Lopez Collazo v. Ruiz-Feliciano

• Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
• Decided: June 30, 2026
• Docket: 24-1745
• Status: Published

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 24-1745

ODETTE LÓPEZ COLLAZO,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

MARITZA FONT ORTIZ; VERANIA CRESPO CRUZ,

Plaintiffs,

v.

WILFREDO RUIZ-FELICIANO; LUIS A. VÉLEZ; NANCY LABOY; MUNICIPALITY OF MARICAO,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Daniel R. Domínguez, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Barron, Chief Judge, Thompson and Gelpí, Circuit Judges.

Israel Roldán-González for appellant. Jorge Martínez-Luciano, with whom Emil J. Rodríguez-Escudero and M.L. & R.E. Law Firm were on brief, for appellees.

June 30, 2026 GELPÍ, Circuit Judge. In 2020, the Popular Democratic

Party ("PDP") candidate defeated the New Progressive Party ("NPP")

incumbent in the Maricao, Puerto Rico, mayoral election. Following

the change in administration, the new PDP mayor, Wilfredo

Ruiz-Feliciano ("Ruiz-Feliciano"), did not reappoint NPP member

Odette López Collazo ("López Collazo") to the position of Internal

Auditor -- a position she had held under the NPP mayor since 1994.

As relevant here, López Collazo filed suit against Ruiz-Feliciano,

claiming that his decision was based solely on her affiliation

with the NPP and constituted political discrimination in violation

of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court

rejected her arguments and granted summary judgment for

Ruiz-Feliciano, concluding that First Amendment protections

against political discrimination did not apply to a decision not

to hire. And that because the Internal Auditor position was

classified as a trust position under Puerto Rico law, the new mayor

could hire and fire at will. We now vacate and remand.

I. Background

In reviewing the district court's decision to grant

summary judgment, we recite the facts in the light most favorable

to López Collazo and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor.

See Cruz-Cedeño v. Vega-Moral, 150 F.4th 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2025).

- 2 - A.

López Collazo has always been affiliated with the NPP,

though the extent of her political activity has been limited to

voting in primary elections, general elections, and plebiscites.

She began working for the Municipality of Maricao (the

"Municipality") in 1993, which is when former NPP Mayor Gilberto

Pérez-Valentín ("Pérez-Valentín") took office. The following

year, Pérez-Valentín appointed her to the position of Internal

Auditor -- at that time, a trust position1 under Puerto Rico law.2

López Collazo was reappointed to that position every election year

and held it until 2020. That year, PDP candidate Ruiz-Feliciano

won the mayoral election, and López Collazo's appointment expired.

Ruiz-Feliciano took office in January 2021.

With the Internal Auditor position vacant, and

Ruiz-Feliciano holding the sole authority to fill it, López Collazo

offered her services to the new mayor. He declined. As López

Collazo recounted in her deposition:

I spoke with the mayor. I told him that I was available, because by that date he didn't have an [I]nternal [A]uditor. He indicated to me that he needed somebody worth of his trust that belonged to the governing party at that

1A "trust" position is an appointed role based on political or personal confidence, as distinguished from career positions filled through merit-based civil-service processes. 2As of October 14, 2022, Puerto Rico Act No. 92-2022 proscribes the position of Internal Auditor from being a trust position. Puerto Rico Laws Ann. Tit. 21, § 7154.

- 3 - point, which was the [PDP]. I mentioned to him I needed my liquidation of sick leave and vacation. A month had gone by already and still those liquidations had not been performed for me.

B.

López Collazo sued Ruiz-Feliciano, Finance Director Luis

Vélez, and Accounting Clerk Nancy Laboy, in their official and

personal capacities, as well as the Municipality (collectively,

"Defendants") under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She claimed that

Ruiz-Feliciano discriminated against her by declining to renew her

appointment as Internal Auditor solely because of her NPP

affiliation, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

She further claimed that Vélez and Laboy did not pay out her

vacation and sick leave balances "to discriminate and harass her

because [of] her political affiliation." Two other plaintiffs

affiliated with the NPP -- Maritza Font Ortiz and Verania Crespo

Cruz -- joined the suit, asserting their own political

discrimination claims based on alleged reductions in workload and

harassment. Their claims are not before us now.

Following discovery, Defendants moved for summary

judgment on all of López Collazo's claims. López Collazo conceded

to summary judgment for her claims against Laboy but otherwise

opposed the motion. The court granted the Defendants' motion as

to Laboy and Ruiz-Feliciano but left López Collazo's claims against

Vélez and the Municipality unaddressed.

- 4 - López Collazo moved for reconsideration of the grant of

summary judgment for Ruiz-Feliciano, but the district court denied

her motion. She then sought entry of a partial final judgment

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) so that she could

appeal the summary judgment rulings while the remaining

plaintiffs' claims were litigated in district court. The court

granted her request and she timely appealed.

After docketing the appeal, we retained jurisdiction but

remanded and directed the district court to provide a statement of

reasons for the Rule 54(b) certification. See, e.g., Quinn v.

City of Bos., 325 F.3d 18, 26 (1st Cir. 2003) ("[I]f a district

court wishes to enter a partial final judgment on the ground that

there is no just reason for delay, it should not only make that

explicit determination but should also make specific findings and

set forth its reasoning."). The district court then explained

that López Collazo's claims against Laboy and Ruiz-Feliciano were

fully resolved and were factually and legally distinct from those

of the remaining plaintiffs. But it did not address how her

resolved claims against Laboy and Ruiz-Feliciano sufficiently

differed from her pending claims against the remaining

defendants -- Vélez and the Municipality. Cf. Credit Francais

Int'l, S.A. v. Bio-Vita, Ltd., 78 F.3d 698, 706 (1st Cir. 1996)

(noting that, in the Rule 54(b) context, district courts must

carefully consider the interrelationship between dismissed and

- 5 - pending claims to prevent piecemeal appeals with common issues of

law or fact).

Hence, we entered a second order directing the parties

to address whether the district court had sufficiently complied

with Rule 54(b). At argument, López Collazo represented that she

would move to dismiss her pending claims to cure any finality

issues. She did so, and the district court granted her motion to

dismiss with prejudice. The sole issue before us now is López

Collazo's claim that Ruiz-Feliciano violated her First and

Fourteenth Amendment rights by refusing to hire her on account of

her political affiliation.

II. Discussion

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment

de novo. U.S. Fire Ins. v. Peterson's Oil Serv., Inc., 155 F.4th

22, 28 (1st Cir. 2025). We will affirm only "if there are no

genuine disputes of material fact and the district court's

conclusions are correct as a matter of law." Id. (citing

Lionbridge Techs., LLC v. Valley Forge Ins., 53 F.4th 711, 718

(1st Cir. 2022)).

A.

First, we lay out the legal principles at play in this

appeal. "The First Amendment protects public employees from

adverse action due to their political affiliation, unless

political affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the

- 6 - position." Méndez-Aponte v. Bonilla, 645 F.3d 60, 64 (1st Cir.

2011). When a government employer violates that First Amendment

right, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides the vehicle through which an

aggrieved individual may seek redress. Rodríguez-Reyes v.

Molina-Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2013). To prevail on

a § 1983 claim for political discrimination, a plaintiff must show

that (1) "the plaintiff and defendant have opposing political

affiliations," (2) "the defendant is aware of the plaintiff's

affiliation," (3) "an adverse employment action occurred," and

(4) "political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor

for the adverse employment action." Méndez-Aponte, 645 F.3d at

64-65 (quoting Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 13

(1st Cir. 2011)).

After a plaintiff establishes a political discrimination

claim, the burden shifts to the defendant to "establish either a

nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action or that

plaintiff held a '[trust] position,' for which party affiliation

constitutes 'an appropriate requirement for the effective

performance of the public office involved.'" Ruiz-Casillas v.

Camacho-Morales, 415 F.3d 127, 131 (1st Cir. 2005) (first citing

Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,

287 (1977); and then quoting Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518

(1980)). Only the latter defense is at issue here.

- 7 - With these principles in mind, we turn to the dispute in

this case. The district court granted summary judgment for

Ruiz-Feliciano primarily on the ground that López Collazo failed

to establish the third element of a political discrimination

claim -- that Ruiz-Feliciano's refusal to hire her constituted an

"adverse employment action." In its reasoning, the court further

suggested that Ruiz‑Feliciano was entitled to consider political

affiliation in his decision because the Internal Auditor position

was a trust position under Puerto Rico law and, therefore, the

position is of free selection and removal. We review each ground

in turn, ultimately reaching a conclusion contrary to that of the

district court.

1.

In deciding that López Collazo failed to establish the

third element of a political discrimination claim, the district

court reasoned that a failure to hire could not constitute an

adverse employment action under the First Amendment.3 Our

precedent, however, dictates otherwise.

Under the First Amendment, an "'[a]dverse employment

action' includes . . . a government entity's refusal to . . . hire

3 The district court relied on Title VII doctrine to reach its conclusion. But the First Amendment's adverse-action standard is broader than that under Title VII, see, e.g., Barton v. Clancy, 632 F.3d 9, 29 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing Rivera–Jiménez v. Pierluisi, 362 F.3d 87, 94 (1st Cir. 2004)), and is the appropriate framework here.

- 8 - an employee." Morales-Tañon v. P.R. Elec. Power Auth., 524 F.3d

15, 19 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill.,

497 U.S. 62, 79 (1990)). The First Amendment's political

discrimination bar also protects "those who fail to receive a new

appointment" to a position they previously held. Cheveras Pacheco

v. Rivera Gonzalez, 809 F.2d 125, 128 (1st Cir. 1987) ("[The First

Amendment] do[es] not distinguish between employees

discharged . . . and those who fail to receive a new

appointment."); see also Peterson v. Dean, 777 F.3d 334, 341 n.2

(6th Cir. 2015) (citing Rutan, 497 U.S. at 72) ("This principle

extends . . . to the failure to reappoint an employee upon the

expiration of a term of office . . . ."). After all, any other

result would seriously undermine the constitutional protections

against political discrimination in public employment "because

local governments could pass laws providing that the jobs of

nonpolicymaking employees extend only from election to election,

and that the new officeholder is entitled to make all new

appointments." Id.

Here, López Collazo introduced evidence that she had

previously served as Internal Auditor, that her appointment

expired, and that she affirmatively offered her services to the

new mayor -- who denied her appointment because of her political

affiliation with the NPP. Whether characterized as a failure to

hire or a failure to reappoint, her claim falls within the scope

- 9 - of First Amendment protections.4 Thus, the district court's

conclusion that she had not established an adverse employment

action was legally flawed.

2.

We turn to the district court's suggestion that

Ruiz-Feliciano could permissibly consider political affiliation in

appointing the Internal Auditor. This conclusion relied solely on

Puerto Rico law's classification of the Internal Auditor as a

"trust" position. That too was error.

Whether an individual's political affiliation is an

appropriate requirement for a particular public office is not

resolved by merely looking to the position's legislative

classification. It is a legal question for the court,

Méndez-Aponte 645 F.3d at 65, resolved through a two-step inquiry,

Galloza v. Foy, 389 F.3d 26, 29-30 (1st Cir. 2004). First, the

court should ask "whether the governmental unit decides 'issues

where there is room for political disagreement on goals or their

implementation.'" Ruiz-Casillas, 415 F.3d at 132 (quoting Jiménez

Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide, 807 F.2d 236, 241-42 (1st Cir. 1986)

(en banc)). If it does, the analysis proceeds to the second step,

4Ruiz-Feliciano attacks a strawman when he argues that, while he was allowed to appoint López Collazo, "he was under no obligation to do so." López Collazo does not claim she was entitled to the position -- she claims that Ruiz‑Feliciano could not refuse to appoint her solely because of her political affiliation with the NPP.

- 10 - which "examine[s] the particular responsibilities of the position

to determine whether it resembles a policymaker, a privy to

confidential information, a communicator, or some other office

holder whose function is such that party affiliation is an equally

appropriate requirement." Jiménez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 242.

Because this inquiry is fact-specific, the court must "weigh all

relevant factors and make a common sense judgment in light of the

fundamental purpose to be served." Id.

Relevant factors typically include the plaintiff's

actual job description -- "the best, and sometimes [a]

dispositive, source for determining the position's inherent

functions." O'Connell v. Marrero-Recio, 724 F.3d 117, 127 (1st

Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Roldán-Plumey v.

Cerezo-Suárez, 115 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 1997)). Also pertinent

are "the extent to which the position involves supervision and

control over others" and "the influence of the position over

programs and policy initiatives." Galloza, 389 F.3d at 29.

Legislative classification of the position "may be entitled to

some weight," but is not dispositive. See id. The district court

did not undertake that analysis in this case and instead premised

the determination that López Collazo could be dismissed because of

political affiliation solely on the legislative classification of

the Internal Auditor position as a trust position. Under our

- 11 - precedent, this constitutes error. We thus turn to that analysis

now.

Step one is easily satisfied here -- a municipality's

functions obviously involve decisionmaking on issues where there

is room for political disagreement on goals or their

implementation. This case therefore turns on the second step,

which, as we noted, entails a fact-specific inquiry.

It is not the first time we have considered whether the

position of municipal Internal Auditor in Puerto Rico is one for

which political affiliation is an appropriate consideration. In

Cordero v. De Jesus-Mendez, 867 F.2d 1, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1989), we

examined the Internal Auditor position of another Puerto Rican

municipality. The duties there included inspecting financial

records, verifying compliance, reporting irregularities, auditing

past transactions, and submitting reports to the mayor on the

results of audits.5 Id. at 17. We held that these duties were

all "technical" functions that entailed no meaningful discretion

or policymaking judgment. Id.; see also Cruz-Baez v.

Negron-Irizarry, 360 F. Supp. 2d 326, 359 & n.17 (D.P.R. 2005)

(concluding that the Internal Auditor of the municipality of San

Germán with identical responsibilities "merely enforces procedural

The Internal Auditor's job description was not admitted into 5

evidence in Cordero, so we relied on the plaintiff's direct testimony about his responsibilities when deciding that case. 867 F.2d at 17.

- 12 - rules, ordinances, laws, and resolutions enacted by the

[Comptroller] of Puerto Rico, the Municipal Assembly, and/or

Legislature."). We reasoned that the auditor could not correct

errors, direct the functions of any administrative unit, or set

the municipality's fiscal priorities; those responsibilities

belonged to the Finance Director, whom we recognized as the

relevant political appointee. Id. at 17-18. Thus, we stated in

Cordero that, despite that position having an advisory function,

it was "a technocrat, as the title implies, and nothing more."

Cordero, 867 F.2d at 17-18. Ruiz-Feliciano does not identify any

features of the Internal Auditor position that López Collazo held

that are distinctive of the position at issue in Cordero. Thus,

we see no basis for affirming on a ground independent of the one

on which the district court relied.

III. Conclusion

For these reasons, the district court's order granting

summary judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

- 13 -