Longstreet, Sr. (Anthony) Vs. Dist. Ct. (State)

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

ANTHONY O. LONGSTREET, SR., No. 81621 Petitioner, vs. THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FILED CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE AUG 2 2020 DOUGLAS W. HERNDON, DISTRICT A. EIROMI JUDGE, CLERK EME COURT BY Respondents, TY CLERK

and THE STATE OF NEVADA; AND DARIN F. IMLAY, PUBLIC DEFENDER, Real Parties in Interest.

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS

This original pro se petition for a writ of mandamus challenges a district court order denying petitioner's request to represent himself and the district court's alleged refusal to file petitioner's motion to dismiss criminal charges. We have reviewed the documents submitted in this matter and, without deciding upon the merits of any claims raised herein, we decline to exercise our original jurisdiction in this matter. See NRS 34.160; NRAP 21(b)(1); Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004) ("Petitioner[ ] carr[ies] the burden of demonstrating that extraordinary relief is warranted."). A writ of mandamus will not issue when petitioner has a "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." Gurnin v. State, Dep't of Educ., 121 Nev. 371, 375, 113 P.3d 853, 856 (2005); NRS 34.170. Petitioner has not established that an

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

(4)1 1947A 0401. 20- 11'162- eventual appeal does not afford an adequate legal remedy. Pan, 120 Nev. at 224, 88 P.3d at 841 ([T]he right to appeal is generally an adequate legal remedy that precludes writ relief."). We therefore conclude that interlocutory review by extraordinary writ is not warranted in this case. Accordingly, we ORDER the petition DENIED.'

Piebit ,C.J. Pickering

0 41,40.4 /A6t,A.tet.ept„ , J. Hardesty Stiglich

cc: Hon. Douglas W. Herndon, District Judge Anthony O. Longstreet, Sr. Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Clark County Public Defender Eighth District Court Clerk

1To the extent petitioner has counsel below, he must proceed by and through his counsel.