light, and the case is remanded to the district court. We

affirm that part of the judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ negligence

claim against the City as to its operation and maintenance of the

sewer main.

22 JUDGE TAUBMAN and JUDGE ROMÁN concur.